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Alternative Dispute Resolution. Radiation Oncology
Associates v. Roger Williams Hospital, 899 A.2d 511 (R.I. 2006).
Plaintiff medical company provided oncology services to the
defendant hospital under a services agreement containing an
arbitration clause and an expiration date of December 31, 2004.
The parties were unable to agree on a renewal of the contract, and
plaintiff sought to submit the dispute to arbitration. The hospital
argued that the arbitration clause did not apply to the duration
dispute because the contract specified the date of expiration. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the parties did not intend
to submit duration disputes to arbitration because the terms of
the agreement included a specific date upon which the contract
would expire, and thus the issue was for a court to determine.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case arose from a contract dispute between Radiation
Oncology Associates, Inc. (ROA), and Roger Williams Hospital.
Radiation Oncology Associates (ROA) and Roger Williams
Hospital entered into an agreement on October 1, 2001 by which
ROA agreed to provide oncology services to the hospital in return
for set rates of compensation.1  The agreement includes the
following provision:
The term of the Agreement shall commence October 1,
2001 and shall terminate on December 31, 2004, and
notwithstanding in the Agreement to the contrary, shall
be subject to termination for the breach of the provisions
hereof. If either party shall decide not to renew this
Agreement at the expiration of the term hereof, it shall,
not later than September 30, 2004, so advise the other
party in writing. If an extension or substitute contract is
not signed by the parties prior to December 31, 2004, this
Agreement shall be null and void and of no further
1. Radiation Oncology Assoc., Inc. v. Roger Williams Hosp., 899 A.2d
511, 512 (R.I. 2006).
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effect.2
When neither party sent notice of non-renewal by September
30, 2004 as required by the agreement, they entered into
negotiations regarding a replacement agreement. 3 Although the
parties entered into several standstill agreements, the rights and
remedies under the services agreement were not disturbed.4 On
December 23, 2004, ROA filed suit in superior court requesting
that an arbitrator be appointed according to the Rhode Island
Arbitration Act.5 In its complaint, ROA alternatively requested a
declaratory judgment that the services agreement was
automatically renewed on December 31, 2004 when neither party
submitted notice of non-renewal by September 30, 2004.6 ROA
further sought from the court an order enjoining Roger Williams
Hospital from interfering with ROA's performance of services
under the agreement while the dispute was in arbitration or until
declaratory judgment was entered in the plaintiffs favor.7 The
hospital objected to ROA's petition for an arbitrator and filed a
motion to enjoin arbitration on January 26, 2005.8
ROA argued that automatic renewal of the services
agreement resulted on December 31, 2004 when neither party
submitted a notice of non-renewal by September 30, 2004.9 The
hospital based its primary argument on the plain language of the
services agreement. 10 The hospital claimed that because both
parties failed to reach a decision through their negotiations on
either an extension or a substitute contract by December 31, 2004,
the October 1, 2001 agreement, as well as the requirement to
arbitrate expired on its own terms.11 In response, ROA argued
that an arbitrator should be appointed due to the broad language
of the October 1, 2001 agreement's arbitration clause, which states
that "[s]hould any dispute arise under this Agreement . . . all
2. Id. at 512-13.
3. Id. at 513.
4. Id. atn.1.
5. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-3-4 (1956)).
6. Id. atn.2.






disputes shall be settled by arbitration."'12 The hospital argued
that the scope of the arbitration clause did not extend to the
duration of the contract because the parties had previously
bargained for an express termination provision that included a
fixed expiration date of December 31, 2004.13
The superior court justice heard arguments and the matter
was taken under advisement. 14 On February 2, 2005, the justice
issued a bench decision that rejected ROA's argument that the
broad language of the arbitration clause demanded arbitration
with respect to the parties' duration dispute. 15 The justice also
rejected the hospital's argument that the arbitration clause was
"null and void and of no further effect" after December 31, 2004.16
Relying in part on Virginia Carolina Tools, Inc. v. International
Tool Supply, Inc.,17 the superior court determined that the intent
to arbitrate a dispute over the duration of the contract could not
be inferred from the nonspecific arbitration clause coupled with
the expiration of the services agreement on a specific date.18
Thus, the motion justice left the matter of whether the October 1,
2001 agreement renewed automatically or expired on December
31, 2004 for a court to decide in due course. 19 On February 17,
2005 an order was entered, denying ROA's motion to appoint an
arbitrator and granting the defendant's motion to enjoin
arbitration.20 ROA appealed this decision to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
ROA alleged on appeal that the court erred by failing to apply
the principle of law that ROA perceived as imposing a





16. Id. at 513-14.
17. 984 F.2d 113, 118 (4th Cir. 1993).
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contract containing a broadly worded arbitration clause.2 2 ROA
further alleged that the court adopted the "circular" analysis the
motion judge criticized in her decision.23 The hospital maintained
that the motion justice correctly reserved the dispute over the
duration of the contract for judicial resolution because the services
agreement did not demonstrate an intent on behalf of the parties
to submit a dispute over the duration of the contract to
arbitration. 24 The hospital further contended that the arbitration
clause was ineffectual because the contract expired on December
31, 2004 rendering the arbitration clause inoperable. 25
The court relied on the fundamental rule that in disputes over
arbitration and adjudication, "arbitration is a matter of contract
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which [it] has not agreed so to submit.' '26 Citing Stanley-
Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Environmental Equipment Co., the
court asserted that in determining whether the parties agreed to
submit a dispute to arbitration depends upon the intention of the
parties when they entered into the contract. 27 The court stated
that the issue of whether a dispute is arbitrable is a question of
law that is reviewed de novo. 28
Intention of the Parties
The court held the parties did not intend to submit disputes
over the duration of the contract to arbitration because the terms
of the agreement included a certain date upon which the contract
would expire.29 Relying on the language of the contract itself,
which stated that if an extension or substitute contract had not
been signed before December 31, 2004, the agreement would be
"null and void and of no further .effect," the court concluded that





26. Id. (quoting Sch. Comm. of North Kingstown v. Crouch, 808 A.2d





the nonspecific language of the arbitration clause.30
While the court acknowledged that it has generally voiced a
preference in favor of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution,
the court did not view their holding in this case in conflict with
this preference. 31 The court pointed to federal circuit cases as a
basis for their holding that have similarly discounted a
presumption in favor of arbitration in cases where the courts have
been called upon to decide whether a contract dispute over
duration should be arbitrated when the contract contains a set
date of expiration. 32
Validity of the Arbitration Clause
The court did not address the alternative argument presented
by the hospital that the arbitration clause became unenforceable
upon the expiration of the contract because the court held that no
intent to submit this type of dispute can be inferred from the
language of the contract itself.33 The court stressed that their
approach was consistent with the United States Supreme court's
previous holding that "in deciding whether the parties have
agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is
not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims. '34
The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor
of the defendant and remanded the case back to the lower court
for decision on the merits of the parties dispute over the duration
of the contract. 35
COMMENTARY
There are two ways to approach the question of whether a
dispute over the duration of an agreement is for a court or
arbitrator. First, the issue could be thought to turn on whether
the agreement itself has expired. 36 Under this approach, if the
agreement itself has expired, the obligation to arbitrate any
30. Id. at 514-15.
31. Id. at 515.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
35. Id. at 516.
36. Id. at 515 (citing Virginia Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int'l Tool Supply,
Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 118 (4th Cir. 1993).
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dispute arising from the agreement has also expired because the
source of the obligation is the agreement's arbitration clause. 37
The United States Supreme Court has, however, rejected this
approach in AT & T Technologies v. Communications Workers of
America, holding that this approach compromises the decision on
the very matter in dispute in the course of deciding who shall
decide it.38
The second approach, and the technique employed by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in the case at hand, considers the
question as one of contract interpretation. This approach has
been held as the proper method, as it avoids determining the
question of the merits of the underlying dispute over the
agreement's duration.39 Considering the question as one simply of
contract interpretation gets to the heart of the matter, applying a
fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of contract and
a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which [it] has not agreed so to submit. '40
Relying on fundamental and well-established precepts of
contractual law, the court properly held that when interpreting a
contract that contains contradictory clauses, the specific clause
trumps the more general one. The opinion of the court also rested
on the well-settled principle that if an arbitration clause provides
that "all" disputes between the parties shall be arbitrated, but
also provides a specific date of expiration, any disputes over
whether a contract expired or was extended by the parties must be
decided by the courts, and not an arbitrator.
While the court correctly applied the law to the facts of this
case, the court could have further relied on the well-settled legal
principle that where two clauses of a contract conflict, "[t]he
clause contributing most essentially to the contract is entitled to
greater consideration. '41 In this case, the expiration date clause
was an essential term to the contract, and therefore contributed
more essentially to the contract itself than the arbitration clause
did. While this further analysis was unnecessary, it may have
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing AT&T Tech., 475 U.S. at 649).
39. Id. (citing Virginia Carolina Tools, 984 F.2d at 118).
40. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
41. 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 384 (2006).
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further supported the court's decision.
The court noted that while it has expressed a preference in
favor of arbitration as an especially effective method of dispute
resolution, it did not view its holding in this case to offend that
principle.4 2 The court's holding is in accord with federal court
decisions in similar cases where there was a challenge to the
duration of a contract containing a specific date of expiration.
4 3
Similar federal circuit court cases have held than an intent to
arbitrate a dispute over duration may not be inferred from an
agreement containing a nonspecific arbitration clause and a
specific expiration date.44
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the more specific
clause containing the expiration date took precedence over the
broad arbitration clause to arbitrate all disputes and thus the
issue was for the courts to resolve. The decision of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in this case correctly applied the facts of
this case to well-established principles of contract law. This
decision is also in line with case law from federal circuit court
decisions and the United States Supreme Court decisions.
Hadley Perry




Bankruptcy Law/Workers' Compensation Law. Department
of Labor and Training v. Michael A. Derderian, Case No. 1: 06-ap-
1004 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2006). On November 30, 2006, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Islandl
conducted a hearing2  in connection with two adversary
proceedings commenced by the Rhode Island Department of Labor
and Training3 against Michael A. Derderian and his brother
Jeffrey A. Derderian.4 Specifically at issue before the Bankruptcy
Court in each of the adversary proceedings involving the
Derderians 5 was whether penalties assessed by the Department
against, among others, the Derderians totaling $1,066,000.00,
would be deemed non-dischargeable as to each of the Derderians'
respective bankruptcy cases.6 The Bankruptcy Court, following
spirited argument, ultimately upheld the penalties as non-
dischargeable. 7
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On February 20, 2003, one of the most horrific events in the
history of Rhode Island occurred in West Warwick, Rhode Island.
During a rock concert in a night club owned and managed by
Derco, LLC,8 a fire spontaneously erupted from a pyrotechnic
1. Hereinafter, the "Bankruptcy Court."
2. Hereinafter, the "Hearing."
3. Hereinafter, the "Department."
4. Hereinafter, collectively referred to as the "Derderians." The
companion adversary proceeding, Department of Labor and Training v.
Jeffrey A. Derderian, Case No. 1:06-ap-1005 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2006) was
consolidated for purposes of the Hearing and the issues raised therein.
5. Hereinafter, sometimes collectively referred to as the "Adversary
Proceedings."
6. Hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Derderian Bankruptcy
Cases."
7. The Bankruptcy Court did not issue a formal opinion following the
Hearing; a transcript of the Hearing was filed with the Bankruptcy Court on
December 22, 2006. Hereinafter, all findings/rulings of the Bankruptcy Court
arising from the Hearing shall be referred to collectively as, the "Decision."
8. Hereinafter, "Derco." Derco is a Rhode Island limited liability
company with two managers - the Derderians.
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display during a portion of the band's performance. The flames
and smoke from the pyrotechnic display immediately consumed
the premises; a mad rush by the concert patrons to the club's
emergency exit was rebuffed by a security guard, resulting in a
mass stampede of frantic people to the front door. 9
The consequences of the pyrotechnics was staggering: all
tolled, one hundred people perished from the fire. 10 Over two
hundred suffered injuries. 11 The building, or what remained of it
when the embers were wetted, was ultimately razed. 12
Subsequent to the events of that fateful night, the
Department filed a complaint against Derco and the Derderian to
seek the assessment of penalties to their collective failure to
maintain workers' compensation insurance. 13 The case was heard
within the Department and the designated hearing officer
assigned to the case assessed a penalty against Derco in the
amount of $1,066,000.0014 but found that the Derderians could not
be found personally liable for the Penalty assessed against Derco.
On appeal by the Department, Derco and the Derderians, the
Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Court affirmed the
assessment of the Penalty against Derco but reversed the finding
against the Derderians and found each of them personally liable
for the Penalty. 15 The ruling was appealed to the Appellate
Division of the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Court; on
appeal, that decision was affirmed and the Order stood.
Derco and the Derderians then petitioned the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for review by writ of certiorari. The Rode Island
Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and issued a stay on
behalf of Derco as to the collection of the Penalty and remanded
the proceeding for a determination on the personal liability of the
9. This incident has been forever scarred in Rhode Island annals as, and
shall be referred to herein as the "Station Fire." Extensive reporting
concerning the Station Fire was and remains reported in The Providence
Journal and/or its website. See PROVIDENCE J., The Station Fire, available at




13. Section 28-36-15 of the Rhode Island General Laws, as amended, sets
forth the
penalty for any employer who knowingly fails to obtain such insurance.
14. Hereinafter, the "Penalty."
15. Hereinafter, the "Order."
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Derderians as to the Penalty assessed by the Department.
On remand, the series of rulings/findings presented in the
preceding paragraph unfurled again. However, during this period,
the Derderians filed their Voluntary Chapter 7 Petitions 16 with
the Bankruptcy Court on September 23, 2005, which filings
operated to stay the proceedings on remand in the Rhode Island
state courts. On the schedules in each of their Petitions, the
Derderians listed the Penalty as claims against their respective
bankruptcy estates, seeking to have the Penalty discharged
against each of them.
Subsequent to the filing of the Derderians' Bankruptcy Cases,
the Department filed the Adversary Proceedings against each of
the Derderians on January 3, 2006.17 The basis of the Adversary
Proceedings lie in the Department's assertion that the Order
should be deemed non-dischargeable against each of the
Derderians because the nature of the assessment of the Penalty
was consistent with United States Bankruptcy Code as to non-
dischargeable debts.' 8 In response to the Adversary Proceedings,
the Derderian each denied the allegations as set forth therein on
the issue in determining the dischargeability of the Penalty.
Thereafter, a discovery plan for each of the Adversary Proceedings
was entered by the Bankruptcy Court and on September 5, 2006,
the Department filed its Motions and Memoranda for Summary
Judgment in each of the Adversary Proceedings. 19 On October 20,
2006, each of the Derderians filed Objections to the Department's
MSJ and Cross-Motions and Memoranda for Summary
Judgment. 20 Following a continuance of the hearing on the
Department's MSJ and the Derderians MSJ, the Bankruptcy
Court conducted the Hearing.
16. Hereinafter, sometimes collectively referred to as, the "Petitions."
17. The Adversary Proceedings were not consolidated by either motions
to consolidate or an order of the Bankruptcy Court, save the comment in note
1, infra, relating to the Hearing.
18. Hereinafter, sometimes referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code." See 11
U.S.C. §527(A)(7).
19. Hereinafter, sometimes collectively referred to as the "Department's
MSJ."
20. Hereinafter, sometimes collectively referred to as the "Derderians'
MSJ."
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ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The Argument by the Department
The Department contended that the Penalty was a "fine"
properly assessed against each of the Derderians by a
governmental entity and pursuant to those pertinent provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code, such fine(s) would be non-dischargeable.
The Department relied upon those pertinent provisions of
Section 523(A)(7) of the Code in support of its argument. That
section provides: "(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit,
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax
penalty."
The Department asserted that the Penalty assessed by its
hearing officer pursuant to those pertinent provisions of Section
28-36-15 of the Rhode Island General Laws, as amended, directing
that a minimum penalty of $500.00 per day be assessed for every
day an employer is found to have been without workers'
compensation insurance was the proper calculation to assess the
Penalty against Derco.21 The Department's hearing officer found
that Derco did not maintain insurance covered the period from
March 22, 2000 through February 20, 2003; hence, the
computation of the Penalty in the amount of $1,066,000.00.22
Based upon the foregoing, it was clear from the Department's
tone, not only within its memoranda, but at oral argument that
the Department's method of determining the amount of the
Penalty contained in the Order was consistent with Rhode Island
law in assessing a Penalty against Derco for its egregious conduct;
the Department argued that the Penalty assessed by the
Department was purely penal in nature.2 3
At the Hearing and in response to an inquiry from the
Honorable Arthur N. Votolato, Jr., the Judge of the Bankruptcy
Court, counsel for the Department reiterated that the fine was a
penalty and was in fact an assessment to assure that the
provisions of the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Act would
21. The statute provides a maximum daily penalty of $1,000.00. See
Department's MSJ at 3; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-36-15 (2003).
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
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be met.24 Given Derco's complete failure to take any affirmative
action in reference to likely claims or to present evidence
regarding its response to employee injuries, the Department
believed the assessment of the largest possible penalty was
proper.25 Therefore, the Order reflected the agreement with the
Department's position through the lower court proceedings.
The Argument by the Derderians
The Derderians argued that the Penalty incorporated into the
Order was intended to be used by the Department for
compensation for actual pecuniary loss to the State of Rhode
Island. Specifically, the Derderians cited Section 28-37-1 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, as amended, as authority for
reimbursing the Department for actual pecuniary losses incurred
in it operations.26
That section states, in pertinent part:
(a) There is established in the department of labor and
training a special account to be known as the workers'
compensation administrative account, an account within
the general fund. This account, referred to as the
"workers compensation administrative account," shall
consist of payments made to it as provided in this
chapter, or penalties paid pursuant to this chapter, and of
all other moneys paid into and received by the fund, of
property and securities acquired by and through the use
of moneys belonging to the fund, and of interest earned
upon the moneys belonging to the fund. All moneys in
the fund shall be mingled and undivided. The fund shall
be administered by the director of labor and training or
his or her designee .... 27
The Derderians asserted that if the director of the
Department was able to turn over any of the fines collected by it
for the benefit of the victim(s) of an uninsured employer, the fine
could not constitute a Penalty under Section 523(a)(7) of the Code
24. Decision, at 6.
25. Id.
26. Derderians' MSJ, at 5.
27. See R.I. GEN. LAws §28-37-1 (2000).
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but would be categorized as compensation, thereby rendering the
fine dischargeable under the Code. 28 In addition, the Derderians
also argued that certain representations made by the
Department's counsel at a hearing of the Rhode Island Workers'
Compensation Court on the determination (and calculation) of the
Penalty where he stated that there was nothing to prevent the
director of the Department to use those funds collected from the
assessment of the Penalty for the benefit of the victims could not
then be used in Bankruptcy Court as conclusive that the Penalty
was non-dischargeable. 29
In response, the Department argued that the Penalty
assessed by the Department could not be deemed compensation
and would never be used as compensation for the benefit of any
victims in the employ of Derco. Historically, counsel to the
Department represented that the Department has never used
funds collected to directly compensate victims. 30  Upon
examination by the Bankruptcy Court, counsel for the
Department indicated that from the records of the Department,
none of the fines collected on behalf of the Department in 2005
were applied to the benefit of any uninsured employee. Upon
further inquiry by the Bankruptcy Court, counsel to the
Department represented that the Department had never used or
applied fines and penalties collected pursuant to Section 28-36-15
of the Rhode Island General Laws, as amended, for the benefit of
uninsured employees. 3 1
28. See Decision, at 21; see also 11 U.S.C. §523(A)(7).
29. Decision, at 11-12. A considerable colloquially between counsel and
the Bankruptcy Court on the Derderians' position that the Department was
judicially estopped from asserting that a possibly compensable fine could, in a
different forum, be deemed "non-compensable" for actual pecuniary loss. See
11 U.S.C. §523(A)(7).
30. Decision, at 6, 7. ("[Tlhe State of Rhode Island has, for better or
worse, no uninsured employee's fund and the State has never compensated
uninsured employees.").
31. Following that representation, counsel to the Department
represented to the Bankruptcy Court that if employees could be benefited,
the Department would suspend the fine. Id. at 8. Specifically counsel
indicated that what the Department had done on occasion, it will no doubt
continue to do, and that would be to suspend significant portions of any fine
assessed if that would assure - that employees be compensated through a
form of offer of compromise. Id. at 9. However, counsel to the Department
represented to the Bankruptcy Court that the negotiations between the
Department and the Derderians failed to reach such offer of compromise.
2007]
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HOLDING
Subsequent to spirited oral argument by counsel, the
Bankruptcy Court Ruled that the claim of the Department had all
the earmarks of a fine or a penalty under Section 523 (a) (7) of the
Code. 32 It further ruled that the Department, pursuant to the
General Laws of Rhode Island, could not provide compensation to
injured employees from the proceeds of the collection of fines
assessed by the Department. 33 In addition, the Bankruptcy Court
held there was no discretion vested in the director of the
Department to use fines paid from assessments by the
Department against any employer. 34
As to the issue of judicial estoppel, Judge Votolato held for the
Department and specifically found that the representations from
the counsel to the Department at the hearing at the lower court
could not bind the State. 35
The Bankruptcy Court granted the Department's MSJ and
held that the Penalty was non-dischargeable to each of the
Derderians; a judgment order to that effect was entered by the
Bankruptcy Court in each of the Adversary Proceedings on
January 3, 2007.36 There was no appeal and each of the
Adversary Proceedings were closed on January 24, 2007.
COMMENTARY
The magnitude of the horror surrounding the events on
February 20, 2003 are indelibly carved in Rhode Island's history
and of those able to comprehend such magnitude from that night.
The innocent victims of the Station Fire were deprived either of
their lives or have endured unimaginable and excruciating
physical and psychological injuries. Litigation on issues of
causation (and ultimate liability) of the conflagration of the flames
continues on behalf of the victims before the United States
Therefore, the Department continued to seek the imposition of the fines
which resulted in the Order. Id.
32. Id. at 25.
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 38; see also Mark J. Plumer, Note, Judicial Estoppel: The
Refurbishing of a Judicial Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 411 n.11
(1987).
36. Decision, at 38.
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District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Each of the
Derderians have been sentenced in proceedings in the Kent
County Superior Court litigation; Michael A. Derderian is
currently serving his prison sentence at the Adult Correctional
Institution.
Each of the Derderians will carry with them for the
remainder of their lives the stigma associated from their various
actions (and inactions) which resulted in the carnage of the
Station Fire. For the victims and their families, accountability on
the part of the Derderians is what has driven most over these past
four years. Some of them saw such accountability slipping away
by the filing of the Derderians' Bankruptcy Cases.
It is unique (in fact, eerie) that the Bankruptcy Court, of all
forums, would be the final arbiter of accountability holding that
Derco's failure to possess workers' compensation insurance for the
period of practically three years prior to the carnage could result
in the assessment of the Penalty. It is likely that the Derderians
will never be able to pay the Penalty; however, the victims from
the Station Fire may take solace in its reaffirmation by the
Bankruptcy Court.
William J. Delaney*
Adjunct Professor of Law, Roger William University School of Law.
A.B. University of Notre Dame, 1976; M.B.A. Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, 1979; J.D. Albany Law School of Union University, 1983; LL.M.
American Banking Law Studies, Morin Center for Banking and Financial
Law, Boston University School of Law, 1991. The author would like to
acknowledge his sincere appreciation to the entire Board and Members of the
Roger Williams University Law Review for the opportunity and honor to
participate in this Survey of Rhode Island Law, and Kevin N. Rolando, in
particular, on this very poignant case arising on that fateful February
evening in 2003.
2007] 479
Civil Procedure. Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co.,
LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838 (R.I. 2006). In this
case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
analyzed the relationship and tension between Rule 26(b)(3) and
Rule 26(b)(4) to determine the extent to which a party may obtain
discovery of written communications between an opposing party's
attorney and its testifying expert witnesses.' The court held that
"core" or "opinion" work product of an attorney, whether or not
shared with an expert witness, must always be protected, while
"factual" or "ordinary" work product is always fully discoverable. 2
The court quashed the Superior Court's order compelling all of an
attorney's correspondence with expert witnesses expected to
testify at trial, and remanded the case with instructions that the
court conduct an in camera review of the documents sought by the
defendant to determine whether entire documents or parts of the
documents are thus discoverable.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case arises from an engineering malpractice case, in
which the plaintiff, Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co.,
LLC ("Crowe"), alleged that the defendant, Novare Engineers, Inc.
("Novare"), negligently advised the plaintiff about a fire alarm
system.4 Novare served Crowe with subpoenas duces tecum
commanding that Crowe's three experts who were expected to
testify at trial bring "[a]ny and all records relating in any way to
[their] review, evaluation and formation of opinions in connection
with the . . . litigation" to their depositions.5 Crowe filed motions
for protective orders, alleging that the documents sought were
protected from discovery by the work-product privilege.6 The
1. Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers,
Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 839 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id. at 847.
3. Id. at 848.





Superior Court justice who heard the motion ruled that when an
expert witness is designated as a testifying expert, "any and all
documents which were exchanged, which in any way relate to the
opinion that [the expert has] given in the case or is prepared to
give in the case are discoverable," and "subject to scrutiny. ' 7 Thus,
the justice denied Crowe's motions for protective orders and Crowe
thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted
by the Supreme Court.8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On certiorari, Crowe argued that the Superior Court justice
should have taken measures to protect its counsel's work product
on the basis of the work-product privilege as embodied in Rule
26(b)(3) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 Novare
argued that any correspondence between an attorney and a
testifying expert that the expert considers or relies on is
discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4).l 0 The Supreme Court's task was
thus to determine "whether and to what extent under Rule 26,
subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), the work product doctrine applies to
documents and other materials reviewed by [testifying expert
witnesses]."11 After examining the scope of the work-product
privilege and approaches by federal courts in similar cases, the
Supreme Court determined that "core" or "opinion" work product,
regardless of whether it is- shared with an expert witness, is
always protected, whereas "factual" or "ordinary" work product is
fully discoverable. 12
Scope of the Work-Product Privilege
The court first looked at the landmark Hickman case to
determine the scope of the work-product privilege. 13 In Hickman,
the United States Supreme Court held that "most written
materials 'obtained or prepared... with an eye toward litigation'
7. Id. at 840.
8. Id. at 840.
9. Id. at 840, 842.
10. Id. at 840.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 841, 843, 848.
13. Id. at 841.
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are protected from discovery" because the "policy against invading
the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation was both well
recognized and essential to an orderly working of the adversarial
system."' 4 The Hickman Court stressed that "it would be a 'rare
situation' that would justify disclosure of attorney work product,
and that '[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can
justify unwarranted inquiries into o the files and mental
impressions of an attorney."'15 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
noted that it has applied the Hickman work-product doctrine and
further noted that the doctrine is embodied in Rhode Island's Rule
26(b)(3) which in pertinent part states that:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions
of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivisions (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's
representative . . . only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has need of the materials in the
preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. 16
The Rule further states that "[i]n ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation."' 7 The court
concluded that the Rule recognizes two types of work product that
warrant different level of protection: (1) "opinion" or "core" work
product, such as an attorney's mental impressions; and (2)
"factual" or "ordinary" work product which requires lesser
protection. 18
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).





Since Rule 26 is based on the 1970 version of the
corresponding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and the court has
previously stated that "where the federal rule and [the] state rule
are substantially similar, [it] will look to the federal courts for
guidance or interpretation of our own rule," the court looked to
approaches used by federal courts. 19 The court determined that
there are generally two approaches, with some variation, used by
federal courts in dealing with the tension between the language of
Rule 26(b)(3) and Rule 26(b)(4): (1) a discovery-oriented approach;
and a (2) protection-oriented approach.20
Federal courts that used a discovery-oriented approach
generally allow broad discovery of information reviewed by
testifying experts, emphasizing the liberal ideals of discovery.2 1
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado in
Boring concluded that the purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) is to help
parties prepare for cross-examination and impeachment and that
this purpose would be frustrated if discovery was limited. 22
Other courts apply a protection-oriented approach.23 The
court noted that the Third Circuit has held that "opinion" work
product was to "absolutely be protected" while "factual" work
product was mostly discoverable only upon a showing of
substantial need. 24 The Third Circuit concluded that the provision
of (b)(3), which makes it subject to (b)(4), only applies to the
portion of (b)(3) pertaining to factual work product, and that "the
marginal value in the revelation of cross-examination that the
expert's view may have originated with an attorney's opinion or
theory does not warrant overriding the strong policy against
disclosure of documents consisting of core attorney's work
product. '2 5 The District of Rhode Island had also followed this line
of reasoning, noting that an expert's opinion can always be tested
19. Id. at 840-41 (quoting Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 489 A.2d 336,
339 (R.I. 1985)).
20. Id. at 843.
21. Id. at 843-44.
22. Id. at 844 (quoting Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo.
1983)).
23. Id. at 845.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 845 (quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3rd
Cir. 1984)).
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by and judged against other experts in the same field. 26
In this case, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found the
above-mentioned protection-oriented reasoning persuasive. 27 The
court added that full disclosure of work product "might hamper
the trial preparation process because attorneys would be reluctant
to reveal their mental impressions, legal theories, trial tactics, and
strategies to testifying experts .. . [and that] it is the disclosure of
just such information that Rule 26(b)(3)'s dictation of the work
product privilege was intended to prevent. 2 8 The court noted that
the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 26 confirm that the first
paragraph of 26(b)(3) governs the "qualified immunity of trial
preparation materials and the absolute immunity of 'the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney."' 29 Accordingly, the court held that the "clear language"
of 26(b)(3) that commands courts that they 'shall protect' opinion
work product . . . appl[ies] to all discovery requests of materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation because of the admonition's
location in the general portion of Rule 26 applying to all
discovery. '30 However, the court held that since the first sentence
of Rule 26(b)(3) is made '[s]ubject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(4)[,]' factual work product exchanged between a testifying
expert and an attorney does not have to meet the substantial
need/undue hardship standard [that would govern in
circumstances in which (b)(4) does not apply], and is instead fully
discoverable in accordance with subdivision (b)(4).' '31
COMMENTARY
This case is significant because it is the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's first opportunity to establish the scope of the
work product doctrine with respect to discovery related to
testifying experts as set forth in Rule 26(b)(4). While the court
adopts a protection-oriented approach, it still preserves the ideals
of discovery by providing that all factual work product underlying
an expert's opinion is fully discoverable. 32 The Court thus strikes a
26. Id. at 846.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 847.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 847.
32. Id. at 848.
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balance between protecting an attorney's opinion work product, as
intended by the United States Supreme Court in Hickman and
codified in Rule 26(b)(3), and promoting discovery of factual work
product underlying an expert's testimony, as contemplated by
Rule 26(b)(4). 33 This means that an attorney's opinion is always
protected regardless of whether it has been disclosed to an expert,
and is thus never discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4).
CONCLUSION
The court held that "core" or "opinion" work product of an
attorney, whether or not shared with an expert witness, must
always be protected under the work product privilege, while
"factual" or "ordinary" work product is always fully discoverable.34
Accordingly, the court vacated the Superior Court's order
compelling all of the correspondence between Crowe's counsel and
the three testifying experts and remanded the case with
instructions that the court conduct an in camera review of the
documents sought by the defendant to determine whether entire
documents or parts of the documents are thus discoverable. 35
Kathleen J. Andresen
33. Id.
34. Id. at 847.
35. Id. at 848.
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Civil Procedure. East Providence School Committee v.
Smith, 896 A.2d 49 (R.I. 2006). Public school committee sued
parents of nonresident children who were wrongfully enrolled in
East Providence school. The school committee sought the
reasonable value of tuition costs incurred for educating the
defendants' children. As a matter of first impression, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the school committee lacked
standing to sue for money damages. Because the school
committee was merely a department of a municipality, the court
advised that the appropriate litigant, as the real party in interest
to such a civil action, was the town of East Providence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
It was the best of schemes, and it was the worst of schemes.
From 1997 to 1998, defendants Charles M. Smith III and Maria
Casimiro, both residents of the city of Providence, enrolled their
children in East Providence schools. 1 To achieve this end, the
defendants provided the school district with the address of their
East Providence rental property as the children's residence.2 The
children actually lived in Providence with their parents.3
The defendants' efforts were subsequently spoiled by a 1999
investigation by the East Providence school department, which
revealed that the children were not residents of East Providence
but rather residents of Providence. 4 Alleging dual residency, the
defendants appealed the investigation's findings to the
commissioner of education, as mandated by the administrative
procedures outlined in G.L.1956 § 16-64-6, 5 the pertinent
statutory provision governing disputes over residency.6
The commissioner rejected the defendants claim in a written
1. E. Providence Sch. Comm. v. Smith, 896 A.2d 49, 50 (R.I 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 50-51.
5. R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-64-6 (1956).
6. Smith, 896 A.2d at 51.
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decision dated February 2, 2000, finding that the children were in
fact, residents of Providence. 7 The commissioner further directed
that "[t]he children . . . be disenrolled from the East Providence
school system and enrolled in the public schools of Providence,
which they reside."'8 This decision was later affirmed by the
Superior Court. 9 Although the defendants sought review by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, their appeal was dismissed; the
court advising that the commissioner's decision would be reviewed
upon certiorari only. 10 Shortly thereafter, in 2001, the East
Providence school committee filed a fresh action in Superior Court
against the defendants, seeking to recover tuition expenses
incurred by the school district for educating the defendants' two
children, and moved for summary judgment on the matter.11 The
defendants retaliated by attacking the school committee's
standing to bring suit.12 The Superior Court rejected the
defendants' contention, and awarded summary judgment in favor
of the school committee. 13 Additionally, after considering
testimony from the East Providence school district's
superintendent relating to per capita public education
expenditures within the city of East Providence, the court entered
damages against the defendants in the amount of $40,538, basing
the award on "book account and unjust enrichment."'14
The defendants appealed the Superior Court's ruling on two
grounds. 15 First, the defendants challenged the Superior Court's
affirmation of the school committee's standing to sue for the
recovery of tuition expenses. 16 Second, the defendants alleged that
even if the school committee had standing, the Superior Court's
method in arriving at its damage award was in error because East
Providence's per capita expenditures may have greatly exceeded




10. Id. at 51 n.1.






17. Id. at 52.
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Despite losing the battles which consumed the initial
administrative proceeding and the latter Superior Court
adjudication, in the end the defendants won the war. Following
review of legal memoranda and hearing of oral argument, the
Supreme Court summarily decided the issues raised by the
defendants on appeal and reversed the order and judgment of the
Superior Court. 18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Because the Rhode Island Supreme Court ultimately held
that the school committee lacked standing to recover tuition
expenses against the defendants, the court avoided determining
whether the per capita expenditure calculation used by the
Superior Court was erroneous. 19  Rather, the court focused
entirely upon the defendants' primary argument relating to the
school committee's standing to bring suit. Applying a de novo
standard of review to the summary judgment order, the court
consulted the pertinent statutory authority concerning matters of
school residency and concluded that no right to recovery of tuition
expenses had been explicitly created by the General Assembly. 20
In response, the school committee insisted that "its authority
to sue [was] implied because of its status as a party in interest to
the administrative proceedings [outlined in § 16-64-6]";21 and
padded this position by relying on provisions encompassed within
the statute encompassing the general powers and duties of school
committees, which appointed the "entire care, control, and
management"22 of the district's schools with the school committee.
Although the defendants conceded that the school committee
was an appropriate party to the first administrative proceeding,
they maintained that the committee's capacity to initiate a civil
action for the recovery of tuition expenses was effectively disabled
by § 45-15-2, which requires "[e]very civil action brought by a town
shall be brought in the name of the town unless otherwise
specified by law. '23 Hence, because the school committee was no
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 54.
20. Id. at 51-52.
21. Id. at 52.
22. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-2-9(a) (1956).
23. Smith, 896 A.2d at 52 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-2 (1956)).
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more than a department of a municipality, the statutory mandate
expressed in § 45-15-2 denied such departments standing,
notwithstanding any law stating otherwise.24 Accordingly, the
proper party to initiate a lawsuit against the defendants was the
city of East Providence. 25
Agreeing with the defendants, the court swiftly rejected the
school committee's urging that it follow the analysis and holding
announced in Irish v. Collins.26 In that case, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the Middletown School Committee had
standing to petition for a writ of certiorari in response to a lawsuit
initiated by the school district's superintendent. 27  The
superintendent had previously successfully challenged his
termination to the State Board of Education.2 8 According to the
East Providence school committee, Irish acknowledged that the
right of school authorities to sue was implied from '"road powers"
expressed by G.L.138, ch, 178, § 22; the "precursor to G.L. 1956 §
16-2-9, which, like the current version of the statute, vested school
committees with 'the entire care, control, and management' of
schools. 29
The court distinguished the case at bar from Irish on several
grounds. 30 First, in the instant action, the East Providence school
committee sued for damages representing tuition reimbursement,
whereas in Irish the Middletown school committee merely sought
judicial review of the Board of Education's administrative
decision. 31 Next, unlike the Middletown school committee in Irish
who was forced to respond to the superintendent's lawsuit, the
present action before the court was initiated by the East
Providence school committee itself.32 Lastly, subsequent cases
decided after Irish "clarified the legal status of school committees




26. Id. (citing Irish v. Collins, 107 A.2d 455 (R.I. 1954)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Irish, 107 A.2d at 459).





490 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:486
On this last point, the court relied chiefly on Peters v. Jim
Walter Door Sales of Tampa, Inc., a 1987 case where the parents
of a student killed on the school's premises sued the school
committee directly for the student's death. 34 In Peters, the court
held that the city was the appropriate the defendant .'[b]ecause
the school committee is a department of the city.' ' 35 Although the
court recognized that the school committee in Peters was a
defendant in the litigation, it nonetheless found Peters instructive
to the extent that the opinion clearly expressed "that the
municipality, rather than the school committee, is the real party
in interest when money damages are at stake. ''36
Consequently, the court declined the school committee's
invitation to imply a right to file suit under G.L.1956 § 16-2-9,
commenting, "if the Legislature intended to vest local school
committees with the authority to sue for damages in cases such as
this, it would have done so."'37 Thus, in the absence of an express
legislative mandate explicitly creating a right to recovery of
tuition expenses, the court concluded that the East Providence
school committee simply did not have the requisite standing to sue
the defendants for money damages since the school committee was
merely a department of the larger East Providence municipality.38
Justice Robinson's Concurring Opinion
In his brief concurrence, Justice Robinson reiterated his
position in Johnston v. Santilli, observing: "elected school
committees have responsibilities and powers that differ radically
from those of the ordinary departments of municipal
government. '39 However, the Justice nevertheless agreed that the
East Providence school committee lacked standing to sue for
money damages in the instant action, reasoning that since the
money received in a civil suit would be forwarded by the school
committee to the municipal's treasurer, "the decision as to
whether or not to sue a particular person or entity should be
34. Id. (citing Peters v. Jim Walter Door Sales of Tampa, Inc., 525 A.2d
46 (R.I. 1987)).
35. Id. (quoting Peters, 525 A.2d at 47).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 54.
38. Id. at 53-54.
39. Id. at 54 (citing Johnston v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 133 (R.I. 2006)).
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vested in the municipal body to which the treasurer reports."4 0
COMMENTARY
Characterizing the events of this controversy "as a tale of two
cities,"'4 1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Smith
emphasizes the notable authority vested in Rhode Island's
municipalities to oversee the general financing of civil litigation.
Assuming that the costs of litigation will be financed by a
municipality's general fund, the court's holding is satisfactory to
the extent that it implies greater administrative oversight in
seeing how lawsuits involving municipal interests are funded. Yet,
on the same token, by announcing that the real party in interest -
at least when money damages are involved - is the municipality,
the court effectively grants cities and towns the significant
responsibility of making well-informed decisions relating to the
prospective merits (and drawbacks) of litigation. This
responsibility may be one that, in the interest of promoting
bureaucratic efficiency, a municipality would prefer to delegate to
an internal department. Certainly, municipal departments, by
virtue of their very nature, purpose, and expertise, would be in a
better position to evaluate the particular facts and circumstances
of a controversy arising within the scope of their administrative
functions so as to make qualified decisions concerning the wisdom
of litigation. Furthermore, the department's presumed familiarity
with the issues giving rise to the lawsuit would put it in the best
position to respond the various demands litigation imposes on the
parties involved (such as decisions to implead a third parties or
engage in settlement negotiations).
And while the court's opinion does not foreclose the
opportunity of departments to involve themselves in litigation
process, it does place greater pressure on Rhode Island's local
governments to make, so far as their respective constituencies are
concerned, politically sound decisions. Hence, in the future,
decisions involving lawsuits against parents suspected of engaging
in school residency infractions are bound to be shaped by the
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CONCLUSION
In this case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court denied the plaintiff school committee's claim to tuition
reimbursement from parents who surreptitiously enrolled their
nonresident children in the district's school on grounds that the
committee did not have standing to sue for monetary damages,
pursuant to the statutory mandate expressed in G.L. § 45-15-2.
Alexandria E. Baez
Civil Procedure. Lennon v. Dacomed Corp., 901 A.2d 582
(R.I. 2006). Using the term "et al" to refer to unnamed parties
fails to satisfy the notice requirement set in Rule 3(c) of the Rhode
Island Rules of Appellate Procedure. Furthermore, the Superior
Court properly grants a plaintiff the choice between accepting a
remittitur or a new trial on damages when a jury award "shocks
the conscience." Finally, res judicata and collateral estoppel
preclude a plaintiff from pursuing an action against a product
manufacturer in state court after first commencing suit against its
parent company in federal court. The court held a subsidiary in
privity with its parent company and the claims substantially
similar in both courts. Moreover, a stipulated voluntary dismissal
from federal court "with prejudice" constitutes a final judgment on
the merits.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1995, after suffering with impotence for years, Charles
Lennon decided to implant the Dacomed Dura-II brand semirigid
penile prosthesis. 1 Lennon received the implant at the Miriam
Hospital on February 23, 1996.2 Not long after, he began to feel
great pain from the prosthesis, which remained in the upright
position. 3 Lennon complained he could no longer leave his home
or interact with his family without great embarrassment. 4
Although an operation could have removed the prosthesis, Lennon
refused to undergo the procedure because his otherwise poor
health put him at great risk for complications during surgery.5
Therefore, Lennon will continually suffer from the Dura-II
prosthesis .6
Lennon brought a diversity suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island against Urohealth System's,
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the company who acquired Dacomed as a wholly owned subsidiary
in 1995. 7  He alleged negligence, breach of warranty, strict
liability, failure to warn, and res ipsa loquitor.8 When Lennon
commenced the suit, it was unknown whether Dacomed
manufactured Lennon's Dura-II before or after Urohealth
acquired the company. 9 For the next sixteen months, contentious
discovery ensued resulting in the District Court admonishing
Lennon's counsel for numerous process abuses. 10 Without a
plaintiffs expert at the close of discovery, Urohealth moved for
summary judgment on June 23, 1998.11 The District Court,
however, refused to grant the summary judgment and extended
pretrial deadlines. 12  Lennon complied with the extended
deadlines by obtaining an expert. 13  Nevertheless, Urohealth
resubmitted their motion for summary judgment and challenged
the expert's qualifications. 14
Soon thereafter in January of 1999, Lennon brought a
substantially similar suit in Rhode Island Superior Court. 15 The
suit named not only Urohealth, but also Dacomed and National
Union Fire Insurance (Urohealth and Dacomed's policyholder). 16
According to Lennon, discovery revealed it had been Dacomed and
not Urohealth that manufactured the Dura-II.17
Meanwhile, less than a month later and with the summary
judgment motion still pending, Lennon moved in Federal Court to
dismiss the case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 Urohealth opposed the motion,
arguing it would be legally prejudiced by having to re-litigate the
same case in state court. 19  Furthermore, Urohealth argued
granting summary judgment would have preclusive effect on the
7. Id. at 585.
8. Id.













state claim.20 The court disagreed and granted the plaintiffs
motion to dismiss without prejudice. 2 1 In its decision, the District
Court reasoned Urohealth and Dacomed were not in privity, so res
judicata and collateral estoppel would not apply.22
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed the District Court decision.2 3  In Doe v. Urhohealth
Systems, the Court held Dacomed and Urohealth in privity and as
a result, res judicata would be available in Rhode Island Superior
Court.24  The court also held the case ripe for a summary
judgment ruling and remanded the case to the District Court.2 5
However, the District Court declined to rule on the summary
judgment motion and chose to stay the proceedings until the state
case reached its conclusion. 26 The court reasoned the Superior
Court proceeding was more comprehensive and might render the
federal court case moot. 27 Moreover, it was in the interest of
judicial economy to stay the federal proceedings until the state
case reached its conclusion.2 8
For the second time, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit reversed the District Court's decision.29 The
First Circuit held that by staying the proceedings, the District
Court effectively reinstated the ruling it reversed in the previous
case - Lennon's motion to dismiss without prejudice. 30  In
response, the First Circuit explicitly held the District Court must
deny Lennon's motion to dismiss without prejudice and hear all
Urohealth motions.3 1 At this point, Lennon's counsel decided not
to move forward. 32 The parties stipulated to a voluntary dismissal
"with prejudice. ' 33





24. Doe v. Urohealth Systems, Inc., 216 F.3d 157, 161-63 (1st Cir. 2000).
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and National Union moved for summary judgment based on res
judicata and collateral estoppel. 34 The defendants argued that
because the federal court dismissal was "with prejudice," the
proceedings there constituted a judgment on the merits. 35
However, the Rhode Island Superior Court only granted
Urohealth's motion.36 The court held that although Dacomed and
Urohealth were in privity, the preclusive effect only applied to
Urohealth. 37 In its opinion, the court reasoned: (1) Dacomed was
not a party in the federal court; (2) the parties never adjudicated
the substantive issues in federal court; (3) Urohealth and
Dacomed were "separate and distinct" entities; and (4) Lennon
brought in Urohealth through vicarious liability in Superior
Court, while he charged Dacomed and National Union with
primary liability. 38  Considering all these factors, the court
rejected a summary judgment applying to all three defendants. 39
On March 22, 2004, a jury awarded Charles Lennon $750,000
for the damage inflicted by the Dura-II.40  Following trial,
Dacomed and National Union brought a renewed motion for a
judgment as a matter of law, a motion for a new trial, or in the
alternative, a remittitur. 41  The Superior Court rejected the
renewed motion for all the product liability counts, but entered
judgment as a matter of law on a claim for implied warranty.42
More importantly, the court held the jury award shocked the
conscience and modified the award to $400,000.43 If Lennon
rejected the remittitur, he could opt for a new trial on damages. 44
In particular, the court concluded the verdict "was a stealth
punitive damage award that was unrelated to the damage proven
by Mr. Lennon as a result of the malfunctioning penile
prosthesis. '45 The plaintiff responded by attempting to cut a deal














return for defendants dropping any appeals. 46  When the
defendants refused, the plaintiff rejected the remittitur.47 The
Superior Court soon ordered a new trial on damages. 48
Both parties appealed the Superior Court's decision. 49
Specifically, Lennon argued the court improperly granted a new
trial because the trial justice applied "an erroneous rule of law"
and "overlooked or misconceived evidence in granting the
remittitur.' 50 The defendants appealed the court's decision to
deny their motion for judgment as a matter of law and the motion
for a new trial.5 1 Additionally, the defendants argued res judicata
and collateral estoppel precluded this action, the trial justice
improperly permitted an expert witness to testify and provided
improper jury instructions, and finally, Lennon failed to state any
causes of action.52
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
First, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held defendant
National Union Fire Insurance ("National Union") failed to perfect
its appeal under Rule 3(c) of the Supreme Court Rules of
Procedure because in its notice of appeal, defense counsel referred
to the company as "et al" instead of specifically naming the
company. Second, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to
grant either a remittitur or a new trial on damages because the
jury award "shocked the conscience." Third, res judicata and
collateral estoppel precluded Lennon from pursuing an action
against Dacomed after first commencing suit against its parent
company, Urohealth, in federal court. The court estopped Lennon
because: (1) Dacomed, a wholly owned subsidiary of Urohealth,
was in privity with its parent company due to a sufficient
commonality of interest; (2) the claims in both courts were
substantially similar claims; and (3) the stipulated voluntary
dismissal from federal court "with prejudice" constituted a final
judgment on the merits.
46. Id. at 589.
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Rule 3(c) shall be strictly interpreted
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held Dacomed's insurer,
National Union, failed to perfect its appeal because the notice of
appeal did not specifically name the company. Lennon argued
that by referring to "Dacomed Corp., et al" in its notice of appeal,
defense counsel failed to preserve National Union's appellate
rights.53 Rule 3(c) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate
Procedure, adopted from the original Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, requires in relevant part: "The notice of appeal shall
specify the party or parties taking the appeal and shall designate
the judgment, order or decree or part thereof appealed from."54
Although the federal court liberalized its rule in 1994 to relieve
parties from strictly naming every party, the Rhode Island rule
remained substantially similar to the original - and stricter -
rule.55 Accordingly, the Supreme Court relied on federal cases
prior to the amendment for its own opinion.
In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Company, the United States
Supreme Court strictly applied the original Rule 3(c) to require
every party's name in the appeal notice.56 The court held that "et
al" failed to comply "with the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c),
even when liberally construed. 57 Here, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reasoned the failure to name National Union in the appeal
notice could be coupled with the fact that only one filing fee was
initially paid to the court (two defendants - Dacomed and
National Union, appealed to the Supreme Court).58 In fact, only
after Lennon's brief argued against National Union's appellate
participation, did defendants motion to pay a second filing fee.59
While the court initially reserved judgment on whether the
defendant's late filing fee effected its case, this opinion provided
an answer.
60
According to the Supreme Court, all rules of appellate
procedure have "technical aspects. '61  Rule 3(c)'s technical
53. Id.
54. Id., R.I. Sup. CT. R. 3(c).
55. Id. at 587.
56. Id. at 588; Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988).






requirement demands each notice of appeal specifically name all
parties to the appeal. 62 Although admittedly strict, the court
"ha[s] been similarly exigent in the past with respect to the clear
requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. '63 Additionally,
while "et al" might be appropriate in Superior Court, a different
standard applies in the Supreme Court.64 The court refused the
defendant's call for leniency and reaffirmed its commitment to the
Rule's strict application. 65 Rhode Island's rule, unlike its federal
counterpart, had never been amended to a more liberal standard.
Accordingly, National Union's appeal was not "appropriately
before this Court" and its appeal would not be heard.66
The Superior Court retains discretion when a jury award "'shocks
the conscience"
The Superior Court properly grants either a remittitur or a
new trial on damages when the jury award clearly appears to be
"excessive," resulting from "the jury's passion or prejudice. '6 7
Lennon argued the Superior Court erred in granting the
remittitur or new trial on damages because the trial justice either
overlooked or misconceived evidence of pain and suffering. 68
Alternatively, Lennon argued the court should affirm the
remittitur he originally declined. 69 The Supreme Court reasoned
trial justices retain the discretion to modify awards thought to be
excessive through the remittitur device.70 Remittiturs are only
available when "the jury award clearly appears to be excessive or
is found to be the result of the jury's passion and prejudice."'7 1
Here, the Supreme Court found no evidence the trial justice
overlooked or misconceived evidence and refused to set aside the





67. Id. at 590.
68. Id. at 589-90.
69. Id. at 590.
70. See id. ("a trial justice can 'conditionally correct and modify a jury
award that is found to be excessive' through the use of remitter ... remittitur
and additur are designed to avoid the costs and delays that arise from
relitigation of the same issues, while providing a just result for the litigants.")
71. Id.
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remittitur. 72 Instead, the court provided Lennon with a twenty-
day window to accept the remittitur or face a new trial on
damages. 73 It then remanded Lennon and National Union to
Superior Court subject to the twenty-day opportunity to accept the
remittitur.
Res Judicata and collateral estoppel can preclude plaintiffs from
jumping between federal and state court
In Rhode Island, res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude
plaintiffs from commencing actions in state court if three
requirements are fulfilled: (1) the parties in the current action are
the same or in privity with parties of a previous proceeding; (2) an
identity of issues exist in both proceedings; and (3) a valid final
judgment on the merits has been entered in the previous
proceeding. 74 Dacomed argued that it was in privity with its
parent company Urohealth, who was sued in federal court.
Therefore, res judicata and collateral estoppel should stop Lennon
from relitigating the same issues.75  Res judicata, or claim
preclusion, relates to "the effect of a final judgment between the
parties to an action and those in privity with those parties.. .claim
preclusion prohibits the relitigation of all the issues that were
tried or might have been tried in the original suit."76 Collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, "makes conclusive in a later action
on a different claim the determination of issues that were actually
litigated in a prior action. '77 With this background, the issue then
before the court was the preclusive effect in Rhode Island state
court of a voluntarily dismissal, with prejudice, from a federal
court sitting in diversity.78
According to the United States Supreme Court in Semtek Int'l
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., judgments from federal courts sitting in
diversity "are to be accorded the same preclusive effect that would
be applied by state courts in the state in which the federal
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 591.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 590 (citing E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund




diversity courts sits. '79 Given the federal court litigation occurred
in Rhode Island, the state's res judicata law controls. 80 Rule 41(a)
of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure deems voluntary
dismissals to be without prejudice unless the parties stipulate
otherwise. 8 1 Here, the parties agreed the federal court dismissal
was "with prejudice." As a result, preclusive effect would be
applied if Dacomed satisfied the res judicata requirements
highlighted above.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held Dacomed and its
parent company, Urohealth, were in privity because the
companies shared a commonality of interests in that Urohealth
wholly owned Dacomed, and the company manufactured,
marketed, and sold the Dura-Il as its own product.
82
Furthermore, National Union financed both company's defenses in
the litigation.8 3 These facts taken together sufficiently satisfied
the Court that a commonality of interests existed between
Dacomed and Urohealth. 84
The Court then determined Urohealth and Dacomed shared a
sufficient identity of issues for purposes of res judicata because
Lennon pled substantially similar claims in both courts that arose
from the same series of transactions.8 5 In fact, the only difference
in the state court complaint was that Lennon named more
parties. 86 Res judicata protects from "the re-litigation of 'all or
any part of the transaction, or series of connected transaction, out
of which the [first] action arose"'87 Here, the court concluded a
sufficient identity of issues existed because the product liability
claims were virtually the same - arising from the same
transaction and with the same amount of alleged damages.
Therefore, if a valid judgment on the merits existed in federal
court, res judicata would preclude Lennon from bringing a claim
against Dacomed.
79. Id. at 591 (citing Semtek Int'l Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 508 (2001)).
80. Id.
81. Id., R.I. SuP. CT. R. 41(a).
82. Id. at 591.
83. Id. at 592; see also Doe, 216 F.3d at 162.
84. Lennon, 901 A.2d at 592.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Waters v. Magee, 877 A.2d 658, 666 (R.I. 2005)).
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Finally, the voluntary dismissal constituted a judgment on
the merits because a dismissal, voluntary or not, "with prejudice,"
is always considered a judgment on the merits. 88 In DiPinto v.
Sperling, The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reaffirmed this per se rule in Rhode Island.8 9 Lennon argued for a
more expansive reading of Semtek, arguing the court should
review each case to determine if a judgment exists on the merits. 90
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, rejected a more
expansive reading of Semtek. 91 The court held "although the
[United States Supreme Court] observed that 'it is no longer true
that a judgment 'on the merits' is necessarily a judgment entitled
to claim-preclusive effect, its statement was limited to that
particular context and has no application here. '92 Accordingly, the
voluntary dismissal constituted a final judgment on the merits
because dismissals "with prejudice" are per se final judgments
subject to res judicata.93 The court saw no reason to "retreat from




The Rhode Island Supreme Court strictly applied Rule3(c) of
the Supreme Court Rules of Procedure. By doing so, defendant
National Union lost any opportunity to appeal the denial of their
motion for a judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new
trial.95  In its analysis, the court cites Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Company, a United States Supreme Court case tackling
whether "et al" sufficiently names all parties. 96 Although Torres is
88. Id.; see, e.g., Sch. Comm. of N. Providence v. N. Providence Fed'n. of
Teachers (AFL-CIO), 404 A.2d 493, 495 (R.I. 1979), ("dismissal with
prejudice.. .constitutes a full adjudication of the merits as if the order had
been entered subsequently to trial").
89. Id.; see DiPinto v. Sperling, 9 F.3d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1993).
90. Lennon, 901 A.2d at 592.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 592-93.
93. Id. at 593.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 588.
96. Id.
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no longer good law in the federal system, it remains so in Rhode
Island because unlike its federal counterpart, the state never
liberalized Rule 3(c). 97 Therefore, Rhode Island retains a stricter
rule than its counterpart in the federal system. 98 Unless the rule
changes, the Rhode Island Supreme Court will not accept "et al"
as an alternative to naming each party because the term fails to
provide notice to the opposing parties, and to the court, of each
party involved in the litigation.
Standard of Review for Damages
The court impliedly proffers a lower standard of scrutiny
when examining a trial justice's determination a remittitur or a
new trial on damages is necessary. The Supreme Court never
explicitly addresses the standard of review, but by its reasoning, it
is clear that only an abuse of discretion will vacate a trial justice's
decision to modify a jury award.99 In examining the record, the
court noted the trial justice found the verdict a "stealth punitive
damage award" and that no sufficient evidence existed to support
an award that "shocked the conscience." 100 The court refused to
set aside the remittitur because the trial justice "carefully
considered the evidence" and did not "overlook or misconceive"
evidence as the plaintiff charged. Therefore, in the absence of
clear error by the trial court, the Supreme Court will reaffirm the
trial justices's decision to grant a remittitur or a new trial on
damages.
Res Judicata & Collateral Estoppel
Additionally, the court never addressed collateral estoppel
because res judicata precluded any claim against Dacomed. It is
97. See id. at 589 ("Although Federal Rule 3(c) was amended as a result
of the Supreme Court's holding in Torres, Rhode Island Rule 3(c) has not
been amended.").
98. See id. at 589 (the amended Rule 3(c) liberalizes the naming
requirements: "specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each
one in the caption or body of the notice, but an attorney representing more
than one party may describe those parties with such terms as 'all plaintiffs,'
'the defendants,' the plaintiff A, B, et al'...").
99. See id. at 590 ("[A] trial justice can 'conditionally correct and modify a
jury award that is found to be excessive' through the use of remittitur.").
100. Id. at 589.
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unclear whether res judicata or collateral estoppel would have
affected the claim against National Union because the company
failed to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, the court reached the
conclusion res judicata barred the claim against Dacomed. While
the case serves as notice that counsel should always specifically
name each party in its notice of appeal, it also warns that
dismissals, voluntary or not, "with prejudice" are valid final
judgments subject to res judicata. 1° 1 The court refused to examine
the record to determine if the parties actually adjudicated on the
merits. 102 Therefore, the court's strict application of procedural
rules affected not only the defendants on Rule 3(c), but also the
plaintiffs voluntary stipulation to remove the case from federal
court.
Finally, although the defendants won their appeal affirming
the Superior Court's decision to grant a remittitur or a new trial
on damages, and the court bared the claim against Dacomed,
ultimately the holding proved a victory for the plaintiff. Both
Urohealth and Dacomed filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. 10 3 Although this left National Union as the only
remaining defendant, the insurance company was the only entity
that had the ability to fully compensate Lennon for his injuries.
Moreover, permitting National Union to appeal could have left
Lennon without anyone to sue because the court may have found
National Union in privity with Urohealth and Dacomed.
101. Id. at 591.
102. Id. at 590-91.
103. Id. at 585.
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CONCLUSION
First, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that using the
term "et al" for a remaining party fails to satisfy Rule 3(c)'s
requirement for specificity in naming parties. Second, the court
reaffirmed the trial court's discretion in modifying jury awards
thought to "shock the conscience." Finally, the court held all three
requirements of res judicata had been satisfied because Urohealth
and its subsidiary Dacomed shared substantially similar interests
in both cases, faced virtually the same claim, and the court always
considers a voluntary dismissal "with prejudice" to be a valid final
judgment subject to res judicata.
Ronald LaRocca
Constitutional Law. In re Matthew A. Brown, 903 A.2d 147
(R.I. 2006). Repeal of a statute giving Rhode Island's Governor the
authority to place nonbinding questions on the general election
ballot applied to two questions submitted by the Governor to the
Secretary of State three weeks prior to the effective date of repeal.
Additionally, the hearing justice erred in raising, without briefing
or argument by the parties, the constitutional aspects of the
Governor's inherent power to direct questions to the electors.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Over the past several decades Rhode Island's governors have
enjoyed the authority, pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
17-5-2, to order nonbinding referendum questions onto the general
election ballot. 1 On May 3, 2006, while 2006-H 6874 ("the Act")
was pending in the General Assembly to strip the governor of this
authority, Governor Donald L. Carcieri sent a letter to Secretary
of State Matthew A. Brown ordering him to place two questions on
the ballot for the November 2006 general election.2 The first
question asked whether voters should have the right to enact laws
and amend the Constitution through the process of direct voter
initiative. 3 The second question asked whether the Constitution
should be amended to place caps on state spending and local
property taxes.4
Three weeks after the Governor ordered the Secretary to place
these two questions on the ballot, both the House and Senate
1. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-5-2 (Supp. 2005) (Questions Ordered by
Governor) provided that "[t]he governor shall have the power to order the
secretary of state to submit any question or questions that he or she shall
deem necessary to the electors at any election." Id.
2. In re Matthew A. Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 148 (R.I. 2006).
3. Id. at 148 n.2 ("Should the voters have the right to vote to enact laws
and to amend the Constitution directly through a process called direct voter
initiative?")
4. Id. ("Should the Rhode Island Constitution be amended to limit the
growth of state spending to the rate of inflation plus 1.5% and to limit annual
increases in local property taxes to 4%?")
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passed the Act repealing § 17-5-2. 5 Governor Carcieri vetoed it,
but the General Assembly overrode his veto and on June 13, 2006,
the Act became effective: Rhode Island's governor could no longer
order nonbinding referendum questions onto the general election
ballot. 6 Faced with the situation of having received the Governor's
orders to place questions on the ballot before his authority to do so
was effectively repealed, the Secretary filed a petition for
declaratory judgment in the Superior Court seeking a
determination of whether or not he was required to execute the
order. 7 A Superior Court judge heard arguments and issued a
bench decision containing two principal findings. 8  First, the
repeal of § 17-5-2 applied to the Governor's most recent ballot
questions and the Secretary could not, therefore, lawfully place
those questions on the ballot. 9 Second, the Governor has an
inherent constitutional authority to put such questions on the
ballot regardless of the statute or its repeal. 10  Both parties
appealed from the judgment, and the appeal was expedited."I
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A. Statutory Authority
The parties submitted briefs on the law regarding the repeal
of a statute and the effect of such repeal on any pending case or
controversy. 12 The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
hearing justice's finding that the repeal of §17-5-2 applied to the
ballot questions transmitted by the Governor before the effective
date of repeal. 13 In analyzing the issue, the Supreme Court
determined that it would be "foolish and myopic literalism" to
focus narrowly on §17-5-2 without considering the broader
statutory scheme concerning ballot issues. 14  The Governor's
authority to put questions on the ballot, the court reasoned,
5. Id. at 148.







13. Id. at 151.
14. Id. at 150.
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cannot be considered in isolation, but only "in tandem" with the
statutory duties of the Secretary. 15 And the Secretary's duty to
place questions on the ballot is in turn limited by the General
Assembly's "authorizing the submission of the question.' 16
Therefore, the court concluded that while the Governor exercised
his authority "in its waning days" to submit questions to the
Secretary, when the time came for the Secretary to perform his
statutory duty of preparing the ballot, the Governor no longer had
the authority to compel the Secretary to comply with the order
and the Secretary did not have the authority to comply. 17
B. Inherent Constitutional Authority
Although neither party briefed nor argued the issue, the
hearing judge held that the Governor has inherent constitutional
authority to place nonbinding questions on the ballot regardless of
the statute or its repeal. 18 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
reversed this finding, indicating that the hearing judge should not
have raised the constitutional issue sua sponte: "[for] reason
known only to [the hearing judge] . . . he also entered a
declaration respecting what he considered to be the inherent
constitutional powers of the Governor - an issue that was not
before him."19  The court concluded that "the hearing justice
should not have reached a perceived constitutional ground that
was not raised or argued by the parties. Neither this Court nor
the Superior Court should decide constitutional issues unless it is
absolutely necessary to do so."' 20
COMMENTARY
The most obvious effect of this decision is that the two
nonbinding referendum questions proposed by the Governor did
not appear on the November 2006 ballot. As it turns out, the
15. Id.
16. R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-5-1.1(1) (Supp. 2005)
17. In re Brown, 903 A.2d at 151.
18. Id. at 149.
19. Id. at 151.
20. Id. (noting "the 'deeply rooted' commitment 'not to pass on questions
of questions of constitutionality' unless adjudication of the constitutional
issue is necessary") (citation omitted).
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question about limiting increases in taxes and spending was
partially moot at the time of the lawsuit because the General
Assembly had already passed a bill to tighten caps on property tax
increases by municipalities. 21 The elephant in the courtroom,
then, must have been the second question, which would have
asked Rhode Islanders how they feel about the idea of direct voter
initiative, a process which enables voters to enact laws and amend
the state constitution by placing proposals on the ballot after
gathering a certain number of signatures.
The battle to keep the direct voter initiative question off the
ballot raises its own question of why members of the General
Assembly were so opposed to its inclusion in the first place, given
its nonbinding nature. It appears that the state's long-standing
conflict over separation of powers is lurking behind this lawsuit.
Members of the General Assembly argued that Rhode Island is the
only state whose Governor had the power to order nonbinding
questions on the ballot, so the repeal of his authority puts this
state back in line with the rest of the country.2 2 The Governor
countered that nearly half the states currently allow some form of
voter initiative, so a ballot question seeking to determine how
Rhode Islanders feel about the issue is appropriate. 2 3
Perhaps the General Assembly was concerned that in the
waning days of his power to place questions on the ballot, the
Governor would open the door to a more direct form of democracy
in Rhode Island. Members of the General Assembly maintained
that when Rhode Islanders approved the state Constitution they
chose a republican form of government based on representative
democracy. 24  Suspicion of direct democracy is nothing new.
James Madison, who had little faith in direct democracy, believed
it meant the tyranny of the majority and the rule of passion over
reason. 25 The advantage of representative democracy, he argued,
21. Elizabeth Gudrais, Ballot Ruling Backs Carcieri, PROVIDENCE J., July
4, 2006, at Al.
22. Elizabeth Gudrais, Governor Vetoes Bill Revoking His Power to
Submit Referenda, PROVIDENCE J., May 31, 2006, at B3.
23. Id.
24. Elizabeth Gudrais, Court Hears Governor's Ballot-Question Case
Today, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 7, 2006, at Cl.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48-54 (James Madison) (J. R. Pole ed.,
2005).
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is that it provides a mechanism "to refine and enlarge the public
views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. '26 But
Madison was of two minds about representative democracy: he
also understood that the system could produce its own problems
when the representatives themselves become a faction and work
against the public good. 27 Not only are Madison's ideas still
relevant to politics in Rhode Island well over two hundred years
later, but they are likely to continue to be played out for years to
come.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Superior Court that the June 13, 2006 enactment of legislation
repealing the Governor's authority to order non-binding
referendum questions onto the general ballot applied to two
questions submitted by the Governor three weeks prior to the
effective repeal date. The court, however, reversed the Superior
Court's finding that the Governor has an inherent constitutional
authority to submit ballot questions irrespective of a statute to the
contrary.
Kenneth Rampino
26. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 52-54.
Constitutional Law. Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226
(R.I. 2006). In ruling on the constitutionality of a redistricting
plan with respect to the Compactness Clause of the Rhode Island
Constitution, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the
court's role in deciding such a case is to ensure the that the
redistricting is done with a rational basis. The clause is violated
only when the redistricting is done purely for political
considerations, when there has been no effort to make the districts
as compact and contiguous as possible. In the context of Rhode
Island, the concept of shore-to-shore contiguity may be used to
form the representative districts so long as there is rational basis
for doing so.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In November 1994, the people of Rhode Island voted to adopt
amendments to articles 7 and 8 of the state constitution. 1 The
amendments, which would take effect in January 2003, required
that roughly a quarter of the seats in the Rhode Island General
Assembly be eliminated.2  This "downsizing" of the General
Assembly consequently entailed the reapportionment of districts
for the Senate and House of Representatives. 3  In order to
formulate a plan to meet the constitutional mandate, the General
Assembly established a Special Commission on Reapportionment
(Commission), which was comprised of members from the House
and Senate, as well as members of the public.4 After conducting
public hearings, the Commission recommended a reapportionment
plan to the House and Senate. 5 On February 20, 2002, after minor
adjustments, the Rhode Island General Assembly adopted the
reapportionment plan as Rhode Island General Law section 22-1-
1. Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1230 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id. (The seats for members of Senate was reduced from fifty to
thirty-eight, and the seats for representatives was reduced from one-hundred
to seventy-five). Id. at n.2.
3. Id. at 1230.
4. Id.; see 2001 R.I. Pub. Laws 315 § 1(a).
5. Parella, 899 A.2d at 1230.
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2.6
The redistricting plan reduced the number of senatorial
districts in Rhode Island's "East Bay" from seven to five districts
and numbered the districts 9,10,11,12 and 13.7 The plan
reconfigured the districts based on contiguity, geographic features
(such as barrier beaches), the district's relationship with bodies of
water, past districting in the area and historic links to other
cities. 8 Some of the districts were structured in such a way that it
6. Id. at 1234.
7. Id. at 1231.
8. Id. at 1248-49. The trial judges findings of facts on the districts were
as follows:
District 9 consists of all of the Town of Barrington and a portion of
Bristol. Driving from Poppasquash to Rumstick Point requires
crossing through District 10 and over the bridge, which is a distance
of 8.8 miles and takes about 20 minutes. It contains the portions of
the East Bay region that are oriented towards the upper
Narragansett Bay; the areas of the Providence, Warren, and Bristol
railroad, the subsequent trolley service and Route 114 corridor; and
the estate areas of Nyatt Point and Rumstick Point in Barrington,
and Poppasquash Point in Bristol. According to the 2000 U.S.
Census, the population in District 9 is 64.1% Barrington and 35.9%
Bristol.
District 10 consists of all of Warren, the northeast portion of Bristol,
and a sliver of land about two blocks wide that connects Warren and
Bristol. In order to drive from one end of District 10 to the other, one
must drive through District 11 and cross two bridges that do not link
the district, the Mount Hope Bridge and the Sakonnet Bridge. It
contains the shared interest of the Kickemuit River and Mount Hope
Bay; and the manufacturing areas of Warren and Tiverton--the
portions of the East Bay that have strong historic links to Fall River.
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the population in District 10 is
14.9% Bristol, 42.9% Warren, and 42.2% Tiverton.
District 11 consists of the southern portion of Bristol and all of
Portsmouth, including the islands to the west of Aquidneck Island,
Prudence Island, Hog Island, Patience and Hope. Given the natural
makeup of the area, with the islands and the peninsulas, District 11
is as compact as possible. It is oriented to the East passage and
contains the region's ferry connections to Prudence Island; the
historic town center of Bristol (those portions of the Town have ties
to Portsmouth and Aquidneck Island); and the Town of Portsmouth
in its entirety. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the population in
District 11 is 34.7% Bristol and 65.3% Portsmouth.
District 12 includes all of Little Compton, the southern portion of
Tiverton up to Bulgamarsh Road. In order to drive across the
district, one must drive through District 10, cross a bridge not used
as a link and then drive through the northern part of Portsmouth,
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would be necessary to cross through other districts or over bridges
in order to travel to different points within a single district.9
On August 22, 2002, a collection of residents and registered
voters from Barrington, Warren, Bristol, Tiverton, and Little
Compton filed suit in Superior Court, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the redistricting violated article VIII section I of
the Rhode Island Constitution."' 0  Specifically, the plaintiffs
argued that the redistricting did not follow natural, historic,
geographic, or political lines11  and therefore violated the
Compactness Clause, which requires districts to be "as compact
and contiguous in territory as possible." 12
On May 5, 2003, the case went to trial before Rhode Island
Superior Court Judge McGuirl. 13 At trial, the plaintiffs relied
primarily upon witnesses who concluded that there were better
plans then the one selected for redistricting the "East Bay."' 4 The
witnesses testified that the districts were irrational and that the
districts would encumber the effective representation of the Rhode
Island electorate. 15 The defendants, on the other hand, relied
upon witnesses who determined that the General Assembly had a
rational basis for districting the communities as they did.16
The trial justice opined that in questions of statutory
constitutionality, the party bringing the challenge maintained the
which is in District 11. It is an hour and a half trip, round trip.
District 12 shares two sides of the Sakonnet River and the region's
significant barrier beaches; the water supply resources of the
Newport Water System; and two wineries, one in Little Compton and
one in Middletown. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the
population in District 12 is 12.7% Little Compton, 61.3%
Middletown, 11.5% Newport and 14.4% Tiverton.
District 13 contains the lower portion of the east passage in Newport
Harbor with the spillover of boating activity into Jamestown Harbor;
the City of Newport almost in its entirety; and the Town of
Jamestown, which has historic ties to Newport through ferry and
bridge connections and social services, especially including those
pertaining to health and housing. Id.
9. Id. at 1248-49.
10. Id. at 1234.
11. Id. at 1231.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1233.
14. Id. at 1235-38.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1238-39.
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burden of proof in invalidating the legislative act. 17 Further, the
lower court found that reapportionment plans violate the
Compactness Clause only when the new plan is drawn solely for
political reasons and makes no attempt to draw the districts as
compact and contiguous as possible.' 8 Based upon-the evidence
presented, the trial justice concluded that the plaintiffs had not
adequately demonstrated that the plan was drawn solely for
political reasons and therefore failed to meet their burden of
proof.19  Accordingly, the trial justice determined that the
redistricting did not violate the Rhode Island Constitution.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Three of the plaintiffs appealed the superior court's ruling to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that: (1) the trial justice
erred in assigning the plaintiffs the burden of proof in
establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the redistricting
lacked a rational basis, (2) the trial court erred by not giving
sufficient weight to "territorial restraints" in determining whether
the districts met the compactness requirements, and (3) the trial
court erred by overlooking evidence of gerrymandering. 21 The
central issue before the court was whether the redistricting plan
adopted by the General Assembly violated the Compactness
Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution.22 The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial justice's decision and noted that because the
supreme xourt could not improve upon the Superior Court's
opinion, it adopted as the lower court's opinion as its own.23
The lower court's analysis began by analyzing who
maintained the burden of proof in cases involving a challenge to a
statute's constitutionality. First, the court recognized precedent,
noting that "all laws regularly enacted by the legislature are
presumed to be constitutional and valid. '24 The court stated that
17. Id. at 1240.
18. Id. at 1231.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1231-32.
22. Id. at 1230.
23. Id. at 1232.
24. Id. at 1240. (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45
(R.I. 1995)).
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it would "make every reasonable intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislative act, and so far as any presumption
exists it is in favor of so holding. '25 With the presumption that a
statute is constitutional until proven otherwise, the court noted
that the plaintiffs carried a heavy burden in establishing not only
that the redistricting was repugnant to the Rhode Island
Constitution, but also that it was enacted without a rational
basis.26
The court next analyzed the constitutional and statutory
mandates that controlled redistricting law. Article VIII, section 1
of the Rhode Island Constitution promulgates: "[t]he senate shall
be constituted on the basis of population and the senatorial
districts shall be as nearly equal in population and as compact in
territory as possible. '27 The court noted that Rhode Island Public
Law 315, the law that created the planning commission, stated
that not only must districts be as compact as possible but also "to
the extent practicable, shall reflect natural, historical,
geographical and municipal and other political lines, as well as
the right of all Rhode Islanders to fair representation and equal
access to the political process ' 28 and to the extent possible should
be comprised of contiguous territory.29
The court next studied the applicable redistricting case law.
The court first examined the seminal opinion on the issue in
Rhode Island, Opinion to the Governor30 where the court similarly
examined the constitutionality of a redistricting plan. 31  In
Opinion to the Governor, the court noted that "[t]he framers of the
constitution, in requiring territorial compactness, clearly intended
to leave the legislature with a wide discretion as to the territorial
structuring of the electoral districts."32 The court further stated
that the discretion given to the General Assembly in drawing
compact districts was especially applicable to the Rhode Island
because "our state with its irregular boundaries, its bays and its
inlets, its islands, its rivers and lakes and its many other
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 978 (R.I. 1984)).
27. Id. (quoting R.I. CONST. art VIII, § 1).
28. Id. at 1240-41 (quoting 2001 R.I. Pub. Laws 315, § 2(d)).
29. Id. at 1241 (quoting 2001 R.I. Pub. Laws 315, § 2(e)).
30. 101 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1966).
31. Parella 899 A.2d at 1242.
32. Id. at 1242 (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 101 A.2d at 803).
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geographical features is obviously not susceptible to being divided
into circular planes or squares. 33 The court continued by noting
the mandate of compactness was established to provide the
citizenry with effective representation and to prevent
gerrymandering, but not to ensure "an orderly and symmetrical
geometric pattern of electoral districts.'' 34 Finally, Opinion to the
Governor established that when a redistricting challenge is
brought the defendants must show that the redistricting is
rational, done in good faith, and is "free from any taint of
arbitrariness or discrimination. 35
The court continued its precedential analysis by examining
Holmes v. Farmer, where the Rhode Island Supreme Court
examined whether placing Jamestown in the same district as
Newport, as opposed to North Kingstown, violated the
Compactness Clause. 36  Applying the precedent set forth in
Opinion to the Governor, the Supreme Court held that the
compactness clause was violated only "when a reapportionment
plan creates districts solely for political considerations, without
reference to other policies, in such a manner that the plan
demonstrates a complete abandonment of any attempt to draw
equal, compact and contiguous districts. '37  Examining the
legislature's decision to link Jamestown and Newport in a single
district, the court held that there were legitimate factors in the
decision, citing historic ties, and therefore, the clause was not
violated. 38
Finally, the lower court analyzed Licht v. Quattrochi39 and
Farnum v. Burns.40 In Licht, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found a violation to the Compactness Clause when the plaintiffs in
the case satisfied their burden of proof, showing that districts had
been crafted to achieve political purposes, improperly crossed
natural boundaries, and "were either not compact, not contiguous,
33. Id. at 1243 (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 101 A.2d at 802).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 101 A.2d at 803).
36. Id. (citing Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 978 (R.I. 1984)).
37. Id. at 1244 (quoting Holmes, 475 A.2d at 986) (internal citations
omitted).
38. Id.
39. 449 A.2d 887 (R.I. 1982).
40. 561 F. Supp. 83 (D.R.I 1983).
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or both."41 In Farnum, the federal district court for Rhode Island
ruled upon a redistricting that violated population requirements.42
The district judge noted that not only must there be a deviation
from "natural, historical, geographical and political lines," but
there also must be evidence of political gerrymandering. 43
In applying the standard in Holmes to Parella, the lower court
concluded that the plaintiffs had not successfully met their burden
of proof in showing that the redistricting lacked a rational basis
and lacked "any attempt to draw equal, compact and contiguous
districts. '44 The court then studied the element of compactness,
noting the goal of which was to provide effective representation.45
In a state like Rhode Island, with its irregular boundaries and
geographic features, districts could not rely purely on geometric
boundaries. 46 Next, the court addressed the contiguity element,
focusing specifically on the concept of shore-to-shore contiguity.47
The court analyzed Opinion to the Governor and noted that the
challenged districts there, which linked Tiverton to Warren,
lacked land-based contiguity. 48 The lower court then concluded
that land-based contiguity was not mandatory but merely one of
the factors considered in reapportionment. 49
The Superior Court next evaluated the communities affected
by the division and determined that, of the existing plans, either
Bristol or Portsmouth would have to be divided.50 The court then
found that the division of Bristol instead of Portsmouth was based
on rational principles. 51 The court further concluded that the
population deviations in the contested districts fell within the
acceptable range of less then 10%.52 Finally, the court dismissed
the plaintiffs' concerns about gerrymandering, noting that the
only evidence presented on the matter was completely
41. Parella, 899 A.2d at 1244-45.
42. Id. at 1245.
43. Id.
44. Id. 1251-52.
45. Id. at 1252.
46. Id.
47. Id. 1251-52.
48. Id. at 1254.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1255-56.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1256.
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unsubstantiated by any other testimony. 53
In her summary, superior court Judge McGuirl stated that
although redistricting necessarily required difficult decisions to be
made, it was not the place of the judiciary to second-guess the
legislature. 54 In finding that the Compactness Clause had not
been violated, she noted that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the
very high burden of proof in establishing that the redistricting
lacked a rational basis.55
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision enforces the fact
that the threat of gerrymandering is one that strikes at the very
heart of the American representative system. Allowing
representative districts to be redrawn for purely political reasons
disenfranchises the American electorate of having their voice
properly heard through their representative. The court rightfully
recognized that the concepts of compactness and contiguity were
there to protect the electorate from this very threat and ensure
proper representation.
The decision also strengthens, however, the existing
precedent that the burden in successfully challenging a
redistricting statute is a heavy one. Due to the fact that the
legislature is given such great deference in establishing
redistricting plans and may consider a multitude of factors
(historic, geometric, geographic, natural) to draw said boundaries,
nearly every redistricting is bound to incite parties who believe
that there was a more appropriate way to divide the districts.
Without requiring the plaintiff show that the redistricting lacked
a rational basis and demonstrated signs of gerrymandering, the
process of redistricting would be nearly impossible to accomplish
without a successful challenge.
It seems evident that the court also wanted to elaborate upon
the concept of shore-to-shore contiguity as it applied to Rhode
Island. The inevitable consequence of districting in Rhode Island
requires that any plan will have to address the state's relationship
to bays, rivers and islands. By adopting the concept of shore-to-
53. Id. at 1257.
54. Id. at 1257-58.
55. Id. at 1258.
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shore contiguity, the court has expressed its belief that districts
may be established without having direct or bridge established
contiguity so long as the districts are formed on a rational basis
and not fueled by gerrymandering motivations.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a party
challenging the validity of a redistricting statute, on the grounds
that it violates the Compactness Clause of the Rhode Island
Constitution, maintains the burden of proof in establishing that
the statute was not adopted on rational basis and is instead based
on political considerations. Here, the plaintiffs failed to establish
that a redistricting plan, which established districts lacking land-
based contiguity, but displayed no evidence of gerrymandering,




Constitutional Law. State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453 (R.I.
2006). Disorderly conduct charged under Rhode Island General
Laws section 11-45-1(a)(1) need not occur in a public place to
satisfy the enumerated elements of the crime, and this case of first
impression explicitly extends the reach of the statute to conduct
that occurs in a private residence. Here, the language of the
statute was held facially constitutional and withstood a vagueness
challenge as applied to the facts of the case. The court declined
formally to engage a substantive due process argument because
the defendant waived any such claim by failing to present it at
trial. In dicta, however, the court declared that the proposed
privacy interests of a defendant charged with disorderly conduct
within the home must yield to the state's codified policy interest in
protecting its citizens from domestic violence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 3, 2002, Linda Russell called the Warwick
police department to report a domestic disturbance at the home
she shared with her husband, defendant David Russell.' The
defendant had fled the scene by the time officers arrived, but Mrs.
Russell recounted a heated argument during which her husband
had threatened to destroy the house if it was not sold in
compliance with his demands. 2  During the altercation, the
defendant had upended the dinner table, leaving a visible stain on
the dining room wall, and he had hurled a chair and other debris
through a screened porch window and into the yard.3 However,
there was no suggestion that the defendant had either struck or
threatened to strike his wife. 4 A warrant was issued for the
defendant's arrest, and he surrendered on October 23, 2002. 5
1. State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 457 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. State v. Russell, No. K3-2002-0730A, 2003 WL 21297136, at *1 (R.I.
Super. May 28, 2003).
5. Russell, 890 A.2d at 457.
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The defendant was prosecuted before the Superior Court on
one criminal charge of disorderly conduct under Rhode Island
General Laws section 11-45-1,6 which provides in part:
A person commits disorderly conduct if he or she
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:
Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or
tumultuous behavior;
In a public place or near a private residence that he or
she has no right to occupy, disturbs another person by
making loud and unreasonable noise which under the
circumstances would disturb a person of average
sensibilities [.] 7
Moving to dismiss the complaint, the defendant argued that
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the statute should be read in
conjunction with each other, and the statute construed to require
that, to meet the definition of "disorderly conduct," offending
behavior must occur "in a public place or near a private residence
that [the perpetrator] has no right to occupy."8 In the alternative,
the defendant alleged that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to conduct that occurred in his home rather than
in a public place.9
The trial court rejected the defendant's first argument,
holding that because section 11-45-1(a) enumerates a total of
seven mutually exclusive categories of prohibited behavior, "an
absurd result" would transpire if conjunctive fulfillment of all
seven statutory conditions were required to support a disorderly
conduct charge.10
The trial court also rejected the defendant's assertion that
section 11-45-1(a)(1) was so facially "vague or indefinite as to
violate the federal and state guaranties of due process."1 To
defeat a facial vagueness challenge, the plain language of a
statute must provide notice that "reasonably inform[s] an
individual of the criminality of his or her conduct," and must also
6. Id. at 456.
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1 (2002).
8. See id.; Russell, 2003 WL 21297136 at *1.
9. Russell, 890 A.2d at 457.
10. Russell, 2003 WL 21297136, at *2.
11. Id. at *3.
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"guide law enforcement officers and the court to avoid the threat
of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and to avoid
inhibiting the exercise of basic freedoms."'12 The court found at
the threshold that the words "fighting," "threatening," "violent"
and "tumultuous," as used in section 11-45-1(a)(1), were
"sufficiently clear to provide a person with notice that such
conduct will subject him or her to criminal prosecution."1 3
However, the trial court accepted the defendant's alternative
contention that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as
applied to a disturbance occurring in a private residence. 14
Despite its conclusion that the statutory language was facially
constitutional in its provision of adequate notice, the trial court
nevertheless found that, as applied to "the context of private
behavior within one's own home, the warning [was] less than
adequate."' 5 Citing the risk of undue state intrusion into domestic
matters, 16 and holding that "private annoyances" that "occur at
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id. at *2-*3. The ruling of the trial court did not rest on the "arbitrary
enforcement" prong of the facial vagueness analysis. However, the judge
thought it "conceivable that some behavior will be charged as criminal [under
the statute] while similar conduct will be excused as the result of a bad day
at work or at school," and concluded generally that section 11-45-1(a)(1)
"fail[ed] to set forth sufficient standards to guide law enforcement officers
and the court to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." See id. at
*4.
14. Russell, 890 A.2d at 458. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
also noted the trial judge's erroneous invocation of an overbreadth analysis.
Id. at 458-59. At trial, the defendant had confined his constitutional
argument to an allegation of vagueness, and the appellate court doubted that
a "separate and distinct" overbreadth challenge had been properly preserved
for review. Id. at 459. Nevertheless, the appellate court briefly addressed the
doctrine of constitutional overbreadth, deeming it inapplicable to the
defendant's case. Id. In the absence of the kind of threat to First Amendment
freedoms that hallmarks an impermissibly overbroad statute, a law that
purports to restrict conduct, rather than speech, will not be invalidated under
the doctrine unless the law's overbreadth is not only apparent, but also
substantial in relation to the universe of conduct that is properly subject to
state regulation. Id.
15. Russell, 2003 WL 21297136, at *4.
16. On appeal, the amici adopted this argument, contending that the
facts of the case implicated a married couple's fundamental interest in
freedom from "unwarranted state interference, through the harsh vehicle of
the criminal laws, in matters relating to very private aspects of their
interpersonal relationships." Brief for the Office of the Public Defender et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner, State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453
(2006) (No. 2003-353-C.A.) (on file with author). Upon examination of the
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home and do not injure or threaten the safety of family members
ought not to be prosecuted criminally as breaches of the peace,"
the Superior Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 17
The state appealed,' 8 and the case came before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court on October 24, 2005.19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the state argued that the trial court had erred in
construing section 11-45-1(a)(1) as unconstitutionally void for
vagueness as applied to conduct occurring within a private
residence. 20 The court conducted a de novo review of the trial
court's statutory interpretation, and confirmed that an "as
applied" vagueness analysis requires consideration of the
questioned regulation in light of the particular facts of the case. 21
The court determined that, as applied to acts committed within
the defendant's private residence, section 11-45-1(a)(1) provided
both sufficient notice regarding the conduct it sought to prohibit
and adequate safeguards against arbitrary enforcement. 22
Concluding that Rhode Island public policy interests weighed in
favor of the statute's constitutionality, the Supreme Court vacated
the trial judgment, and remanded the case to the Superior Court
to reinstate the complaint. 23
Notice and Arbitrary Enforcement
The test for evaluating the notice requirement of a vagueness
record, the appellate court declined to consider this substantive due process
argument, concluding that - notwithstanding the appearance of related
language in the trial court's opinion - the defendant had not presented a
substantive due process claim at trial, and therefore such a claim could not
be addressed when raised on appeal. Russell, 890 A.2d at 462.
17. Russell, 2003 WL 21297136, at *5.
18. The defendant did not participate in the appeal. Russell, 890 A.2d at
456. However, "in light of the importance of the issues raised in this case,"
the Rhode Island Supreme Court invited amicus curiae briefs from the Rhode
Island Office of the Public Defender and other interested parties. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 458. The court further cautioned that it would not "indulge in
hypothetical situations that would lead to absurd results." Id.
22. Id. at 459-62.
23. Id. at 461-62, 463.
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challenge is "whether a person of ordinary intelligence has a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited" by the
statute.24 Noting that "[a] mens rea requirement often defeats a
vagueness challenge because the state of mind element is used to
signify the defendant's guilty knowledge," the Supreme Court
faulted the trial judge for overlooking the mens rea language -
"intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly" - incorporated into
section 11-45-1(a) of the Rhode Island disorderly conduct statute.25
Turning to the facts of the case, the court inferred that "the fact
that [the defendant] fled the scene before the police arrived [was]
evidence of actual knowledge" that "his conduct could lead to
arrest and prosecution. ''26
Furthermore, the court concluded that the plain language of
the statute provided satisfactory safeguards against arbitrary
enforcement. 27 The court noted that "responding police officers
are not confronted with the difficult task of differentiating
between a public or private place," determining the relationship
between the complainant and the offender, or considering
geographical or temporal statutory components. 28  Indeed, a
charge of disorderly conduct does not require the identification, or
even the existence, of an individual victim. 2 9
On the grounds that section 11-45-1(a) met both the notice
requirement and the arbitrary enforcement test, the court held
that the statute withstood the vagueness challenge. 30
Disorderly Conduct in a Private Home
The amici also argued on appeal that, despite the absence of a
public/private distinction in the language of section 11-45-1(a)(1),
"when considered collectively, the words 'fighting, threatening,
violent, and tumultuous,' indicate a legislative intent to prevent a
public disturbance or breach of the public peace. ' '31 The court
refused to ascribe such an intent to the Legislature, noting that
the subsequent section, 11-45-1(a)(2), specifies both public and
24. Id. at 460.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 460-61.
28. Id. at 461.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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private locations where disruptive behavior constitutes actionable
disorderly conduct, and reasoning that the Legislature could have
similarly defined the reach of section 11-45-1-(a)(1), had such a
proscription been intended. 32
In ruling that section 11-45-1(a)(1) was applicable to private
as well as public disturbances, the court emphasized its belief that
"Mrs. Russell was entitled to be free from the defendant's violent
33
and threatening behavior." Wishing to avoid an "absurd result"
where "the defendant's activities would be immune from police
involvement simply by virtue of the[ir] location," the court rejected
the notion that "violent conduct occurring in the home is insulate34
from arrest and prosecution" as a matter of statutory policy.
Rather, the court reasoned that Rhode Island's Domestic Violence
Prevention Act explicitly enumerates disorderly conduct as one of
eleven crimes that constitute domestic violence if perpetrated by
one family or household member against another.
The cour 6 declined to consider the amici's substantive due
process claim because that argument had first been raised on
appeal. However, emphatic dicta revealed the court's
disagreement with "the suggestion that a fundamental liberty
interest was infringed in this case." Dismissing as irrelevant the
amici's citation of landmark United States Supreme Court
opinions establishing the constitutional right to privacy in marital
and intimate relations, the court observed that, here, "the
defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct based on his wife's
telephone call to the police." Thus no marital privacy right had
been assailed by the state, and the court declared that "neither
the state nor federal Constitution guarantees the 0right to throw
furniture against the wall or through the window."
The court vacated the grant of summary judgment for the





36. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15.
37. Russell, 890 A.2d at 462.
38. Id. at 463.
39. Id. (emphasis in original).
40. Id.
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41
instructions to reinstate the complaint.
COMMENTARY
This case presented the Rhode Island courts with an issue of
first impression as to whether criminal disorderly conduct could
be charged based on actions occurring in a private home.42 The
trial and appellate judges agreed that the unambiguous language
of section 11-45-1(a)(1) does not incorporate a publicness
element. 43 However, the defendant's alternative contention that
"when considered collectively, the words 'fighting, threatening,
violent, and tumultuous,' indicate a legislative intent to prevent a
public disturbance or breach of the public peace"44 is not without
support in the case law of other jurisdictions.45 The notion that
disorderly conduct, by definition, can occur only in public can be
understood as the product of two factors: the statutory history of
the offense, and the constitutionally enshrined idea of the home as
a private space impervious to government interference. In any
jurisdiction, these factors may operate in concert or in tension
with other important state policy objectives to determine whether
the reach of a disorderly conduct statute extends to a private
residence.
The Statutory History of Disorderly Conduct
Because the offense of disorderly conduct was unknown by
that name under common law, its definition in any jurisdiction
depends entirely on the precise wording of the statute providing
41. Id. at 457, 463.
42. Russell, 2003 WL 21297136, at *4.
43. See Russell, 890 A.2d at 458; Russell, 2003 WL 21297136, at *2.
44. Russell, 890 A.2d at 461 (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 184 A.2d 188, 189 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1962)
(citing "a long line of [New York state] decisions [in which] guilt of disorderly
conduct [was] predicated on the fact that the defendant's misconduct occurred
in a private dwelling or in a locale where no members of the public were
present," and in which the courts held it to be "statutorily impossible to
commit disorderly conduct in private"). The Robinson court also cited
collected cases from Illinois, Georgia, Louisiana, and New Jersey holding
"that acts charged as disorderly conduct must be public in character and such
as actually tend to disturb the public peace and quiet." Id.
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for its criminalization. 46 Although "the types of conduct that may
be disorderly almost defy definition .. .[disorderly conduct] tends
to cause or provoke a disturbance, and to disrupt or destroy public
order, or to endanger the morals, safety, or health of the
community or of a class of persons or a family. '47
Thus, in the many jurisdictions where the "dominant purpose"
of a disorderly conduct regulation is understood to be the
"preserv[ation] of peace and good order" in public spaces, 4 8
disorderly conduct statutes include elements specifically requiring
that the action in question be committed in a public place, or that
it bear a defined relationship to the public order.4 9 In jurisdictions
where a publicness element is written into the disorderly conduct
statute, the court's primary task is often to decide whether a
particular location is "sufficiently public" to support the charged
crime.5 0 As the Rhode Island Supreme Court approvingly noted,
this potentially difficult differentiation between public and private
spaces is avoided by the generalized language of section 11-45-
1 (a)(1) .51
However, the exclusion of a publicness element from section
11-45-1(a)(1) makes the Rhode Island disorderly conduct statute
unusual 52 enough to invite interpretive confusion of a different
nature. Despite the section's explicit silence on the public/private
distinction - a silence that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
supposed to be intentionally crafted by the Legislature 5 3 - Russell
illustrates that it may be difficult to overcome a tacit, majoritarian
presumption that disruption of the public peace is required to
sustain a disorderly conduct charge.
Other minority rule jurisdictions have encountered the same
46. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 26 (1964).
47. Id.
48. See Hackney v. Virginia, 45 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1947).
49. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 29 (1964).
50. See id. (comparing the public character of locations including a public
road, a retail establishment, a public restroom, the hallway of an apartment
building, and a hospital emergency room).
51. See Russell, 890 A.2d at 461.
52. Cf. Town of Springdale v. Butler, 384 S.E.2d 697, 698 (S.C. 1989)
(upholding defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct and noting that,
"unlike most municipal ordinances, the Springdale [South Carolina]
ordinance does not require that the incident occur in a public area")
(emphasis added).
53. Russell, 890 A.2d at 461.
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interpretive tension, with varying results. For example, in State
v. Richards, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a disorderly
conduct conviction under a statute worded similarly to Rhode
Island's; the Richards majority held that a boisterous, angry
confrontation that occurred within a private residence could not be
charged as disorderly conduct because it did not produce
"unreionable noise" so as to disturb anybody outside of the
home. Conversely, in Town of Springdale v. Butler a unanimous
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a disorderly conduct
conviction under a minority rule statute, holding that "the place
where the conduct is committed [was] not an element of the
offense, and therefore, the fact that [the defendant] was on his
private property does not defeat the charge."
In reaching its conclusion, the South Carolina Supreme Court
emphasized that "the wording of the particular [disordgerly
conduct] ordinance controls the definition of the offense." In
Russell, the Rhode Island Supreme Court made no such explicit
statement referencing the history of disorderly conduct as a purely
statutory creation; however, the Supreme Court nevertheless
overruled the Superior Court's presumption of a public/private
distinction where no such element appeared in the language of the
regulation. Particularly in minority rule jurisdictions like Rhode
Island, it would seem that disorderly conduct statutes should be
strictly construed - as the state Supreme Court did in Russell - to
avoid the potentially inconsistent interpretations that arise when
a publicness element is presumed.
The Home as Private Space
The amici appellants in Russell further argued that the Rhode
Island disorderly conduct statute impermissibly infringed on the
defendant's 59xercise of freedoms protected by the federal
Constitution. The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to
54. 779 P.2d 689, 691-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The dissent, however,
believed that the boisterous, angry confrontation entailed 'tumultuous or
threatening behavior' sufficient to support the offense charged" under the
language of the Utah statute, regardless of the fact that it occurred in a
private residence. Id. at 692.
55. 384 S.E.2d at 698.
56. Id.
57. See Russell, 890 A.2d at 462.
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engage this substantive due process argument, finding that the
defendant had not raised it properly at trial. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court answered the trial judge's observation - that "[t]o
the extent that the disorderly conduct statute criminalizes noisy
and boisterous behavior in the home, it invites the state to intrude
into domestic matters beyond that which may 5 e necessary for the
protection of the safety of family members" - by noting that
section 11-45-1(a) is not directed at 'noisy and boisterous behavior
in the home,"' and that it is only when "disputes escalate into
fighting or violent 6 r threatening behavior that the criminal law
becomes operable."
In practice, however, the distinction between "noisy and
boisterous behavior" and "fighting" in a private residence may
sometimes prove to be less than clear. For two reasons, the
Russell court was not required to grapple with that potentially
troublesome distinction: first, the Supreme Court's analysis of the
issue was relegated to dicta because of the defendant's procedural
failure to raise the substantive due process issue at trial.6 1
Second, the specific facts in Russell rendered superfluous any
judicial consideration of a privacy-based claim because any
constitutional protection afforded to the privacy of the home was
ceded by the defendant's wife when she invited the police to enter
the marital residence.6 2
Because the Supreme Court was conducting an as-applied,
and therefore fact-sensitive, vagueness analysis, it quite properly
refused to speculate as to the statute's constitutionality in
application to hypothetical situations. However, it is not difficult
to imagine a case in which neither a raise-or-waive violation nor a
narrow factual peculiarity would exist to defeat a charge of
disorderly conduct arising in a private residence. In such a case,
the Supreme Court's rather light conclusion in Russell - that
"neither the state nor federal Constitution guarantees tI right to
throw furniture against the wall or through the window" - might
58. Id.
59. Russell, 2003 WL 21297136, at *4.
60. Russell, 890 A.2d at 462 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-45-1 (2002)).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 463.
63. Id. at 458.
64. Id. at 463.
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require further substantiation before it could appfse the
constitutional concerns presented by the amici on appeal.
Other State Policy Objectives
The amici suggested that "[d]espite the fact that society might
condemn or disapprove of certain conduct, when such behavior
occurs in one's home, does not result in harm to anyone inside,
and is not exposed to the public, it is constitutionally protected. ''66
Similarly, the trial judge held that "some domestic disputes fall
outside the realm of criminal conduct. Those acts which occur at
home and do not injure or threaten the safety of family members
ought not to be prosecuted criminally as breaches of the peace."67
Both statements reflect an esteem for the notion of the home as a
"quintessentially private space" into which criminal law ought not
intrude.6 8
The Supreme Court, however, embraced a different policy
priority. Citing the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), and
noting that that Rhode Island statute enumerates disorderly
conduct as a constituent crime, the court declared that "the
protection of family members from violent and threatening
behavior by one household member is the statutory policy of this
state. ' 69 However, the court's conclusion that "[o]bviously, the
[DVPA] applies to crimes occurring within the home"70 does not
necessarily mean that disorderly conduct, which is only one of
eleven constituent crimes within the DVPA,71 is itself criminally
65. Indeed, the amici complained that the quoted language, presented by
the state and adopted by the Supreme Court, "trivializes the [privacy] right
necessarily implicated by [the court's] interpretation of the statute," and
claimed that,
[iun fact, the liberty interest at issue is far broader, far more
substantial, and far more important, because what is at stake here is
the right of a married couple (or family members living under the
same roof) to be free from unwarranted state interference, through
the harsh vehicle of the criminal laws, in matters relating to very
private aspects of their interpersonal relationships.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15.
66. Id.
67. Russell, 2003 WL 21297136, at *4.
68. Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2006).
69. Russell, 890 A.2d at 461.
70. Id. at 462.
71. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-29-2(a)(4) (2002).
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punishable when it occurs within a private residence. The
meaning of disorderly conduct within the DVPA is defined only by
reference to its construction under section 11-45-1(a).
Those who seek to stop domestic violence face the problem of
longstanding cultural "confusion around whether this type of
violence should be treated as a public or a private issue. 72
Despite the criminalization of wife beating in all the states by
1920, it was not until the 1970s that the women's rights
movement began to succeed in recasting domestic violence as a
public concern. 73 Even in light of this "reform effort [that] has met
with remarkable and transformative success," 74 jurisdictions that
refuse to extend disorderly conduct statutes to capture conduct
within the home may be guided by pre-1970s case law,75 resulting
in a potential inconsistency between the traditional construction
of disorderly conduct statutes and more contemporary policy
priorities that seek to eradicate domestic violence through
criminalization.
If Rhode Island truly wants to promulgate a cohesive
"statutory policy"76 against violent and threatening behavior
within the home, a small change to the statutory language of
section 11-45-1(a)(1) would achieve that end. The Rhode Island
law takes a minority approach, but it is not alone in excluding a
publicness requirement from some constituent behaviors of
disorderly conduct. Instead of remaining silent on the
public/private distinction otherwise incorporated into the offense,
the Legislature could easily provide language specifying that a
charge under section 11-45-1(a)(1) may be grounded upon events
transpiring in public or in private spaces. Such a revision to the
statute would make explicit Rhode Island's commitment to the
liberalization of its definition of disorderly conduct, 77 if indeed the
72. KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 2
(2003).
73. Suk, supra note 68, at 12.
74. Id. at 6.
75. See, e.g., Robinson, 184 A.2d at 189 (citing the "long line" of New
York decisions holding that it is "statutorily impossible to commit disorderly
conduct in private").
76. Russell, 890 A.2d at 461.
77. Even absent a revision to the statute, it is likely that subsequent case
law will further entrench the approach enunciated in Russell. Within six
months of its decision in Russell, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
already reaffirmed that "the state did not have to prove that the defendant's
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state intends such a result, and would bring section 11-45-1(a)(1)
into harmony with the policy priorities embodied in the DVPA.
CONCLUSION
By expanding the scope of section 11-45-1(a)(1) to reach
actions occurring in a private home, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court adopted a minority approach to the construction of a
disorderly conduct statute. However, the minority approach is
justified both by the great extent to which the definition of the
offense is controlled by the precise language of the statute, and by
contemporary policy objectives to which Rhode Island is
committed, but which historically have not informed the statutory
construction of disorderly conduct in other jurisdictions.
Debra L. Conry
behavior occurred in a public place or disturbed another member of the public
to prove disorderly conduct under section 11-45- 1(a)(1) beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194, 1201 (R.I. 2006).
Criminal Law. State v. Andujar, 899 A.2d 1209 (R.I. 2006).
Criminal solicitation requires that the soliciting message actually
be received by the intended recipient. A defendant should be
allowed to introduce the fact of his acquittal after the state made
references to the previous charges during trial. A pre-trial
detainee does not retain any legitimate expectation of privacy in
his or her jail cell.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In October 2001, the defendant, Jose A. Andujar, was arrested
and charged with one count of burglary and three counts of first
degree sexual assault perpetrated against a woman referred to as
Donna, for which he was later acquitted.1 The facts giving rise to
State v. Andujar occurred in August 2002, while the Defendant
was awaiting trial at the Adult Correctional Institute ("ACI"). 2
New York City Detective Enrico Viola discovered an opened letter
in his own mailbox, addressed to the defendant's brother, Miguel
Henriquez. 3 At trial, it was undisputed that Henriquez never
actually received the letter,4 which contained various references to
Donna including detailed instructions on how Henriquez should
kill her in Westerly, Rhode Island. 5 For instance, the letter said,
"she can be lured into a remote area and you could just throw her
up into a headlock until she crokes [sic] then bounce. '6 After
reading the letter, Viola contacted Detective Edward St. Clair of
the Westerly Police Department because he was concerned about
the numerous references to Westerly, Rhode Island.7 St. Clair
suspected the letter was written by the defendant because he was
1. State v. Andujar, 889 A.2d 1209, 1211 (R.I. 2006). To identify the
victim in this case, the court referred to a fictitious name, Donna. Id. n.1.
2. Id. at 1211.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1211-12.
5. Id. n2.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1211. "This b--- lives in a town called Westerly." Id. at 1212
n2.
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currently working on a case involving the defendant and Donna. 8
St. Clair proceeded to call Special Investigator Stephen
Mokler at the ACI to alert him of his suspicions that the
defendant was trying to have Donna murdered. 9 Based on this
information, Mokler searched the defendant's cell and seized a
yellow legal pad and other papers.1o Mokler never obtained a
warrant to search or seize anything from the cell.1' Next, St. Clair
obtained a court order to gather handwriting samples from the
defendant, which were then analyzed by a certified document
examiner. 12 St. Clair did not obtain a warrant to conduct a
writing sample analysis. 13 Nevertheless, after conducting the
analysis, the examiner concluded that the defendant wrote the
solicitation letter and that the letter could have come only from
the yellow legal pad that was found in the defendant's cell block. 14
The defendant was charged with one count of criminal
solicitation of murder in violation of G.L.1956 §11-1-9.15 Prior to
trial, the state filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the
defendant's acquittal of the previous assault charges. 16 The
defendant objected and argued that the trial justice should not
allow the state to present evidence of his prior charges without
also allowing him to inform the jury that he was acquitted of those
crimes. 17 Additionally, the defendant filed a motion in limine to
exclude evidence of the prior charges all together. 18 The motion
justice held that the evidence would be allowed at trial with a
8. Id. at 1212.
9. Id.






Every person who solicits another to commit or join in the
commission of a felony under the laws of this state shall be guilty of
a felony and upon conviction shall be subject to the same fine and
imprisonment as pertain to the offense which the person did solicit
another to commit, provided that imprisonment for the solicitation
shall not exceed ten (10) years.
R.I. GEN. LAws §11-1-9 (1956).




limiting instruction to the jury.1 9 Next, the defendant filed a
second motion in limine hoping to suppress the evidence acquired
from the search of his cell block.20 The motion justice denied this
motion as well.2 1 The defendant then filed a motion pro se to
dismiss the charge against him for lack of probable cause under
Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 22 The
defendant argued that because Henriquez never received the
letter, the solicitation was never completed. 23 The motion justice
denied the motion, but admitted that it was a close call.24
At trial, the state mentioned the defendant's prior sexual
assault charges in both the opening and closing arguments. 25
After the state rested, the defendant posed substantially the same
argument as his pre-trial motion to dismiss and filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal according to Rule 29, which was ultimately
denied.26 The defendant rested without presenting a case. 27 In
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1214.
21. Id.
22. Id.
A defendant who has been charged by information may, within
thirty (30) days after he or she has been served with a copy of the
information, or at such later time as the court may permit, move to
dismiss on the ground that the information and exhibits appended
thereto do not demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe
that the offense charged has been committed or that the defendant
committed it. The motion shall be scheduled to be heard within a
reasonable time.
R.I. Sup. CT. R. CRIM. P. 9.1.
23. Andujar, 899 A.2d at 1214.
24. Id. ("Despite noting the state's concession that Henriquez never did,
in fact, receive the letter, the motion justice denied the motion, but admitted
it was a close question").
25. Id.
26. Id.
Motions for a directed verdict are abolished and motions for a
judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. The court on
motion of a defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the
indictment, information, or complaint, after the evidence on either
side is closed, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of
such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the State is not
granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved
the right.
R.I. SuP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 29.
27. Andujar, 899 A.2d at 1214.
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the jury instructions, the judge informed the jury that the
statements made in opening and closing arguments were not to be
considered as evidence.2 8 Even so, the jury found the defendant
guilty of criminal solicitation. 29 After trial, the defendant argued
a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 again on the basis that
solicitation requires that the intended solicitee actually receive
the communication to constitute a completed crime. 30 The trial
justice denied the motion for a new trial, but was hesitant in doing
so. 3 1 The defendant appealed. 32
HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
Andujar raised three issues on appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, however, this survey will address only the most




On motion of the defendant the court may grant a new trial to the
defendant if required in the interest of justice. If trial was by the
court without a jury, the court on motion of a defendant for a new
trial may vacate the judgment, take additional testimony, and direct
the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence may be made only within three (3) years
after the entry of judgment by the court, but if an appeal is pending,
the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion
for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within ten
(10) days after the verdict or finding of guilty or within such further
time as the court may fix during the ten-day period. A copy of the
motion for a new trial shall be filed with the trial justice
contemporaneously with its filing with the clerk of the court.
R.I. SUP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 33.
31. Andujar, 899 A.2d at 1214 ("Despite the state's again conceding that
Henriquez was never in receipt of the letter, the trial justice eventually,
although hesitantly, issued an order denying the motion for a new trial").
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1214-15. In addition to challenging his conviction for
solicitation, the defendant also asserted that the trial court violated his due
process rights by not permitting him to present evidence of his acquittal for
the sexual assault charges after the state introduced evidence of those
allegations. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the acquittal
evidence was relevant and material evidence that should have gone to the
jury. Id. at 1222. Because it was impossible to speculate whether the
acquittal evidence would have had a different effect on the jurors, the trial
justice's error was not harmless and thus the exclusion of the evidence denied
the defendant due process. Id. The defendant also argued that the trial
court violated his Rhode Island and Federal Constitutional rights when it
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defendant asserted that the court erred in denying his pretrial
motion to dismiss, motion for judgment of acquittal, and motion
for a new trial.34 His primary argument was that he could not be
convicted for criminal solicitation under §11-1-9 when the
solicitation was never actually communicated to the solicitee and
thus never complete. 35 The court stated that when a statute's
language is clear and unambiguous, it will look only to the words
in the statute and apply their plain meaning. 36 With that said,
the court held that "the plain language of § 11-1-9 clearly indicates
that actual receipt of a criminal solicitation by an intended
solicitee is required for liability to attach. '37
To reach this conclusion, the court examined the language in
the Rhode Island statute, and considered People v. Saephanh, a
court of appeals case from California. 38  In Saephanh, the
defendant wrote a letter requesting that the recipient assault his
pregnant friend; however, the intended recipient never received
the letter.39  The court in Saephanh held that there was
insufficient evidence of solicitation since it was uncontested that
the intended solicitee never received the communication.4 0 With
the California appellate court's holding in mind, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court concluded that the words, "solicits another" in the
Rhode Island statute, like the words "solicits another" used in the
California statute in Saephanh, indicated that another person
must actually receive the communication for a solicitation to
transpire and be complete.4 1 In Andujar, it was undisputed that
Henriquez, the intended solicitee, never received the letter and
thus the solicitation was incomplete.42 The court agreed with the
refused to suppress the evidence seized from his cell block. Id. at 1222-23.
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his cell, and thus the search and seizure of the defendant's cell
was lawful. Id. at 1226.
34. Id. at 1215.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1217.
38. Id. at 1216; 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 915 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.)
('The plain language of [the California statute], in particular the phrase
'solicits another,' demonstrates that proof the defendant's soliciting message
was received by an intended recipient is required for liability to attach").
39. Andujar, 899 A.2d at 1216.
40. Id. at 1217
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1219.
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state's argument that the defendant's act of trying to solicit
another is criminal on its own.4 3  The court, however,
distinguished attempting to solicit another from actually
completing criminal solicitation."4 The court also noted that
criminal solicitation statutes are designed to protect citizens from
being induced to commit a crime and preventing solicitations from
resulting in completed crimes.4 5 In the defendant's case, however,
there was never such a threat that Henriquez would be induced to
commit the crime because he never even received the letter.4 6
Furthermore, the court concluded that while the defendant's
conduct may not amount to a criminal solicitation, the existence of
§12-17-14 indicated that the defendant could be convicted of
attempted solicitation.4 7  The court concluded that when the
defendant put the solicitation letter in the mail, he committed the
last proximate act in the attempt to communicate the
solicitation.4 8
COMMENTARY
The essence of criminal solicitation is to punish a defendant
for taking steps to induce another to commit a crime.4 9 The policy
behind punishing solicitation, as described, in Andujar, is to
prevent citizens from being induced to commit crimes, and to






Whenever any person is tried upon an indictment, information, or
complaint and the court or jury, as the case may be, shall not be
satisfied that he or she is guilty of the whole offense, but shall be
satisfied that he or she is guilty of so much of the offense as shall
substantially amount to an offense of a lower nature, or that the
defendant did not complete the offense charged, but that he or she
was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same offense, the court
or jury may find him or her guilty of the lower offense or guilty of an
attempt to commit the offense, as the case may be, and the court
shall proceed to sentence the person for the offense of which he or
she shall be so found guilty, notwithstanding that the court had not
otherwise jurisdiction of the offense.
R.I. GEN. LAws §12-17-14 (1956).
48. Andujar, 899 A.2d at 1219.
49. Id. at 1218.
50. Id.
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mind, it seems odd that the court in Andujar concluded that
because there was no possible way the defendant's brother was
actually induced to commit the crime, given that he never received
the letter, the policy behind the statute is no longer relevant. If
the defendant's culpable state of mind and his action in mailing
the letter qualifies as an act to further his intent to solicit murder,
solicitation seems to be the proper charge, whether it is completed
or not. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's analysis of the words
in the Rhode Island statute appears to be somewhat questionable.
It is logical that the words "solicits another" mean that another
person has to be solicited. Yet if the word 'another' was not in the
statute, who or what would be solicited? It is only possible to
solicit another person, so the word 'another' appears to be merely
descriptive. The court uses the plain meaning rule to interpret the
statute, but it is not clear and plain that the words 'solicits
another' must mean that the solicitation has to actually be
received to be a crime under § 11-1-9.
The future implications for this change in Rhode Island law is
that defendants now have three charges to be concerned about:
attempted solicitation, solicitation, or the substantive crime. The
new interpretation of §11-1-9 gives prosecutors another way to
charge defendants, depending on how far they get in executing the
intended crime. With the underlying policy and rationale of the
Rhode Island statute in mind, defendants probably would be
deterred from inducing others to commit crimes more so if they
knew that they would be subject to prosecution for the completed
solicitation charge, regardless of whether the solicitation was
successful or not. Thus, the policy of preventing citizens from
being induced to commit crimes and of preventing substantive
crimes from being completed is better reached when defendants
fear being responsible for the entire solicitation charge rather than
the possibility of only being charged with the lesser crime of
attempt.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the criminal
solicitation conviction should be vacated after considering the
plain meaning of §11-1-9. The court entered judgment of acquittal
for the solicitation charge and remanded the case to superior court
for a new trial for attempted solicitation.
Allyson Picard
Criminal Law. State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631 (R.I. 2006). The
admission of a decedent's statement to a friend days before his
death, that is not testimonial in nature and possesses
characteristics of reliability, does not violate the Confrontation
Clause. A medical examiner may answer hypothetical questions
when there are essential facts to base an opinion. A general
objection to testimony regarding prior identification through an
interpreter is insufficient to properly preserve the issue for appeal.
Finally, failure to file the requisite motion constitutes waiver of
the double jeopardy defense.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On the morning of June 16, 2001, Anthony Feliciano
(Feliciano) was in the back yard of a Bergen Street home "smoking
a blunt" with a friend, Jesse Simas (Simas), when both were
approached by two males, one of whom was Angel Rivera
(Rivera).1 Rivera asked Feliciano and Simas how much it would
cost to "cap a Guatemalan. ''2 Rivera was told that it would cost
One Thousand Dollars.3 Rivera left and later returned with cash. 4
Feliciano and Simas counted the cash and Rivera handed each of
the men a handgun. 5
That same evening, Walter Sol (Sol) and Juan Palomo
(Palomo) were socializing at a park on Valley Street in Providence
along with their friends, Marvin Torres (Torres) and Jorge Benitez
(Benitez).6 The men drank "until the point of dizziness. '7 At
about 11:30 p.m., the men decided to drive to a friend's house.8 As
they drove down Bergen Street, Simas walked into the middle of
the street and pointed a gun at the vehicles. 9 Torres put his foot
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on the gas pedal, barely missing Simas, who shot at the
windshield of the Camry.10 The bullet struck Palomo, who was a
passenger, in the left arm.11 Torres continued driving and fled the
scene with an injured Palomo in tow. 12
At this point, Simas turned his anger towards the Honda that
Benitez was driving and shot at it.13 Benitez ran Simas over,
crashing into another vehicle. 14  The crash rendered Benitez
temporarily unconscious and Sol was stuck in the windshield of
the Honda. 15 When Benitez regained consciousness, he fled. 16
Simas, having been exacted from the windshield, ran toward 59
Bergen Street. 17 Feliciano then appeared from between 61 and 59
Bergen Street with two other men, peered into the Honda, and
walked back between the houses. 18 An injured Sol extricated
himself from the Honda, fell to the ground, then got up and ran
north on Bergen Street.19 A short time after, Feliciano left Bergen
Street in a gray station wagon. 20
Sol was found by a police officer lying unconscious behind 48
Bergen Street. 21 After ensuring that an ambulance had arrived to
assist Sol, police officers followed a trail of blood to 59 Bergen
Street where they found a wounded Simas in his sister's
apartment. 22 Police also found a jammed 9mm semiautomatic
handgun and used bullet casings at the crime scene. 23
At trial, Feliciano alleged that he was at 61 Bergen Street at
the time of the shooting, incidental to refurbishing his illegal drug
supply.2 4 Feliciano testified that he did not witness the shooting
incident and only went outside after hearing the ensuing











20. Id. at 636.
21. Id. at 635.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 637.
25. Id.
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that a friend of Feliciano, known by the name of "Nuts" was
responsible for the shooting.26 A jury convicted Feliciano of five
counts as follows: conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree
murder, assault with intent to commit murder, discharging a
firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death,
and discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence
causing injury.27 Feliciano received two mandatory consecutive
life sentences on the counts of first-degree murder and discharging
a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in
death.28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice
committed reversible error: (1) in admitting a statement decedent
made to a friend days before his death;29 (2) by allowing the
medical examiner to respond to the prosecution's hypothetical
questions even though the record lacked facts to support the
questions and the medical examiner's responses were misleading
to the jury;30 and, (3) by allowing a detective to testify to Palomo's
written assertion regarding photo identification of Simas, as
translated by a Spanish-speaking officer. 31  Further, the
defendant argued that the court should set aside its holding in
State v. Rodriguez32 and conclude that defendant's convictions for
murder and discharging a firearm in connection with the murder
violate the double jeopardy doctrine. 33
Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence
The defendant contested admission of Sol's statement to
Benitez, prior to the shooting, that Rivera had been one of the
people that had jumped him.34 The defendant argued that, in
26. Id.
27. Id. at 633.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 634.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 822 A.2d 894, 906-08 (R.I. 2003).
33. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 634.
34. Id. at 637. A week or two before the shooting, there was an incident
wherein numerous people attacked Palomo and Sol. Id. Sol's statement
arose while he and Benitez were standing on a porch on Bergen Street. Id. at
637-38. Sol made the remark as a couple walked by, identifying the male as
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light of the recent United States Supreme Court ruling in
Crawford v. Washington,35 admitting Sol's statement under Rule
804(c) 36 violated his right to confrontation of the witness under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.37
The court first rejected the defendant's contention that Rule
804(c) was not applicable to criminal proceedings, and based its
determination on two facts. First, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court noted that the language of the Advisory Committee's Notes
clearly stated that the rule applied to criminal cases. 38 Second,
the court validated its holding in State v. Burke by making a
distinction between Ohio v. Roberts and Crawford.39 The court
noted that the Crawford decision specifically addressed only the
admissibility of testimonial statements. 40 Thus, the Roberts test
requiring that an out-of-court statement contain an "adequate
indicia of reliability"4 1 was still a sound analytical tool for out of
court statements that were not testimonial. Consequently, the
Burke decision, wherein Rule 804(c) was invoked in a criminal
matter to admit a decedent's out of court statement 42 of a non-
testimonial nature, was still valid. 43
Although the court concluded that Crawford did not
one of the attackers. Id. at 638. Benitez later identified this male as Rivera.
Id.
35. See 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding that out-of-court statements by
witnesses that are testimonial in nature are not admissible under the
Confrontation Clause unless the witnesses are not available and the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
36. See R.I. R. EVID. 804(c) (stating that a declaration of decedent made
in good faith "shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court
finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action
and upon personal knowledge of the declarant").
37. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 638. To reach this conclusion, the defendant
argued that the Crawford ruling affected the court's decision in it's seminal
case assessing the constitutionality of Rule 804(c) in criminal trials, State v.
Burke, 574 A.2d 1217 (R.I. 1990). Id. In Burke, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court analyzed Rule 804(c) under the framework of the United States
Supreme Court's decision, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 574 A.2d
1217, 1221-24 (R.I. 1990). The defendant alleged that Crawford overturned
or, alternately, changed the nature of the ruling in Roberts, compelling the
court to reexamine its holding in Burke. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 638.
38. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 639.
39. See id. at 639-41.
40. Id. at 640.
41. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
42. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1222.
43. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 641.
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invalidate the application of Rule 804(c) in criminal cases, it did
change the analysis.4a Thus, the court developed a tripartite
approach to analyzing the admissibility of out of court statements
in criminal proceedings under the Confrontation Clause: (1) the
statement must fulfill the requirements of Rule 804(c);4 5 (2) using
an objective standard, the statement must be non-testimonial in
nature;4 6 and (3) the statement must bear the "indicia of
reliability."4 7
Under this three-step analysis, the court ascertained that
allowing Sol's out of court statement did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.4 8 First, the court noted that the statement
satisfied the requirements of Rule 804(c). 4 9 The court found that
because Sol made the statement to a friend, the good faith
requirement 50 was met. The personal knowledge element 51 of
Rule 804(c) was satisfied because the statement was about a fight
44. Id.
45. Id. To satisfy Rule 804(c), a statement must be "made in good faith
before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of
the declarant." R.I. R. EVID. 804(c).
46. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 641.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 642.
49. Id. at 641-42.
50. Id. at 642. The Feliciano court neither defined "good faith" nor
enumerated specific factors that establish "good faith." See id. The court did,
however, refer to Burke and Rule 804(c). Id. at 642. The Burke court focused
on two factors: (1) the time lapse between the statement made and the
incident that evoked the statement; and (2) the fact that the statement was
made between family members. See 574 A.2d at 1223. While the Feliciano
court also focused on the timing of the statement and the relationship
between the parties who were privy to the statement, see 901 A.2d at 641-42,
the Feliciano court used a very broad approach in determining these factors
have been met. The statement in Burke was made within hours of the
incident, see 574 A.2d at 1223, while the statement in Feliciano was made "a
week or two" after the incident. See 901 A.2d at 637. Furthermore, unlike
the family member who was the recipient of the information in Burke, see 574
A.2d at 1223, the recipient of the statement in Feliciano was merely a friend.
See 901A.2d at 641. Thus, timeliness and the nature of the relationship are
two factors that can be used to determine whether a statement was made in
good faith. It should be noted, however, that the court did not indicate that
these are the only two factors that are determinative of good faith. See
Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 641-42; Burke, 574 A.2d at 1220-23.
51. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 642. It can be inferred that personal
knowledge requires first-hand observation. See id. (declarant was the
victim); Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223 (declarant was the victim).
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Sol was personally involved in.52 Finally, the statement was
uttered days before the shooting incident occurred 53 satisfying the
requirement under Rule 804(c) that the statement be made "before
commencement of the action."54
The court further concluded that the statement was not
testimonial in nature.55 The court reasoned that the statement
was an off-hand remark made between two friends. The
statement was not made to prove a fact.56 In addition, the court
deduced that the defendant could not have believed the remark
would be used later at trial.57
Finally, the court determined that the statement exhibited
adequate indications of reliability.58 To support this conclusion,
the court relied on the friendly relationship between Sol and
Benitez. 59 Further, the court noted that the seriousness and
severity of the attack to which Sol referred to in his statement
supported its reliability. 60
Testimony of Medical Examiner
The defendant also argued that the trial justice abused his
discretion by allowing Dr. Swartz, the state's medical examiner, to
answer a sequence of hypothetical questions regarding the
position of the gun at the time of the shooting because the doctor's
responses were speculative, misleading and substantially
prejudicial. 61 In finding that the trial justice did not abuse his
discretion, the court focused on the fact that hypothetical
questions have traditionally been acceptable as long as the record
provides facts sufficient to base an opinion on.62 The court was
persuaded that Dr. Swartz's examination of the body during
autopsy provided essential facts on which to opine about the
52. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 642.
53. Id.
54. R.I. R. EVID. 804(c).






61. Id. at 642-43.
62. Id. at 643.
SURVEY SECTION
possible positions of the gun.63 Further, the court noted briefly
that the hypothetical questions were appropriately framed.6 4
Thus, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
justice and, accordingly, no need to visit the defendant's allegation
of prejudicial error.6 5
Detective's Testimony as to Witnesses Prior Identification of Co-
Conspirator
The defendant next asserted that the trial justice erred in
allowing the testimony of Detective Hartnett concerning Palomo's
written statement identifying Simas in the photo lineup.66 The
defendant argued that the statement, written in spanish, was
inadmissible hearsay because it had to be translated to Detective
Hartnett and, therefore, the detective was testifying as to what
the interpreter said Palomo wrote.6 7
The court focused on the fact that the defendant's general
objection to the testimony in question was not sufficient to
preserve the issue for appellate review.68 The court reasoned that
the context of the questioning and objections thereto would not
alert a trial judge as to the issue being raised. 69 Furthermore, the
court held that while it had the discretion to hear even
unpreserved assignments of error, in this case, review was not
warranted because if there was any error, it was harmless. 70 In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Palomo testified at
trial that he had identified Simas from the photo lineup the day
after the shooting and that the writing in question was his.7 1
Double Jeopardy
The defendant's final contention was that the court should





68. Id. at 646.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 647.
71. Id.
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reevaluate its holding in State v. Rodriguez,72 that a crime
requiring proof of even one differing element than the other crime
cannot merge for purposes of double jeopardy. 73  The court
rejected the defendant's plea for reconsideration. The court
reasoned that the defendant failed to preserve his right to claim
double jeopardy by neglecting to file the appropriate motion before
trial.74 The court, however, suggested that even if it were to
address the defendant's argument, the Rodriguez holding would
remain intact because of the fundamental principle that
"[1]egislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments. '75
COMMENTARY
The admissibility of hearsay statements in criminal trials
continues to be a divisive issue around the country as the courts
struggle to find a balance between justice and a defendant's right
to a fair trial.76 To add to the dispute, Rhode Island is the only
state with the unique distinction of affirming the use of hearsay
statements by deceased declarants as evidence in criminal
proceedings. 77 While the Feliciano court attempts to develop a
three-prong rule that appropriately addresses Confrontation
Clause issues, the rule actually illustrates the difficulties
inherent in admitting hearsay evidence. Specifically, although the
court determines that the good faith requirement and reliability
requirement are separate and distinct elements of the rule, the
court employs good faith factors to resolve the issue of reliability.78
The end result appears to be that, in fact, the court is applying a
72. 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003).
73. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 647-48 (citing Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 906-08).
74. Id. at 647.
75. Id. at 648 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983)).
76. The Roberts reliability test created a pattern of inconsistent rulings
on the admissibility of hearsay evidence throughout the United States. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (discussing various cases
that exemplify the vacillating application of the rule to hearsay statements).
Two cases have reached the Supreme Court in the last three years as a result
of the unpredictability of the rule in an effort to discern what type of hearsay
statements are in opposition to the Confrontation Clause. See Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
77. Edward Fitzpatrick, Conviction Stands in '01 Killing for Hire: The
Supreme Court Rejects Arguments for Anthony Feliciano Who Received Two
Consecutive Life Sentences, PROV. J., July 19, 2006.
78. Id. at 641.
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two-prong rule.
The court points to the fact that Benitez and Sol were friends
and the seriousness of the attack on Sol as factors which led the
court to determine the statements were reliable. 79 While these
factors might indicate that Sol meant what he said to Benitez,
fulfilling the good faith requirement, do they necessarily signify
that that the hearsay statement was accurate? In this case, the
fact that Sol was jumped by six or seven people might affect the
reliability of his identification of Rivera. Furthermore, the length
of time between the actual assault and the day the statement was
made could make Sol's identification of Rivera less reliable. It is
further interesting to note that the parties in this case were all
involved in an ongoing turf war 80 which might have arguably
predisposed Sol to inadvertently identify Rivera. However, these
factors were not addressed in assessing the reliability of Sol's
statement. Thus, it appears that those factors which determined
good faith, were also determinative of reliability.
If the court, in fact, is applying the same factors to the good
faith and reliability requirements of hearsay admissibility, the
question becomes whether the rule as developed in Feliciano
appropriately addresses a defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights. The primary function of the Confrontation CJuse is to
assure the reliability of evidence against a defendant. A mere
finding that statements are made in good faith is not sufficient to
sustain a finding of reliability. However, because the reliability
prong of the test is so broad, the result of the test is completely
dependent on what factors a judge takes into consideration in
making the determination. As the Crawford court noted, the
reliability test that evolved from Roberts "vindicates the Framers'
wisdom in rejecting a general reliability exception. The
framework is so unpredictable that it fails to prov'1e meaningful
protection from even core confrontation violations." Thus, it will
be interesting to observe how the rule will be applied in the future
and what types of factors the courts will use to assess the
reliability of hearsay statements.
79. Id. at 642.
80. Fitzpatrick, supra note 77.
81. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123 (1999).
82. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63-64 (2004).
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the admission of the victim's
nontestimonial hearsay statement. In addition, the court held
that permitting a medical examiner to answer hypothetical
questions was not an abuse of discretion.
Wendy Andre
Criminal Law. State v. Lough, 899 A.2d 468, 469 (R.I.
2006). A conviction of embezzlement does not require proof that
the defendant charged with the crime acquired any benefit from
the property. Also, to satisfy the element that the defendant
intended to appropriate and convert the property for his own use,
it is enough to establish that the defendant treated the property
as his own. Discarding, or throwing away property is one manner
that the defendant could treat the property as his own.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Late at night on July 14, 2003, John Lough, a patrolman in
the Providence Police department, stopped to aid a fellow officer,
Thomas Teft who was dealing with an individual with a possibly
stolen minibike.1  Lough's arrival allowed Teft to defer to the
more experienced officer for the correct protocol for confiscating
the minibike. 2 Teft was a new officer, on probationary status, so
when Lough offered to take care of the confiscation and the
necessary paperwork, Teft accepted.3 Lough put the minibike in
his car and drove away from the scene. 4
A short time later, when responding to a report of a stolen
vehicle, Lough's apparently faulty brakes did not stop his car, and
he struck the back of another patrol car.5 He returned to the
police station to fill out the paperwork for the accident, and then
went to drop off his damaged cruiser to be repaired.6
Lough claimed that he was aggravated by the night's events
and wanted to go home, so he decided to rid himself of the
annoyance of dealing with the minibike and left it behind a
dumpster. 7 He assumed that the young man the bike had been
confiscated from would never show up to claim the bike; which
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was a harmful mistake, as it turned out.8
When the young man did show up to claim the bike, it was
nowhere to be found.9 Internal Affairs searched for the bike, and
questioned Teft who directed them to Lough.10 When Lough was
informed by Teft that Internal Affairs was looking for the
minibike, he apparently retrieved the minibike from the dumpster
and arranged a meet to put the minibike into the trunk of Officer
Petrella's cruiser. 11
Lough told a little white lie when asked about the minibike:
he said that after the accident he transferred the minibike to
Petrella's vehicle. 12 Officer Petrella supported Lough and told
another inspector that the minibike had been in his trunk at the
start of the shift. 13 Internal Affairs did not believe the story
however; Petrella's vehicle had been searched earlier that day and
the minibike was not in it. 14 Caught in this lie, Lough came clean
with the story of leaving the bike behind the dumpster. 15
In August 2003 Lough was indicted on one count of
embezzlement and fraudulent conversion in violation of Rhode
Island General Laws §11-41-3.16 This led to a four-day trial were
Lough testified that he "made a wrong decision" and told the story
about leaving the minibike behind the dumpster. 17  A jury









16. Id. The pertinent part of the statute is as follows:
Every officer ... or other person to whom any money or other
property shall be entrusted for any specific purpose.... who shall
embezzle or fraudulently convert to his or her own use, or who shall
take or secrete, with intent to embezzle or fraudulently convert to
his or her own use, any money or other property which shall have
come into his or her possession or shall be under his or her care or
charge by virtue of his or her employment ... shall be deemed guilty
of larceny and shall be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) or three (3) times the value of the money or property thus
embezzled or converted, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not
more than twenty (20) years, or both.
RI GEN. LAws §11-41-3.
17. Id. at 469.
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a one-year suspended sentence.18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Lough's appeal contends that the trial judge incorrectly
instructed the jury that a person could violate the Rhode Island
embezzlement statute when they disposed of the property of
another.19 This improper interpretation of the law, he contends,
was also the reason that the judge inappropriately denied Lough's
motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.20
Essentially, Lough's appeal turns on the question of whether a
charge of embezzlement can be sustained absent any evidence
that he "derived a benefit" from using the property.2 1 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court unanimously found that the trial judge
correctly instructed the jury on the elements necessary to sustain
a conviction under Rhode Island General Laws §11-41-3.22 Also,
because the judge correctly interpreted the statute, Lough's other
claims of error were also rejected.23
Elements Necessary to Sustain an Embezzlement Conviction
The Rhode Island Supreme Court established in State v.
Oliveira that the state must establish the following: '(1) that the
defendant was entrusted with the property for a specific use, (2)
that he came into possession of the property in a lawful manner,..
.and (3) that defendant intended to appropriate and convert
property to his own use and permanently deprive that person of
the use.' 24 Lough had lawful reasons to take possession of the
minibike and deliver it to the police station.2 5 Therefore, there is
no quarrel that the state had met their burden in the first two
elements necessary to sustain a conviction. 26 Lough tactically
admitted during the trial that when he threw the minibike away,




22. Id. at 473.
23. Id.
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he was intending to permanently deprive the owner of the use of
the minibike. 27 However, Lough claims that the state's case was
deficient of proof necessary to show that he 'converted the
property to his own use. '' 28
Conversion of Property to One's Own Use and the Derivation of a
Benefit
To support Lough's contention that the state failed to meet it's
evidentiary burden, he relies on the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's holding in State v. Powers, where the court explained that
'an element of the crime charged is that defendant put the
property to 'his own use' or used the property for his own
benefit.' ''29 Lough argues that "by instructing the jury that a
person converts property to his own use by disposing of it, the trial
justice permitted the jury to return a guilty verdict in the absence
of evidence that he derived a benefit from his use of the
minibike. ''30 Otherwise, Lough's testimony that he threw the
minibike away would essentially be an admission of guilt.31
The Rhode Island Supreme Court squarely addressed what it
means to convert the property to one's "own use" under Rhode
Island General Laws §11-41-3. The court rejected Lough's
interpretation of Powers.32 Although in Powers the court had
noted that the defendant didn't receive a benefit, the court held
that the observation only underscored that defendant in that case
did not in fact convert the property to his own use.33 Therefore,
the court held that "the relevant inquiry is not whether Lough
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Olivera, 432 A.2d at 666.)
29. Id. (citing State v. Powers, 644 A.2d 828, 830 (R.I. 1994).)
30. Id. at 472. The jury instructions in pertinent part are as follows:
A conversion of property requires a serious act of interference with
the owner's rights, using up the property, pledging it, giving it away,
delivering it to one not entitled to it and inflicting serious damage to
it, claiming it against the lawful owner, unreasonable withholding
possession of it from the owner, or, otherwise, disposing of the
property. Each of these acts seriously interferes with the ownership






derived a benefit from throwing the minibike away, but rather
whether he put the property to 'his own use.' ' 34
Disposal of Property as Conversion
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island noted that the court had
never directly addressed whether one converts property to his own
use when he disposes it, and therefore, looked to other
jurisdictions that had addressed the subject and found disposal
was a manner of conversion. 35 Because the court held that Powers
did not require a benefit, they reasoned that neither did it
foreclose the possibility that disposing of the item could be
conversion.36 The court then looked to the plain language of the
statute, Rhode Island General Laws §11-43-3, and found that
converting property to one's own use by disposing of it to be a
consistent interpretation.37 The court held that "when Lough
decided to dispose of the minibike . . . he made a decision that was
properly vested in its lawful owner. '38 Therefore, when you treat
property as if it were your own, including throwing out the
property, you are converting that property to your own use. 39
COMMENTARY
Lough essentially interpreted the existing statutory law. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court cleared up the statutory language,
and clearly held that you can embezzle something by tossing it in
the trash.40 Some controversy has been engendered by opinion
because it had to do with a policeman in the performance of his
duties.
There has been some reaction that calls this result "bizarre".41
34. Id. (citing Powers, 644 A.2d at 831).
35. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court used the same sources that the
trial judge cited for support of his instruction, rejecting Lough's argument
that the trial court had improperly looked outside Rhode Island when Powers
addressed the matter at hand. Id.





41. The Police News, A Blog for Policemen, The Rhode Island Supreme
Court Says Chucking is Embezzlement, June 8, 2006, http://www.thepolice
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It was stated, "to charge a police officer who improperly disposed
of property with embezzlement is absolutely ridiculous. There was
clearly no criminal intent. The officer was flustered or lazy and
didn't properly dispose of a minibike. Yes, a violation of (probably)
several rules and regulations but certainly not a crime. '42
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not look at this
problem of being a problem of a policeman improperly submitting
evidence, but treating the minibike as his own; that supplied the
requisite criminal intent. Given the court's tendency to give police
officers wide discretion in the performance of their duties, it is
unclear whether this decision is holding police officers to a higher
standard than the national judicial body is willing to do.43
However, the court in Lough has emphasized the importance of
officers and other bodies in Rhode Island to correctly treat other
people's property. With the low standard of disposal being an
example of one manner to treat another's property entrusted to
the officer as his own, it would seem almost any failure to properly
evidence possessions could subject an officer to embezzlement
charges under Rhode Island General Laws §11-43-3.
The court in Lough also neglected to address the purported
dicta of Powers; although the defendant in that case did not
convert the property to its own use, there still remains the
question of why the absence of a benefit would "underscore"" that
holding unless a benefit was of some import to establishing the
necessary element of conversion to one's own use. In Lough the
court looked to other jurisdictions to help them fill the hole of
whether disposal could be considered treating another's property
as one's own. 45  The inconsistency of this holding with any
necessity of finding that the embezzler had received some benefit
may have necessitated the departure from any past indications of
the necessity of a benefit, which the court could justify because it
news.com/2006/06/rhodeislandcourt-says-chuckil.htm.
42. Id.
43. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2806
(2005). ("A well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted
with apparently mandatory arrest statutes .... Against that backdrop, a true
mandate of police action would require some stronger indication from the
Colorado Legislature than "shall use every reasonable means to enforce a
restraining order" (or even "shall arrest ... or ... seek a warrant")").
44. 899A.2d at 472.
45. Id.
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was not what Powers had not essentially been decided upon.
CONCLUSION
This case has uncluttered the landscape of what must be
proven to establish the conversion element of an embezzlement
charge. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that one does not
need to derive a benefit from the use of an item to have embezzled
the item.4 6 Even more clearly, the court expressly held that even
throwing an item out, or disposing of it, is treating the item as if it
were your own. 47 These actions satisfy the necessary element of




47. Id. at 473.
48. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108 (R.I. 2006). A
criminal defendant cannot argue that he was compelled to wear
prison attire and be handcuffed if a timely objection was not made
during trial. Further, there may be times when handcuffing a
defendant is necessary to the safety and order of the courtroom.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 12, 2001, Tanny Eisom was leaving her home to
attend a birthday party with her sister and a friend, when she
encountered her ex-boyfriend, Curley Snell, dropping off their
infant son.1 An argument ensued over Eisom's plan to go out for
the evening, even though Eisom's brother Slade Edmonds was
there to watch the baby.2 Snell was enraged over Eisom's plans to
go out, and told her, "I'm gonna get you. ' 3 Eisom returned home
later that evening, but when she arrived Snell was waiting for
her.4  Snell chased Eisom outside, where the icy conditions
prevented Eisom from getting away; Snell proceeded to hit her
several times in the head with a closed fist.5  The violence
escalated and Snell stabbed Eisom in the back of the neck with a
three-inch pocket-knife. 6 At this point, Eisom's brother, Edmonds,
who was awakened by the screaming, came outside to protect his
sister.7 Edmonds attempted to pull Snell off of his sister, but
Snell used the pocket-knife to stab Edmonds in the neck and slice
his stomach.8 After the stabbing, Snell then proceeded to kick
Edmond's head and face while he was on the ground. 9
Snell was charged with felony domestic assault, two counts of
assault with a dangerous weapon, and simple domestic assault
1. State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108, 112 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id.









after previously having been convicted twice of domestic assault.' 0
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts; Snell then made a
motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules
of Criminal Procedure, arguing "not only that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, but also that he was entitled to
a new trial because he had been in handcuffs and shackles during
the trial.""1 The trial court denied Snell's motion for a new trial
stating that "the evidence was absolutely overwhelming of this
defendant's guilt on each of these counts."1 2 Snell subsequently
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion to stay his
sentencing, both of which were denied. 13 Snell was sentenced to
"a total of forty-five years at the Adult Correctional Institutions
(ACI), with thirty years to serve and the rest suspended, with
probation."' 4  After sentencing, the defendant filed a timely
motion of appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant argued that "the trial justice erred
in compelling him to stand trial in prison clothing and
handcuffs."'16  The court also addressed additional issues on
appeal; however, this survey focuses on the matter of first
impression before the court, regarding defendant's clothing and
restraint. 17 The Rhode Island Supreme Court found no error and
affirmed the defendant's convictions.' 8
10. Id. at 112.
11. Id. at 114. (referencing R.I. Sup. CT. R. CRIM. P. 33).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 112.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 119-23. The defendant also argued that the trial justice
committed reversible error, "by not permitting him to select his own attorney,
in allowing the jury to hear that he had two previous convictions for domestic
assault, and in excluding certain medical records." Id. at 112. The Supreme
Court of Rhode Island found no errors on appeal, and confirmed defendants'
conviction. Id.
18. Id. at 112.
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Defendant's Appearance in Prison Attire
The defendant contended that the trial court's ruling
compelling him to stand trial in prison garb was in error. 19 At
trial, "[a]fter the jury was selected and sworn, but before opening
statements, the trial justice gave preliminary instructions to the
jury," 20 advising them:
You may have observed that the defendant in this case is
in the custody of the State marshal. I specifically caution
you that this fact is not at all germane or important to
your task in determining the defendant's guilt or
innocence. Also in no way does this defendant's detention
diminish or effect his guaranteed presumption of
innocence. The mere fact that the defendant is being
detained must not prejudice you against him in any way
nor should it generate any sympathy for him. It should be
regarded by you as a neutral fact and you should give it
no weight whatsoever.21
At trial, the defendant argued that this instruction was not
sufficient, and "moved to pass the case because the clothing he
was wearing, prison attire with his name being emblazoned on a
tag on a T-shirt and jeans, was inherently prejudicial. ' 22 The trial
justice denied the motion because the defendant could have made
arrangements to acquire civilian clothes, and his family had
ample opportunity to provide non-prison clothing for him.23
A defendant's right to a "fair trial by an impartial jury is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by article 1, section 10,
of the Rhode Island Constitution. '24 The court acknowledged the
widely held notion that "the presumption of innocence, although
not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair
trial under our system of criminal justice. '25 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has held that "knowledge of a defendant's
19. Id.
20. Id. at 114.
21. Id.
22. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
23. Id. at 114-15.
24. Id. at 115.
25. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)).
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incarceration may have a serious prejudicial effect on the
presumption of innocence. 2 6 This prejudicial effect "results from
the likelihood that the jury will infer that the defendant is
incarcerated as a result of previous criminal activity and is thus
possessed of a general criminal disposition. ' 27 To prevent the
possibility of prejudice, "the state may not compel an accused to
stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison
clothing. 2 8 To determine whether the defendant's attire during
trial was a constitutional violation, the court focused on "whether
the defendant was truly compelled to wear the prison clothing. '29
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the failure to
make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for
whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion
necessary to establish a constitutional violation. '30
The Rhode Island Supreme Court had "not had the occasion to
address the precise issue of prison clothing," however the court
had "addressed claims of error when trial justices verbally
informed the jury of the defendant's incarceration."3 1 Analyzing
these cases, the court determined that "an objection is timely if
made before any prejudice can emanate from a defendant's
appearance in prison garb. '32 This conclusion also concurs with
the United States Supreme Court, which held that a defendant's
"silence precludes any suggestion of compulsion. '33
Consequently, the court found that the defendant's objection
to his prison attire was untimely because defense counsel did not
raise the objection "until after the jury was selected and sworn,
and after the trial justice gave preliminary instructions. ' 34 When
the objection was finally made, the jury "already had observed
defendant in his so-called prison garb for quite some time. '35 If
the defendant had any real concerns about the jury seeing him in
his prison attire, he should have presented the concerns before the
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting State v. Burke, 529 A.2d 621, 628 (R.I. 1987).
28. Id. (citing Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512).
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
30. Id. (quoting Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 116.
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jury panel was brought into the courtroom. 36 Given this situation,
the court could not "say that defendant was compelled to be tried
in prison clothes," and the trial justice's cautionary instruction to
the jury was "sufficient to negate any potential prejudice. '37
Defendant's Appearance in Handcuffs
The defendant next asserted that compelling him to stand
trial while in handcuffs was in error. 38 During the trial the
defendant did not specifically object to the handcuffs; the
defendant maintained, however, that "his objection to prison
clothing was sufficient to encompass any prejudice caused by
being forced to stand trial while branded with an unmistakable
mark of guilt. '39 The court determined that "[h]andcuffing a
defendant is treated differently from prison attire because the
former provides security and the latter does not. '40 The court
recognized that there are times when restraining a defendant is
justified "by essential state interests such as physical security,
escape prevention, or courtroom decorum."41 In situations similar
to the defendant's, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has upheld
trial justice's decisions to handcuff defendants to "minimize
danger or maintain order in the courtroom. '42
Akin to its holding regarding prison clothing, the court ruled
that the defendant failed to make a timely objection to the
handcuffs during trial, and the cautionary instructions from the
judge were sufficient to negate any possible prejudice.43 Perhaps
more importantly, the court acknowledged that the trial justice
gave adequate reasons for restraining the defendant: "he was
disruptive during his trial, speaking out-of-turn, making sarcastic
faces, snickering, and laughing out loud while witnesses were
testifying," and he was on trial for a serious criminal charge, with
36. See id. at 117.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Id. at 117 (internal quotations omitted).
40. Id. (quoting State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1256 (R.I. 1981)
(internal quotations omitted)).
41. Id. (quoting Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2004)).
42. Id. at 118.
43. Id. at 118-19.
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a violent past.44 The court declined to overturn the defendant's
conviction on the grounds that he was in restrained during trial.4 5
COMMENTARY
This case is significant because it represents the first time
that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has addressed the issue of a
defendant's appearance in prison clothing at trial.4 6 Presenting a
defendant before the jury in prison clothing and handcuffs
strongly insinuates, in the mind of the jury, that the defendant is
guilty. This suggestion could easily tempt a juror to overlook the
evidence presented at trial and prompt them to convict based on
preconceived notions.
The threat that the jury might use a defendant's appearance
at trial against him is bona fide. Lawyers often tell their clients to
dress a certain way for a court appearance, in attempt to win good
favor from the judge and jury. Compelling a defendant to stand
trial in prison clothing is clearly a violation of a defendant's right
to trial by an impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 7 True compulsion
is marked by lack of choice over objection. The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that there are times when a defendant might
choose as a "defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes
in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury,"48 however if a
defendant makes a timely objection to the court, then he should be
allowed to obtain a change of clothes for trial. Unlike handcuff
restraints, a prisoner's attire adds nothing to the court
proceedings in the way of safety or order, and thus should be
decided upon by the defendant. That said, a defendant cannot
present himself to the jury in prison clothing, allowing for
prejudices to take hold, and then object to the fact that he is in
prison clothing. To avoid possible unfair prejudice, a defendant
must object to his appearance before the jury is present, or else
the damage is already done. In Snell, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court acknowledged the threat of prejudice from a defendant's
attire, but cautioned defendants who have genuine concerns about
44. Id.
45. Id. at 119.
46. See id. at 115.
47. Id. (referencing U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
48. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508 (1976).
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the jury seeing them in prison attire to present a motion to the
court before they are in the presence of the jury.49 If this does not
occur, then the defendant is left with the judge's cautionary
instructions, and the jury's obligation to adhere to them.
Unfortunately, society constantly categorizes people based on
appearance, and a defendant in a criminal trial cannot escape this
discrimination. While a person on the street may simply be
labeled, the stakes are infinitely higher for a defendant in a
criminal proceeding. The impartiality of the jury is crucial if the
defendant hopes to stand trial on the facts, and not on perception
based on what he is wearing. If the defendant does not object to
his attire in a timely fashion, the jury is liable, even with limiting
instructions, to forget the old adage that you cannot judge a book
by its cover.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the defendant's
appeal on the subject of prison attire and handcuffs was waived
because it was made after the jury had already observed him in
the courtroom. 50 Further, the court held that there may be times
when handcuffing a defendant is necessary to the safety and order
of the courtroom, as in the instant case where the defendant had a
criminal past, and was very disruptive during trial.51
Mary Kibble
49. See Snell, 892 A.2d at 117.
50. Id. at 116.
51. Id. at 119.
Criminal Procedure. State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042 (R.I.
2006). In an issue of first impression the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that "once a Family Court justice determines that a
child should be waived from the jurisdiction of the Family Court,
there is no limitation to the charges that may be lodged against
the child in the adult court, as long as those charges spring from
the nucleus of operative facts upon which the Family Court waiver
of jurisdiction was based."
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Police arrested defendant Corey Day and accused him of
breaking and entering into the Ocean Tides Residential
Treatment Program ("Ocean Tides"), as well as binding, gagging,
and imprisoning one of its employees in the facility's walk-in
freezer.' Because the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the
arrest, the family court had exclusive jurisdiction over him.2 In
order to try Day as an adult, the attorney general moved to have
the family court waive over Day under sections 14-1-7 and 14-1-
7.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws. 3 At the time of the waiver
motion, the attorney general indicated a desire to charge day with
four offenses arising out of his conduct at Ocean Tides.4 The
family court granted the waiver motion on November 8th, 2004.5
When Day was indicted in the superior court, the grand jury
indictment included five charges. 6 Day then moved to dismiss, for
lack of jurisdiction, under the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2), asserting that the
indictment "impermissibly charged him with crimes that were
1. State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 1044 (R.I 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. The anticipated charges were: breaking and entering, second-degree
robbery, kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit robbery and
kidnapping. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The indictments were for: burglary, first-degree robbery, felony
assault, kidnapping, and larcency of goods valued at greater than $500. Id.
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different from, greater than, and in addition to, the offenses for
which he was waived by the family court.' '7 Day argued that
section 14-1-7.1 limited the state to filing charges for which the
family court found probable cause as a basis for the waiver.8 The
Judge Clifton of the superior court agreed with Day and granted
the motion to dismiss.9 The state appealed.' 0
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island's family court is a court of limited jurisdiction
without the power to hear criminal cases against children but
with the power to hear delinquency petitions."1 Section 14-1-40(a)
provides that no juvenile can be "charged with or convicted of a
crime in any court, except as provided in [that] chapter."'12 Rather
than defend criminal charges, the usual course of prosecution for a
juvenile offender is based on delinquency petitions heard in the
family courts, which exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
"delinquent and wayward children."'13 Thus "although the Family
Court has exclusive personal jurisdiction over juveniles appearing
before it on delinquency petitions, it lacks the subject matter
jurisdiction needed to adjudge a juvenile's behavior criminal in the
traditional sense." 14 In contrast to the limited jurisdiction of the
family court, the superior court exercises general subject matter
jurisdiction but is generally barred from exercising personal
jurisdiction over juveniles. 15 In order to allow the criminal trial of
juvenile defendants in certain limited circumstances, sections 14-
1-7 and 14-1-7.1 "serve as a jurisdictional bridge between the two
courts." 16
Section 14-1-7 permits a motion for the family court to waive
personal jurisdiction by the attorney general if the child under
consideration "is charged with an offense which would be
7. Id. at 1044-45.
8. Id. at 1045.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1049.
12. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §14-1-40(a) (2006)) (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 1049 n.8.
14. Id. at 1049.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1050.
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punishable by life imprisonment if committed by an adult"17 or if
the child is over the age of sixteen and "charged with an offense
which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult."1 8 In
considering the motion, the court must consider whether "probable
cause exists to believe that the offense charged has been
committed and that the child charged has committed it . .. "19 The
court must also consider "the child's past history of offenses,
history of treatment, or the heinous or premeditated nature of the
offense is such that the court finds that the interests of society or
the protection of the public necessitate the waiver of jurisdiction..
"20
Under sectionl4-1-7.1(b), "[i]f the court finds that [the above
standards] have been proven by a preponderance of evidence, it
may waive jurisdiction over the child and refer the child to the
appropriate adult court to be tried for the offense as an adult."
Section (c) of the same statute further provides that
[a] waiver of jurisdiction over a child pursuant to this
section shall constitute a waiver of jurisdiction over the
child for the offense upon which the motion is based as
well as for all pending and subsequent offenses of
whatever nature, and the child shall be referred to the
court which would have had jurisdiction if the offense had
been committed by an adult ... 21
The section concludes by ensuring that "in the event that the child
is acquitted of the offense for which the waiver has been sought,
the waiver shall be vacated. '22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
This case presented the issue of first impression of "whether
[sections] 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 require that, after a waiver has been
granted, the charges brought against a child in the Superior Court
must be precisely aligned with the charges set forth in the Family
17. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7(a) (2006).
18. Id. at § 14-1-7(b).
19. Id. at § 14-1-7.1(a)(1).
20. Id. at § 14-1-7.1(a)(2).
21. Id. at § 14-1-7.1(c).
22. Id.
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Court's waiver order. ''23 Justice Flaherty, writing for the court,
first set out the standard of review. Because the question was one
of statutory interpretation, the court reviewed de novo the lower
court's holding.24 The court recognized the "well settled 25 rule of
statutory construction, that "when the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous [the] [c]ourt must interpret the statute
literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and
ordinary meanings. '26  First, the court assessed whether the
statute was clear and unambiguous. 27 Each side argued that the
statute was clear, but after considering the arguments, the court
concluded that the statute was "neither clear nor unambiguous. ''28
In reaching this conclusion the court focused on the language
of the statute, which seemed to alternate between effecting a total
transfer of personal jurisdiction ("[a] waiver of jurisdiction over a
child pursuant to this section shall constitute a waiver of
jurisdiction over the child for the offense upon which the motion is
based as well as for all pending and subsequent offenses of
whatever nature")29 and that which seemed to indicate a waiver of
personal jurisdiction only over the specified conduct (". . . it may
waive jurisdiction over the child and refer the child to the
appropriate adult court to be tried for the offense as an adult"). 30
To resolve this ambiguity, the court had to consider whether "the
[1]egislature intended for a waiver of jurisdiction under [sections]
14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 to constitute a complete waiver of personal
jurisdiction over the child, or merely a waiver of jurisdiction for
the particular offense for which the child is waived.' '31
To help answer this question, the court turned first to an
examination of the history of the family court and the underlying
rational behind the juvenile court system. The court noted that
the separate juvenile justice systems "stemmed from the belief
that people under a certain age inherently were less culpable than
23. State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 1046 (2006).




28. Id. at 1047.
29. R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-7.1(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at § 14-1-7.1(b) (emphasis added).
31. Day, 911 A.2d at 1047.
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were adults"32 and that "[s]ociety's goal for juveniles, it was
believed, should be to rehabilitate through treatment and
supervision. '33 With this in mind, the court next turned to the
courts of sister states for guidance.
The court observed that "the great majority of courts faced
with this question have held that prosecutors may charge a child
who is waived from jurisdiction with any crime that arises from
the conduct for which the waiver was sought. '34 Though
recognizing that each state may have different waiver statutes,
the court emphasized that the value in examining the other
court's decisions was "showing their approach to the problem and
not the result. '35 The court also took pains to note that waiver
statutes in America "share a common thread of consistency, '36
based upon the United States Supreme Court's holding in Kent v.
United States.37 Premised on this notion, the court found that
examination of other courts decisions provide "both persuasive
authority and valuable insight into the philosophy and legislative
intent of juvenile waiver in general."38 In particular, the court
found persuasive the other court's holdings that the purpose of the
waiver proceedings is "to make a judicial determination of
whether a juvenile should remain within the province of the
juvenile court and not [to] determine what charges the State can
file."39
Returning to the actual language of sectionl4-1-7.1, the court
concluded that the words "for the offense" in section 14-1-7.1(b)
could not refer to a particular crime but instead had to refer to
"the actions of the accused child. '40 This reading was compelled
because children, while still subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the family court, cannot be criminally charged but must be dealt
with through the delinquency process. 41 Accordingly, to read the
32. Id. at 1048.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1051.
35. Id. at 1052 (quoting State v. Randolph, 876 P.2d 177, 180 (Kan. App.
Ct. (1994)).
36. Id. at 1052.
37. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (setting forth factors a juvenile court should
consider in waiving jurisdiction).
38. Day, 911 A.2d at 1052.
39. Id. at 1052 (quoting Randolph, 876 P.2d at 180-81).
40. Id. at 1053.
41. Id.
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term offense "to mean a particular crime defined by the laws of
this state"42 would be to "completely ignore the statutory
limitations of the Family Court, which does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over violations of the criminal code."43
Continuing its analysis, the court noted that requiring the
prosecutor to return to the family court to secure a new waiver
each time new evidence was found which supported a greater
charge would produce the "absurd result" of returning to a court
which by the plain terms of section 14-1-7.1(c) would no longer
have any jurisdiction over the child. Therefore the court
concluded that "once a Family Court justice determines that a
child should be waived from the jurisdiction of the Family Court,
there is no limitation to the charges that may be lodged against
the child in the adult court, as long as those charges spring from
the nucleus of operative facts upon which the Family Court waiver
of jurisdiction was based. '45
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in this case puts it
in line with the majority of state courts that have considered the
issue.46 In so deciding, however, the court failed to adhere to the
plain meaning of the statute. Certainly, the central holding that
once a family court waives jurisdiction "there is no limitation to
the charges that may be lodged against the child in the adult
court"4 7 is a faithful interpretation of sectionl4-1-7.1, but the
court does not stop there. Rather the court inexplicably limits the
scope of its holding to charges that "spring from the nucleus of
operative facts upon which the Family Court waiver of jurisdiction
was based. ' 48 This arbitrary limitation is supported neither by
the plain text meaning of sectionl4-1-7.1 nor by the public policy
behind the waiver process.
The court's first error occurs when it concludes that the
statute is ambiguous. In fact, the state offers a compelling
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1054.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1051.
47. Id. at 1054.
48. Id.
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reading of the statute that resolves the "ambiguity" by recognizing
that any waiver of jurisdiction accomplished under section 14-1-7
must necessarily be a waiver that "extends to the child
personally"4 9 rather than subject matter jurisdiction extending
only to the offense. 50  Such a reading is buttressed by the
additional language at the end of §14-1-7.1(c) which provides that
"[a] waiver of jurisdiction over a child pursuant to this section
shall constitute a waiver of jurisdiction over that child for the
offense upon which the motion is based as well as for all pending
and subsequent offenses of whatever nature."51  When read in
combination, it is clear that section 14-1-7.1 was intended to affect
not only a complete, but also a permanent waiver of the family
court's personal jurisdiction over a juvenile tried and convicted in
the adult courts. Rather than accept this reasonable
reconciliation of the apparent ambiguity, the court focused on the
language of sectionl4-1-7.1(b), thus allowing for the family court
to make a referral to the appropriate adult court so that the
juvenile may be tried "for the offense. '52 The court thereby
concluded that the statute contained ambiguity.
Given the court's failure to comprehend section 14-1-7.1 as
intended to effect a complete and permanent transfer of the family
court's personal jurisdiction over a juvenile, the court's insistence
on the limitation that the criminal charges arise out of the same
operative nucleus of facts also fails to adhere to the public policy
behind the jurisdictional bridge is, though inexplicable, not
entirely surprising. After arbitrarily concluding that "the waiver
of jurisdiction is limited by the language of section 14-1-7.1(b) to
the actions which spawned the waiver," 53 the court relegated to a
footnote the final portion of section 14-1-7.1(c), which provides
that "[imn the event that the child is acquitted of the offense for
which the waiver has been sought, the waiver shall be vacated. '54
The court emphasized that the language in section 14-1-7.1(c),
49. Id. at 1047
50. Id. This is the only reasonable reading because, as the court notes,
the family court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to try criminal cases.
Id. at 1049.
51. Id. at 1046 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-7(c) (2006)) (emphasis
added).
52. Id. at 1046.
53. Id. at 1053 (emphasis omitted).
54. Id. at 1053 n.13.
20071
572 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:565
referring specifically to the "the offense for which the waiver has
been sought,"55 compelled the conclusion that the additional
charges must be based on the same nucleus of operative facts.
The court, however, while choosing to focus on limited language at
the end of section 14-1-7.1(c), conveniently ignored the first part of
section 14-1-7.1(c), which clearly states that "[a] waiver of
jurisdiction over a child pursuant to this section shall constitute a
waiver of jurisdiction over that child for the offense upon which
the motion is based as well as for all pending and subsequent
offenses of whatever nature .... "56 An elementary understanding
of the public policy behind the waiver process clearly illuminates
the court's mistaken emphasis.
When faced with a petition for waiver of jurisdiction, the
family court judge presiding over a juvenile must undertake a
careful balancing to protect the interests of the child, and of
society. On the one hand, family courts exist to "guard children
against the stigma attaching to criminal proceedings." 57 On the
other hand society has a compelling interest in its own protection.
Accordingly, while addressing a waiver motion, a court, in
addition to finding probable cause to "to believe that the child in
question has committed the act upon which the motion to waive is
based,"58 must also find that "either the heinous nature of the
juvenile's alleged conduct by itself, or the nature of the juvenile's
act in conjunction with his or her past behavior and treatment in
the juvenile system, indicates that the child is not amendable to
rehabilitation." 59  When such a finding is made, "waiver is
appropriate because the state's interest in protecting the child
from the stigma of conviction is outweighed both by the public's
need for safety from the possible future misconduct of the accused
child and its need for redress for the wrong allegedly
committed."60
When these policy and procedural considerations are taken
into account, it is clear that rather than intending for section 14-1-
7.1(c) to serve as a limitation on the scope of the additional
55. Id. (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 1049.




charges to be brought against the juvenile defendant, section 14-1-
7.1(c) was intended to serve as a check on the initial
determination that waiver was appropriate. If the child is
convicted in the adult court, then the balancing performed by the
family court was correct and society's interests outlined above do
not cease to outweigh the child defendant's interest (or whatever
is left of it) in protection from the stigma of adult criminal
prosecution. In contrast, an acquittal results in the vacating of
the jurisdictional waiver because, in the absence of a criminal
conviction, the child is again entitled to the presumption of
protection from the stigma of adult criminal prosecution.
Therefore, it is quite clear that rather than support the court's
interpretation that the scope of additional charges are limited by
the defendant's action that served as a basis for the waiver,
section 14-1-7.1(c) actually supports the conclusion that, where
the court secures a conviction of a juvenile, the family court's
waiver of jurisdiction is intended by the legislature to be complete
and permanent.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a juvenile
offender, waived from the jurisdiction of the family courts to stand
trial in the adult courts, could be charged with any crime arising
from the nucleus of operative facts that supported the waiver.
The court thereby aligned Rhode Island law with that of the
majority of other states. 61 Yet this alignment comes at the cost of
fidelity to the legislature's clear expression that waiver of
jurisdiction under section 14-1-7 "shall constitute a waiver of
jurisdiction over that child for the offense upon which the motion
is based as well as for all pending and subsequent offenses of
whatever nature. '62 On its face, the court appears to have decided
that the rule in the other jurisdictions that permits additional
charges to be filed, but only if they arise out of the same nucleus of
operative facts was desirable and set about to change Rhode
island law regardless of what the prior statute indicated. We have
a word for such an institution and it is legislature.
Matthew Fabisch
61. Id. at 1051.
62. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (2006).
Criminal Procedure. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267 (R.I.
2006). A criminal defendant is not entitled to documentation
regarding computer software used by a third party laboratory
employed by the State in its DNA analysis, "including any user's
manuals, package inserts, protocols, revised protocols, technical
manuals, manufacturer revisions, and updates to protocols,
calibrations standards, and service contract agreements," as that
information is not within the possession, custody, or control of the
State and is therefore not discoverable under Rule 16 of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 21, 2006, defendant Jeremy Motyka's conviction for
first-degree murder and first-degree sexual assault in the death of
sixty-six-year-old Angela Spence-Shaw was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.2 Ms. Spence-Shaw's savagely
beaten body was found in her Little Compton home by a friend of
hers after she failed to show up for work on May 30, 1999. 3 Aside
from the scene of the brutal attack, which apparently began in the
victim's bedroom and ended in the bathroom where her body was
found,4 the victim's home otherwise appeared remarkably intact.
There were no signs of forced entry, her wallet and cash (in excess
of $500) were still in a ceramic box on her dresser, and all her
jewelry was untouched. 5
At the time of her murder, Ms. Spence-Shaw was in the
process of renovating her home.6 Two days before her murder, a
construction crew performing renovations on her home, broke
through a wall of her house in order to connect an addition to the
existing house. 7 This opening left her home unsecured, and
1. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 278 (R.I. 2006); R.I. SUPER. CT. R.
CRIM. P. 16.
2. Motyka, 893 A.2d at 291.
3. Id. at 271.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 272.
7. Id.
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anybody who knew about the opening could gain entry.8 The
defendant was part of the crew that broke through the wall two
days before the murder.9
A number of people who had done work on Ms. Spence-Shaw's
home were asked by the police to give blood samples to the police
so that DNA testing could be conducted. 10 Twenty three people,
including the defendant, voluntarily gave blood samples to the
Rhode Island State Police.II
The supervisor in the Rhode Island Department of Health's
Division of Forensic Biology, conducted DNA testing on the
vaginal and rectal swabs collected from the victim. 12  The
supervisor then compared the results of that testing with the
blood samples provided by the State Police. 13 Incidental to the
testing, twenty-two of the twenty-three people who provided blood
samples were excluded as the possible assailant; the defendant
was the only one that could not be excluded.14 As a result of this
DNA testing, the defendant was arrested. 15
On July 6, a second blood sample was taken from the
defendant while he was being held at the Adult Correctional
Institutions. 16 This sample, the vaginal and rectal swabs obtained
from the Ms. Spence-Shaw's body, and the known sample of her
blood, were sent to the Bode Technology Group ("Bode"). 17 Bode
was not able to exclude defendant from being a possible donor of
the sperm fraction on the vaginal swab at any of the eight
locations that they analyzed on the DNA molecules, because he
was a match at every location tested.18 A statistical analysis was
then performed to determine the probability of randomly selecting
an unrelated individual with the same DNA profile as the
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 274.
11. Id.




16. Id. at 277.
17. Id. Bode is a private biotechnology laboratory in Springfield, Virginia
that specializes in DNA testing and identification. Bode also has the ability to
conduct STR/PCR/DNA analysis, which is more discriminating and allows
more genetic locations to be analyzed than the system employed by Rhode
Island Department of Health.
18. Id.
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defendant's; the results determined that the probability in the
Caucasian population was "one in 1.77 x 10"18; "one in 4.25 x 10)19
in the African-American population; and "one in 2.15 x 10"20 in the
Hispanic population. 19  Based on the test results and these
statistics, Bode concluded it was scientifically logical and
reasonable that the DNA from the vaginal swab, sperm fraction,
and DNA from the defendant, all came from the same person.20
On April 27, 2000, the defendant filed a discovery motion
requesting that the Superior Court order the state to produce
certain information and materials related to the DNA testing
performed by Bode in this case. 21 While parts of the motion were
granted, the trial justice denied defendant's request for all
documentation regarding the computer software used by Bode in
its DNA analysis, "including any user's manual, package inserts,
protocols, revised protocols, technical manuals, manufacturer
revisions and updates to protocols, calibration standards, and
service contract agreements. '22  The trial justice based his
decision on the information not being "within the possession,
custody, or control of the State" and therefore not discoverable by
the defendant; furthermore, the trial justice determined that such
documentation was outside the scope of Rule 16(a)(5). 23
The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the Rhode Island Supreme Court seeking review of the trial
justice's discovery ruling, but the petition was denied. 24
Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion in limine which was
also denied.25 At the commencement of the trial the defendant
was found guilty of the first-degree murder and first-degree sexual
assault upon Ms. Spence-Shaw. 26
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 277-78.
22. Id. at 278.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 278-79. The defendant had filed the motion requesting that a
pretrial evidentiary hearing be held to determine the reliability, relevancy,
and admissibility of the DNA evidence and seeking an order prohibiting the
state from making any reference to the DNA evidence in this case; the trial
justice denied the motion in limine and held that the DNA evidence at issue
in the case was admissible.
26. Id. at 280.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant challenged two rulings made by the
trial justice.27 The first challenged ruling precluded the defendant
from obtaining the software package that the Bode laboratory
used for performing the DNA testing and analyzing the results.28
This ruling had been conditional, if the prosecution produced the
users manuals to the defendant, the defendant would then have a
reciprocal duty to disclose the identity of the DNA expert with
whom they were consulting.29 On appeal, the defendant argued
that the software package and the user manuals for the
fluorescent scanner and thermocycler that he sought from this
case was discoverable under Rule 16(a)(5). 30
The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled
to discovery of the software or user manuals under Rule 16(a)(5);
therefore the trial justice's pretrial discovery ruling was not
clearly erroneous. 31 The court held that Rule 16(a)(5) applies only
to "items within the possession, custody, or control of the State,"
and that this does not entitled defendants to discovery of
materials that are controlled by third parties. 32 The software
package and the user manual for the fluorescent scanner that
defendant sought were not within the "possession, custody, or
control of the State" as required by Rule 16(a) and instead were in
the sole possession, custody, and control of a third party, Bode, a
private laboratory, and therefore not discoverable by the
defendant. 33  Given that the defendant was not entitled to
discovery of these materials, the court declined to make a ruling
regarding the trial justice's decision to condition the discovery of
the user manuals upon the disclosure by the defense of the
27. Id. at 281.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 270.
30. Id. at 281; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(5). Rule 16(a)(5) permits
discovery by a defendant of "all results of reports in writing or copies thereof
of physical or mental examinations made in connection with the particular
case * * *, any tangible objects still in existence that were the subject of such
tests or experiments."
31. Motyka, 893 A.2d at 282. The standard of review applicable to a trial
justice's determination regarding discovery of certain evidence pursuant to
Rule 16 is a narrow one, overturned on appeal only if it was clearly
erroneous.
32. Id.; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
33. Motyka, 893 A.2d at 282.
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identity of DNA expert they were consulting.34
In the second challenged ruling, the defendant contended that
it was an abuse of discretion for the trial justice to refuse to allow
the defendant to explore certain areas on cross examination of a
particular witness (on the grounds that it would exceed the scope
of direct examination of the witness).35 Reviewing this decision
for a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the court upheld this
limitation.36 The court held that although in some instances
questions which go beyond the scope of direct examination are
permissible on cross examination, the decision is well within a
trial justice's discretion.37
In the third challenged ruling, the defendant contended that
the trial justice erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to diminished
capacity.38 To warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge, the
evidence must show an actual and adequate dispute about the
presence of a mitigating factor that would negate the malice
element of first-degree murder.39 Reviewing this decision de novo,
the court held that defendant's intoxication was not of such a
degree as to negate the specific intent necessary for murder and
therefore, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the
lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to
diminished capacity. 40
Lastly, the defendant argued that a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole was not warranted in this case.4 1 In
determining whether a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole was proper, the court must examine the
record, the findings of the trial justice, and the personal character,
34. Id.
35. Id. at 283.
36. Id. at 284.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 287.
40. Id. To warrant this instruction, a defendant's intoxication must have
been of such a degree as to completely paralyze the will of the defendant, take
from him the power to withstand evil impulses, and render his mind
incapable of forming any sane thoughts. Here, evidence is plentiful that
defendant maintained his ability to act in a rational and purposeful manner
during the relevant time period.
41. Id.
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record, and propensities of the defendant. 42 Also reviewing this
decision de novo, the court held that evidence was sufficient to
support findings that the defendant committed the victim's
murder intentionally while engaged in the commission of first-
degree sexual assault and committed the murder in a manner
involving both torture and an aggravated battery, thus justifying
his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. 43 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction
and the sentence.4
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Motyka, as far
as it relates to the DNA discovery issue, is contrary to past Rhode
Island decisions, a majority of other states, National Research
Council Reports, the American Bar Association, and the United
States Constitution.
In Rhode Island, a defendant has consistently been able to
discover an expansive array of information. These liberal pre-trial
mechanisms in Rhode Island are evident through the Superior
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; 45 the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence; 4 6 and prior case law.47
42. Id. at 290.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 291.
45. Rule 16 has consistently been construed broadly but was amended to
be even more liberal in 2002 when Rule 16(a)(6) was added, which included
"a written summary of testimony that the State intends to use under Rules
702, 703, or 705 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief
at trial, which describes the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for
those opinions, and the witnesses qualifications."
46. RIRE 705 states that before testifying in terms of opinion, an expert
witness shall be first examined concerning the facts or data upon which the
opinion is based (unless the court directs otherwise) in order to protect the
accused's right to effective cross examination).
47. In 1980, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declared that in
promulgating Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Superior
Court, Rhode Island had in place one of the most liberal discovery
mechanisms in the United States. The rule itself was liberal, and remains so
to this day, furthermore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has continuously
interpreted it liberally. See State v. McParlin, 422 A.2d 742, 744 (R.I. 1980);
State v. Faraone, 425 A.2d 523, 525 (R.I. 1981) (holding that Rule 16 provides
for extensive discovery on the part of a defendant in a criminal case going far
beyond the requirements of due process); State v. Adams, 481 A.2d 718, 724
(R.I. 1984) (holding that the state's non-disclosure was in violation of Rule 16
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Other jurisdictions have consistently ordered liberal discovery
of all information and material relating to DNA analysis.48 This
view has cemented itself as the better and more progressive view
which is preferred by the courts and forensic science community
alike.
The National Research Council stated in their 1992 report
that "all data and laboratory records generated by analysis of
DNA samples should be freely available to all parties" and that all
relevant information should include "original materials, data
sheets, software protocols, and information about unpublished
databanks.' '4 9 They re-emphasize that point in explicitly stating
that "there are no strict scientific justifications for withholding
information in the discovery process."50 Because of the nature of
the complex scientific information regarding DNA, defendants will
need comprehensive and detailed reports to adequately prepare
for trial. The Council recommends that "all aspects of DNA
testing be fully documented. ' 51 The need for this is enhanced
further when it is to be discovered in advance of trial
Likewise, the American Bar Association updated their rules
handling pre-trial discovery to include a more liberal view on pre-
trial discovery.
because the rule requires that when requested, the prosecution must disclose
to the defense specific information relating to physical examinations, or to
scientific tests or experiments, and does not give the prosecutor the authority
to interpret the rule and decide what constitutes substantial compliance.)
48. See United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629, 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990)
(holding that experts who testify in support of admission of novel scientific
evidence to be used by the government as evidence in chief, must disclose all
underlying predicate materials relating to DNA analysis); People v. Davis,
601 N.Y.S.2d 174, 174 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1993) (holding that failure to
disclose something material either to guilt or punishment constitutes a due
process deprivation to the defendant. "The rule is plain that where the
prosecution is permitted to call a witness, expert or not, who testifies to a fact
in issue or a conclusion to be drawn, the defendant is entitled to examine the
underlying data, the basis for the testimony, or else the defendant suffers
undue prejudice."); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989)
(holding that access to the data, methodology, and actual results pertaining
to DNA analysis is crucial so a defendant has at least an opportunity for
independent expert review).
49. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENsIc DNA
EVIDENCE 167 (National Academy Press 1996).
50. Id.. Allowing such disclosure facilitates technical review of the
laboratory work, both within the laboratory and by outside experts.
51. Id. at 168-169.
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Lastly, the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution guarantees that no person will be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.5 2 If the state is
not required to disclose to the defense all materials used,
generated, relied upon, or otherwise utilized in connection with
the DNA analysis, this fundamental liberty has been violated.
If the Motyka rule is allowed to stand, a custody issue would
be created. It would allow plaintiffs, namely the state, and any
third parties that it contracts with (here, Bode), to perform
forensic analysis to evade Rule 16. In light of the danger that this
presents, and the positions stated above to the contrary, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision on this issue is clearly
erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision and held that a defendant is not entitled to discovery of
the software package and the user manual for the fluorescent
scanner used by the laboratory as it performed DNA testing.5 3 The
court also held that the record supported finding that defendant's
failure to obtain certain materials used by laboratory in
conducting DNA testing did not prevent defendant from
adequately challenging the State's DNA evidence; the trial justice
did not abuse her discretion by refusing to allow defense counsel
to question detective about his participation in the interrogation of
defendant; defendant was not entitled to instruction on lesser-
included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to diminished
capacity; and evidence was sufficient to support finding that
defendant committed victim's murder intentionally while engaged
in the commission of first-degree sexual assault, thus justifying
defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole. 54
Christina Paradise
52. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XXV, § 1.
53. Motyka, 893 A.2d at 282.
54. Id. at 291.
Employment Law. Neri v. Ross-Simmons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42
(R.I. 2006). An employee handbook that is expressly subject to
unilateral change by an employer at any time does not create a
legitimate expectation that a particular provision will remain in
effect. As such, provisions contained therein do not have the force
of an implied contract on which a plaintiff-employee may bring
suit. Additionally, evidence that an employer may have failed to
adhere to a handbook provision, without other evidence of
impropriety, is insufficient to cast any meaningful doubt on an
employer's otherwise legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating the plaintiff.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Dorothy Neri was employed by defendant Ross-
Simons from 1992 until her termination in April 2001.1 At the
time of her discharge, plaintiff was fifty-three years old, and held
a salaried position as a call center manager.2
Neri alleged that her termination was in violation of staff
reduction protocol contained within the company's employee
handbook, which she had read and signed, thereby indicating her
acknowledgment of its terms. The handbook stated that "[iun the
event positions in the same Job [sic] classifications are equal in
value and each individual's performance of the assigned duties are
relatively the same, the least senior employee within the
department will be identified for staff reduction. '3 Both parties
refer to this provision as "bumping" rights.4 Neri asserted that
this bumping provision granted her the right to displace a less
senior employee in the event of staff reduction, and thereby
effectively circumvented her otherwise "at-will" employment
providing a breach of contract cause of action. 5 Ross-Simons
1. Neri v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 45 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id. at 45-46.
3. Id. at 46.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 47.
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contended that this provision was inapplicable to salaried
employees, which Neri disputed. 6 Neri, however, was unable to
give an example of such "bumping" rights ever having been
utilized by a salaried employee. 7
The employee handbook included disclaimers stating that
policies contained therein were subject to change by Ross-Simons
at any time, and that the relationship between Ross-Simons and
employees remained one of "employment at-will. '8 The portion of
the handbook that employees were required to sign and return to
Ross-Simons indicating they had read the handbook also stated
that the handbook was intended as a "guideline."9
Neri claimed, and Ross-Simons did not dispute, that she filed
a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for
Human Rights and waited 120 days before filing a complaint in
Superior Court.10 Neri's amended complaint alleged age and
gender discrimination based on the State Fair Employment
Practices Act (FEPA), and breach of an employment contract. 11
On Ross-Simons' motion for summary judgment, the motion
justice found that the employee handbook did not create a contract
under Rhode Island law, and that there was insufficient evidence
to permit a claim of age or gender discrimination. 12 The motion
justice entered summary judgment for Ross-Simons, and Neri
appealed. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Neri argued that the motion justice erred in
granting Ross-Simons' motion for summary judgment. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court reviewed Neri's case de novo first as to
whether the employee handbook constituted an employment
contract, and then as to whether there existed grounds for a claim
of age or gender discrimination.' 4
The court found that there was no error below, and





11. Id. at 46-47.




determined that summary judgment was appropriate for all
claims. 15 First the court ruled on the alleged breach of contract,
holding that an employee handbook subject to unilateral change
by the employer does not create a legitimate expectation that a
particular policy will remain in effect. 16 Neri should not have
relied on language that may have granted "bumping" rights, as
such a provision could be amended or deleted at any time and for
any reason. Furthermore, the terms of the handbook
unambiguously stated that the handbook was intended only as a
"guideline," and that it did nothing to affect the at-will
employment relationship. 17
The court then found that Neri, a fifty-three year old woman,
could show a prima facie case as a member of the classes protected
from age and gender discrimination.' 8  This was overcome,
however, when Ross-Simons produced a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs termination as part of a
company-wide staff reduction. 19 Neri was unable to refute Ross-
Simons' justification as merely pretext for a discriminatory
animus, and cited only the handbook "bumping" provision as
tending to show defendant contravened its staff reduction policy. 20
Although Neri offered the affidavit of another employee who
supports that the handbook "bumping" policy applied to salaried
employees, she was unable to provide the motion justice with a
single instance where a salaried employee was offered to displace
a less senior salaried employee. 2 1  At the time Neri was
discharged, several other employees, including other salaried
employees, were also terminated, lending credibility to
defendant's assertion of pervasive staff reduction. 22 Neri failed to
cast any meaningful doubt on Ross-Simons' justification of staff
reduction for terminating the plaintiff. The court concluded that a
jury could not reasonably infer age or gender based discrimination
based on the plaintiffs prima facie case and the possibility that
15. Id. at 52.
16. Id. at 48.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 49.
19. Id. at 50.
20. Id. at 50-51.
21. Id. at 51.
22. Id.
20071
586 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:583
Ross-Simons may have contravened its staff reduction policy.23
Employment Contracts in Rhode Island
In Rhode Island, there is a strong presumption in favor of at-
will employment, and "when the duration of a contract is
uncertain, the contract is to be considered terminable at will. ' '24
Prior to Neri, the court had stated, in dictum, that "if an employer
notifies its employees that its policies are subject to unilateral
change, the employees can have no legitimate expectation that
any particular policy will remain in force. ' '25 Neri reaffirmed this
principle, denying any contractual implications resulting from a
provision in an employee handbook that is subject to change at
any time.
Employment Discrimination in Rhode Island
FEPA prevents an employer from discharging an employee on
the basis of age or sex.26 Both age and gender based disparate
treatment claims involve a three-step burden shifting framework
as established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.27
For both age and gender discrimination claims, the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case for discrimination. When
alleging age discrimination, the plaintiff must show: (1) he or she
was at least forty years of age; (2) his or her job performance met
the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) the employer subjected
the plaintiff to adverse employment action; and (4) the employer
had a continuing need for the services provided by the position
from which the plaintiff was discharged.2 8
Similarly, to present a prima facie case for gender
discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she is a
member of a protected class; (2) his or her job performance met
23. Id. at 51-52.
24. Id. at 47 (citing Payne v. K-D Mfg. Co., 520 A.2d 569, 573 (R.I. 1987)).
25. Id. (citing Roy v. Woonsocket Inst. for Sav., 525 A.2d 915, 918 (R.I.
1987)).
26. Id. at 48 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-7(1)(i)-(ii) (1956)).
27. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
28. Id. at 49 (citing Rodriguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 78 n.1 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he or she suffered an
adverse job action by her employer; and (4) the plaintiffs
employers sought a replacement for her with roughly equivalent
qualifications. 29
For both age and gender discrimination claims, the second
step of the analysis shifts the burden to the employer to offer a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's
termination.3 0 The third and final step shifts the burden back to
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's reason for termination
was merely pretext for a discriminatory animus.3 1
COMMENTARY
In the two years before this case, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had previously analyzed the proper framework for age and
gender discrimination claims. The novel consideration here was
that the court directly ruled on whether an implied contract may
exist based on a handbook that the employer does not bind itself
to follow. The court quickly dispensed with this breach of contract
claim "because defendant unilaterally could change its policy
concerning staff reduction, plaintiff did not have a contractual
right to displace less senior employees. '32
Although not specifically addressed, the "bumping" rights
provision addressed here probably was not reasonably relied upon
by the plaintiff as a reason for either beginning or maintaining
employment with the defendant. The ruling seems to nonetheless
preclude recovery under a promissory estoppel theory even when
the plaintiff reasonably relied upon a handbook provision,
changed her position, and suffered harm as a result. In instances
of handbooks with boilerplate disclaimers, such disclaimer
language apparently operates as a per se bar to a claim on the
basis of handbook provisions without regard to surrounding
circumstances.
This ruling is valuable to Rhode Island workers who should
know better than to place too much reliance on the terms of the
company handbook.
29. Id. (citing DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 21 (R.I.
2005)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. at 48.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an employee
handbook that is subject to change by the employer at any time
does not create a contractual relationship between an employer
and employee whose relationship is otherwise at-will. 33 The court
applied the framework for age and gender based discrimination,
finding that a possible violation of handbook termination protocol
is insufficient to overcome a defendant's legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee. 34
Adam Noska
33. Id.
34. Id. at 51.
Employment Law. Trant v. Lucent Technologies, 896 A.2d
710 (R.I. 2006). Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an
employee who is totally incapacitated for more than fifty-two
cumulative weeks is eligible for a cost-of-living adjustment
(COLA) provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-33-17(f)(1)
regardless of whether or not those weeks of total incapacity are
consecutive. The court found requiring more than fifty-two
consecutive weeks of total incapacity as both inconsistent with the
remedial purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act and contrary
to the canons of statutory construction.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The petitioner-employee, John Trant was injured on July 26,
2000, causing harm to his neck, right ear, right arm, right hand,
and post-traumatic stress syndrome.' As a result of his injury,
Trant became totally incapacitated on July 27, 2000 and remained
totally incapacitated through May 10, 2002.2 However, during
that period, between August 23, 2000 and May 25, 2001, Trant
was placed on partially disability. 3  Trant claimed workers'
compensation but later filed a petition against the respondent-
employer, Lucent Technologies (Lucent), alleging that the
employer had failed to pay the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA)
provided by R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-17(f)(1), as amended by P.L.
2000, ch. 491, § 4.4 Lucent contended that because the employee's
period of total incapacity as of May 10, 2002 - the statutorily
prescribed date on which COLAs are to be considered 5 - did not
exceed fifty-two consecutive weeks, he was not entitled to a
1. Trant v. Lucent Techs., 896 A.2d 710, 711 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id. The petitioner was totally incapacitated until at least May 10,
2003. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The COLA provision is part of the Workers' Compensation Act,
chapters 29-38 of title 28 of the Rhode Island General Laws. See R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-29-1 et seq.
5. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-17(f)(1), as amended by P.L. 2000, CH. 491,
§4.
589
590 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:589
COLA. 6
The only issue before the Workers' Compensation Court was
one of statutory interpretation: whether or not the employee was
eligible for a COLA in the year 2002. The COLA statute provides
in relevant part:
Where any employee's incapacity is total and has extended
beyond fifty-two (52) weeks, regardless of the date of injury,
payments made to all totally incapacitated employees shall be
increased as of May 10, 1991, and annually on the tenth of May
after that as long as the employee remains totally incapacitated. 7
The trial justice agreed with Lucent, concluding that Trant
was not entitled to a COLA under the Workers' Compensation Act
because, although his period of total incapacity exceeded fifty-two
weeks as of May 10, 2002, this period was not consecutive.8 The
Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court (Appellate
Division) affirmed.9 It gleaned two conditions from the "plain
language of the statute."10  First, the statute's first phrase,
"[w]here any employee's incapacity is total," requires an eligible
employee to be currently suffering from total incapacity on May 10
of a given year."I Second, the statute's use of the word "extended"
requires that current period of incapacity to be continuous. 12 In
addition, the Appellate Division found that allowing an injured
worker to tack together periods of incapacity would 'impose an
almost impossible administrative burden."' 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Trant argued
that, to be eligible for a COLA, a worker's total incapacity need
not be consecutive as long as it lasts longer than fifty-two
6. Trant, 896A.2d at 711.
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-17(f)(1), as amended by P.L. 2000, CH. 491, § 4.
This statute has been amended since the date of the petitioner's injury;
however, the substantive language remains the same. Trant, 896 A.2d at 711
n. 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 712.
10. Trant v. Lucent Techs., W.C.C. 04-01981, *4 (R.I. Workers' Comp. Ct.
App. Div. 2004).
11. Id. (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at *4-5.
13. Id. at *5.
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cumulative weeks, pointing to the remedial purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act.14 Trant contended that the Appellate
Division erred as a matter of law by reading a restrictive provision
into the Act. 15 The Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner.
The court pointed out that the plain language of the COLA
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act does not explicitly
require an excess of fifty-two consecutive weeks of total
incapacity. 16  Nonetheless, the court found the statute to be
ambiguous "about whether periods of incapacity may or may not
be combined for COLA purposes."' 7 The court stated that, as a
matter of statutory construction, when a statute is unclear or
ambiguous, the court "shall examine the entire statute to
ascertain the intent and purpose of the Legislature"' 8 and
"attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its
policies."' 9  The Workers' Compensation Act, as a remedial
statute, "should be liberally construed to effectuate [its] salutary
purpose. '20  More particularly, "ambiguities in the Workers'
Compensation Act generally must be construed liberally in favor
of the employee."'2 1
According to the court, the Appellate Division did not construe
the COLA provision in conformity with these canons of statutory
construction. 22 The court emphasized the fact that the petitioner,
between July 27, 2000 and May 10, 2002, had been totally
incapacitated in excess of fifty-two weeks with only a short
interval of partial incapacity in that time period. 23 Throughout
that time period, Trant's disability was attributable to the same
injury. Additionally, throughout that time period, Trant did not
recover, nor did he hold another job.24 As such, denying the
petitioner a COLA, by "insert[ing] into the statute language that




18. Id. (quoting Jeff Anthony Props. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of N.
Providence, 853 A.2d 1226, 1230 (R.I. 2004)).
19. Id. (quoting Oliveira v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453, 457 (R.I. 2002)).
20. Id. at 712-13 (quoting McCarthy v. Envtl. Transp. Servs, Inc., 865
A.2d 1056, 1063 (R.I. 2005)).
21. Id. at 713 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id. In fact, petitioner was on partial disability for thirty-nine weeks.
24. Id.
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has significant independent meaning" was not a method of
construing the statute "liberally in favor of the employee. ''25
Furthermore, because the General Assembly presumably knows
the meaning of its enactments and used the word "consecutive"
numerous other times in the Workers' Compensation Act, the
word's absence "was both purposeful and meaningful. '26 The
General Assembly could have included "consecutive" in the COLA
provision if that had been its intention. Finally, the court
disagreed with the Appellate Division's concern that construing
the provision otherwise would impose an "almost impossible
administrative burden," finding instead that piecing together
periods of total incapacity is "a matter of simple arithmetic. '27
COMMENTARY
At first glance, it appears that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reached a legitimate conclusion. The decision assured that
an injured worker who had been disabled and unable to work for
over a year would receive a cost-of-living adjustment on his
workers' compensation rate. Perhaps more importantly, the court
rejected a judicially-imposed restriction on what the legislature
intended to be a remedial provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act. Surely the lower court's decision to insert an additional word
into what the legislature had carefully written implicated the
separation of powers. The problem lies, however, in the
application of this decision. While the Supreme Court accurately
noted that determining whether an injured worker has suffered
from total disability for more than fifty-two weeks is a matter of
mere arithmetic,28 the burden created here is not one of simple
math. Rather, determining the scope of this decision will likely
breed litigation, making attorneys the real benefactors of this
case.
It is no coincidence that the COLA provision requires an
excess of fifty-two weeks of total incapacity and there are fifty-two
weeks in a year. Consider the rationale of the Appellate Division:
To allow an employee to piece together periods of total
25. Id. (emphasis omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 713.
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incapacity which may be accumulated over any number of
years would lead to an absurd result. An employee who is
totally disabled is unable to work and earn any wages at
all. When such an employee is entirely unable to work for
a period of a year or more and is locked [into] a weekly
compensation rate set at the time of his injury, he begins
to lose ground against a rising cost of living and misses
out on increases in wages. The implementation of a
COLA for injured workers who have been continuously
disabled for at least a year reflects an effort to assist
those employees in keeping up with rising costs. Such a
rationale would not apply to an employee who is only
totally disabled for brief periods and is otherwise capable
of some type of restricted work if he or she chooses to find
work. 29
There was a sound basis, therefore, for the Appellate
Division's decision and the one-year requirement set out in the
COLA provision. The Supreme Court's decision might still be
considered the "right" one in this case, however, because of the
statute's arbitrary date for the determination of COLA benefits
and its assumptions about incapacity.
The statute provides that payments to totally incapacitated
employees will be increased on May 10th of each year. Read quite
literally, this means an employee who is seriously injured in June
and remains totally incapacitated until the second following April,
for example, will never benefit from a cost-of-living adjustment.3 0
The following May 10th, he will not have accumulated fifty-two
weeks of disability. A year after that, he no longer has total
incapacity status. This, of course, may have been what the
legislature intended and was not directly addressed in this case.
Nonetheless, the provision's arbitrary date did play a role in this
case. While the decision did not say for how long Trant continued
to suffer from total incapacity, it did mention that he was granted
a COLA in 2003 and, thus, was still completely disabled over a
29. Trant v. Lucent Techs., W.C.C.04-01981, *5 (R.I. Workers' Comp. Ct.
App. Div. 2004).
30. A period of total incapacity from June until the second following April
(for example, June 2007 until April 2009) would last for at least twenty-two
months - far exceeding, if not almost doubling, fifty-two weeks.
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year later.31 Trant did not qualify for the 2002 COLA under the
"consecutive" reading of the statute because he relapsed into total
incapacity on May 25, 2001, making him just fifteen days short of
qualifying, even though he did not hold a job from July 26, 2000
until, as far as the court tells us, May 10, 2003.32 It seems likely
that the court considered this in determining that requiring an
excess of fifty-two consecutive weeks simply did not work "in favor
of the employee. ' '33
The statute also arbitrarily assumes that injured workers who
fluctuate between periods of partial and complete disability will be
"otherwise capable of some type of restricted work. ' 34  The
realities of our economy and human health instead make it
unlikely such an employee will be able to go back to work, find a
new job, or make a substantive amount of money during those
healthier periods. While this assumption may be a political
matter left better to the legislature, it makes sense that the
Supreme Court did not want to limit the benefits to those workers
whose illness or injury varies in severity.
The problem created by this seemingly appropriate decision,
then, is the fact that the Supreme Court did not attempt to draw a
line. Of course, the court did not need to go beyond answering the
simple question in this case: whether the COLA provision requires
more than fifty-two consecutive weeks of total incapacity. 35 But
the court did not articulate a holding in its decision. It simply
"disagree[d] with the Appellate Division. '36 As such, the Appellate
Division's concern, that an employee may try to tack together
periods of total incapacity accumulated over any number of years,
may be the actual result. The bottom line is that more injured
workers will feel that they are eligible for a COLA benefit, and
more claims against employers will be filed. Reporting on this
decision, the Beacon Mutual Insurance Company website
observed,
Employers can [now] expect inquiry from injured workers
and their attorneys about the duration of benefit receipt.
31. Trant, 896 A.2d at 711.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 712 (emphasis omitted).
34. Trant, W.C.C. 04-01981, *5.
35. See Trant, 896 A.2d at 710.
36. Id. at 713.
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Detail is the watchword, as the potential impact will be
more related to interest, penalties, and attorney's fees, as
distinguished from the actual COLA benefit, if any.3 7
Then again, this may be a cost that the Supreme Court
deemed worthwhile in order that injured workers have adequate
compensation.
The facts of the decision will likely provide some guidance in
determining future COLA claims. The Supreme Court noted that
the employee's accumulation of over fifty-two weeks of total
incapacity was attributable to the same injury, he did not recover
from the original injury, he did not hold a job since the date of his
injury, and he was placed on partial disability for only a short
interval (thirty-nine weeks). These four simple facts may be
considered factors in the subsequent cases that are likely to
follow. Nonetheless, the Workers' Compensation Court will need
to address other questions: Is there a cap on the number of years
from which fifty-two cumulative weeks of total disability can be
combined? Does the length of the relative periods of total and
partial incapacity matter? What is the dividing line between
partial disability and recovery? How will it be determined that
the injured worker could have held a job in the interim? Does an
employee have to be totally incapacitated on May 10 of each year,
as the Appellate Division held? Regardless of these open-ended
questions and their potential ability to create a flood of COLA
litigation, it seems that the Supreme Court made a rationale,
equitable, and legally-sound decision in quashing the
"consecutive" requirement 
- at least in this case.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Workers'
Compensation Act does not require that an injured worker be
totally incapacitated in excess of fifty-two consecutive weeks in
order to qualify for a cost-of-living adjustment under Rhode Island
General Laws § 28-33-17(f)(1). As long as an injured worker
suffers from total disability for longer than fifty-two cumulative
weeks, the injured worker may be eligible.
Megan Maciasz
Evidence. State v. Silvia, 898 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2006). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction
of second-degree murder. The defendant argued, inter alia, that
the lower court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude
his prior convictions from being used as impeachment evidence
against him should he choose to take the stand. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Luce v. United States, which stated that "in order to
preserve for appeal a claim of improper impeachment with a prior
conviction under Rule 609, the defendant must testify at trial."
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 30, 2001, Joseph Lima (the victim) and Robert
Silvia (the defendant) were drinking at the Somewhere Else Bar,
located at 22 Earle Street in Central Falls. 1 According to the
testimony of Margaret White, the bartender on the evening in
question, Santos, Silvia's roommate, "started to 'get loud' and
began waving his arms in the air," almost burning Warren Dolan
with a cigarette and knocking over his drink.2 White told Santos
to calm down. 3 Santos called Silvia over to tell him what had
happened, and Silvia approached the bar and began screaming
and swearing at White.4 Lima then stood up and told Silvia that
he should not disrespect White. 5 The two men yelled back and
forth at each other, and White told Silvia to leave the bar, which
he did.6
White further testified that ten minutes later, Silvia called
the bar and told White that he was "coming back that night to
burn the bar down with her inside of it .... ,"7 Sensing that she





6. Id. at 710-11.
7. Id. at 711.
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was in real danger, White immediately called Kathleen Ash, the
owner of the bar who lived upstairs.8 Ash went out to find Santos
because she wanted to ask him about Silvia's behavior. 9 Without
an invitation, Lima decided to follow Ash to another bar where she
suspected Santos would be. 10 Soon after, Ash was notified that
Silvia was riding his bicycle back and forth in front of her bar and
she returned to the bar. 11 There are multiple accounts of what
occurred next.
According to Ash, she approached Sylvia and "asked him what
his problem was." 12 She further testified that Lima "suddenly
appeared, and the next thing she remembered was seeing Lima
stumbling near a van ... ."13 According to Dolan's account of the
same events, Ash approached and "started screaming at defendant
and asking him why he had threatened to burn her bar down. '14
Dolan then described that "hands reached over me ... [and] the
defendant jumped of his bike."'15 Then Silvia punched Lima in the
stomach, and Lima "went down on one knee.' 16 A man, Victor
Estrada, who lived diagonally across the street from the bar also
claims that he saw what happened that night. 17 Estrada explains
that Lima approached Silvia and told him not to talk to the owner
disrespectfully. 18 According to Estrada's testimony, Silvia then
got off his bicycle and attacked Lima. 19 Although there are
differing accounts of what exactly happened outside the bar, no
one, including Silvia, denies that Sylvia stabbed Lima.
A jury found Silvia guilty of second degree murder.20 After
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, Judge Ragosta
sentenced Silvia to a term of sixty years - forty to serve at the







14. Id. at 712.
15. Id.




20. Id. at 714.
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probation. 2 1 Silvia appealed, arguing that the lower court "erred
in (1) limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of Victor
Estrada; (2) admitting into evidence Lima's bloody and cut
clothing and also admitting testimony by Michael Bessette (a
rescue worker) about efforts to resuscitate Lima while he was
being transported the Rhode Island Hospital; and (3) denying
defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior
convictions." 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in an opinion written by
Justice Robinson, addressed each of Silvia's arguments seriatim.
While this survey will touch briefly on Silvia's first two
arguments, more focus will be given to the third argument.
The Cross-Examination of Victor Estrada
The issue was whether the trial court erred in restricting the
cross-examination of Estrada by defense counsel.2 3 A trial justice
has discretion to determine the permissible scope and extent of
cross-examination and only a clear showing of abuse of discretion
and prejudice to the moving party will cause the lower court's
decision to be overturned. 24 Here, the court found that the trial
justice did not abuse his discretion and that Silvia had an
opportunity to cross-examine Estrada's testimony. 2 5 Therefore,
the court held that "there was no reversible error in the trial
justice's rulings limiting the cross-examination of Estrada. ' '26
The Admission of Certain Items of Clothing and Admission of
Michael Bessette's Testimony
Silvia argued that the trial court erred when it allowed the




24. Id. at 715.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 715-16.
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and also admitted Michael Bessette's testimony.27 Because he did
not dispute the fact that he had stabbed Lima, Silvia argued that
the above mentioned evidence was "more prejudicial than
probative" and should, therefore, have been kept out under Rule
403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 28  The court
emphasized that it would only reverse if the trial justice abused
his discretion. 29 Unable to find that abuse of discretion, the court
refused to disturb the lower court's determination. 30
The Denial of Silvia's Motion to Exclude Evidence of his Prior
Convictions
Silvia contends that the trial justice erred when he denied his
motion in limine to bar the 'prosecution from using his prior
convictions to impeach him under Rule 609, if Silvia decided to
take the witness stand.31 Understandably, Silvia did not want the
jury to know that he had been convicted of first-degree sexual
assault in 1994, possession of cocaine in 1992, breaking and
entering with intent to commit larceny in 1990, and assault in
1989.32 The most damning evidence, though, was that the 1994
sexual assault involved the use of a knife - the same type of
weapon involved in the present case.33 Under the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence, Rule 609 allows evidence of a witness's prior
conviction for impeachment purposes unless "its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs the probative value of the conviction. '34
Determining that a trial justice has "broad discretion in deciding
whether or not to admit evidence of prior convictions under Rule
609," the court refused to overturn the lower courts ruling.35
After disposing of the third issue on the merits, the court then
announced that it would "adopt a new policy with respect to
appeals that challenge Rule 609 rulings by the trial court. '36 The




31. Id. at 717-18.
32. Id. at 718.
33. Id.




court decided to follow the practice established in the United
States Supreme Court decision in Luce v. United States which
provided that "in order 'to raise and preserve for review the claim
of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant
must testify."'37 The Supreme Court reasoned that a reviewing
court would have no way of determining (or if it did, any such
determination would be purely speculative) the impact of
erroneous impeachment, unless the defendant testifies. 38 If the
defendant testifies at trial and is impeached with evidence of his
prior convictions, then the reviewing court will at least have the
full record to assist it in weighing the probative value of the
impeachment evidence against its prejudicial effect. 39
Furthermore, there was concern that if in limine rulings were
reviewable even when the defendant did not testify, "almost any
error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal [because]
the appellate court could not logically term 'harmless' an error
that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying. 40 In sum,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Luce, and held that "[iun order to
preserve for appeal a claim of improper impeachment with a prior
conviction under Rule 609, the defendant must testify at trial. '41
While recognizing that in this situation criminal defendants face
''a serious dilemma," the court responded that "serious dilemmas
are part and parcel of the life of every person. '4 2
COMMENTARY
The Supreme Court of the United States decided Luce in
1984. Twenty-two years later, in 2006, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court decided to adopt the policy established in Luce. One might
ask, if the policy established in Luce is correct, why did the Rhode
Island Supreme Court wait so many years to adopt this "new"
policy? While this question may never be answered, or if it is, the
answer may be entirely unsatisfying,4 3 there are other troubling
37. Id. at 718-19 (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)).
38. Id. at 719.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Luce, 469 U.S. at 42).
41. Id. at 720.
42. Id.
43. For example, the reason could simply be that a case that presented
the right set of facts to address the issue never arose until the present case.
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aspects of this case. First, Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence is "substantially broader than its federal counterpart."44
Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the same policy
regarding defendants taking the stand that the Federal Courts
had adopted with respect to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. However, Rhode Island continues to use a broad Rule
609, without adopting the narrower federal version. Do the same
rationales for adopting the "defendant-must-testify-standard"
apply when Rule 609 is different under the Rhode Island and
Federal Rules of Evidence? The Court focused primarily on how
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Luce was sound.4 5
In this case, on each of Silvia's arguments, the court found
that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion.4 6 However, it is
hard to see how evidence of a prior conviction of first-degree
sexual assault with a knife, would not have an unfairly prejudicial
effect that will substantially outweigh its probative value. Does
evidence of a person being convicted of sexually assaulting
another with a knife in the past really make that person any more
likely to be telling the truth or not at trial? If the answer is yes,
then the prior conviction is probative. However, it is hard to see
why a violent person would be any more likely than a non-violent
person to lie under oath. As for the unfairly prejudicial aspect of
the weighing test, when the jury hears that Silvia was convicted of
sexual assault with a knife, they will likely say to themselves that
Silvia probably did stab Lima; not because the evidence of Silvia's
conviction makes it more likely that he is lying, but rather
because of the similarity of the two crimes - both involving a
knife. Furthermore, the jury may not be able to use the evidence
exclusively for its permitted purpose, but will simply decide to
convict the defendant because he is a bad man - after all, he did
sexually assault a woman at knife point. For the above reasons,
the trial justice should have found that on the merits the unfair
prejudice of allowing the prior convictions to be used as
impeachment substantially outweighed the marginal probative
value of the prior convictions.
44. Silvia, 898 A.2d at 718 n.9.




The Rhode Island Supreme Court, adopting the policy of Luce
v. United States, held that a criminal defendant, in order to
preserve for appeal a claim of improper impeachment with a prior
conviction under Rule 609, must testify at trial.4 7 The court
rejected each of Silvia's arguments finding that the trial justice
did not abuse his discretion. 48
J. David Freel
47. Id. at 720.
48. Id.
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Family Law. Cote- Whitacre v. Department of Public Health,
No. 04-2656, 2006 WL 3208758 (Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 2006). The
Superior Court of Suffolk County, on remand from the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, interpreted Massachusetts
General Law ch. 207 §11 to preclude same-sex marriage in Rhode
Island only to the extent that an express prohibition by positive
law of Rhode Island precludes such unions. The court interpreted
positive law to include constitutional amendments, statutes, and
controlling appellate decisions. At the time of the decision, there
was no evidence of any positive law in Rhode Island prohibiting
same-sex marriages. Therefore the court held that same-sex
marriage was not prohibited in Rhode Island and couples married
in Massachusetts and residing in Rhode Island shall have their
marriages processed.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
After the decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health,' which provided that persons of the same sex were legally
allowed to marry in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, eight
same-sex couples from states outside of the Commonwealth
wished to marry in Massachusetts. These couples resided in
Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and
Rhode Island, and intended to continue to reside within those
states following their union. Three of the couples were refused
marriage licenses, and five who received licenses were prevented
from being registered in the Commonwealth. 2 In June of 2004,
the couples filed suit in Suffolk County, Massachusetts seeking
declaratory judgment that Massachusetts General Law 207 §11
was unconstitutionally applied to the plaintiffs. 3
The statute in question provides that:
No marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by
a party residing and intending to continue to reside in
1. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
2. Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Public Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL
3208758, at *1 (Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 2006).
3. Id.
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another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if
contracted in such other jurisdiction, and every marriage
contracted in this commonwealth in violation thereof
shall be null and void.4
The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary order enjoining the
application of the statute and an order requiring the processing of
the marriage licenses. 5 The Superior Court of Suffolk County
denied the motions after determining that the couples failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. 6
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct
appellate review of the Superior Court decision and affirmed the
denial of the motion by the lower court.7 The court, however,
ordered the cases of Rhode Island and New York to proceed in
Superior Court "for a determination whether same-sex marriage is
prohibited in those States. '8 The Rhode Island plaintiffs and
defendants submitted memoranda to the Superior Court of Suffolk
County on whether same-sex marriage is prohibited in Rhode
Island and oral arguments were heard in June of 2006.9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Superior Court quickly dispensed with the question of
whether same-sex marriage in New York is prohibited, noting that
the Court of Appeals of New York decided in July of 2006 that
same-sex marriage was unconstitutional in New York.10 The
resolution of the question of prohibition in Rhode Island, required
much closer scrutiny.
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in the previous Cote-
Whitacre provided a majority only in that the Superior Court was
directed to consider whether same-sex marriage was prohibited in
Rhode Island. The three concurrences authored by the Justices on
the issue of statutory construction of Massachusetts General Laws
4. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207 §11 (West 1998)
5. Cote-Whitacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *1.
6. Id.




10. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006)
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ch. 207 §§11 and 12"1 did not produce a majority, and thus there
was "some difficulty in determining a binding rule of law."1 2
Justice Spina's concurrence construed the statutes broadly to
prohibit same-sex unions if the state of domicile of the residents
prohibits same-sex marriage expressly, through constitutional
amendment, common law, or by statutory language. 13
Furthermore, Justice Spina urged that in absence of appellate
decisions on the matter, to look at the general common law for to
see if marriage is interpreted to mean between one man and one
woman. 14 On the other hand, Chief Justice Marshall construed
the statutes more narrowly, stating that same-sex marriage is
only precluded by explicit positive law (constitutional amendment,
statute, or controlling appellate decision) that these particular
marriages are void. 15
Because the Supreme Judicial Court was unable to produce a
majority as to the proper construction of the pertinent statutes,
the Superior Court turned to the rule laid down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Marks v. United States, that states that "when
a divided court provides no majority rationale for its decision, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."' 16 With this foundation, the Superior Court reasoned
that Chief Justice Marshall's construction of the statutes was
narrowest and therefore represented the holding of the court on
the issue on how the statutes are to be constructed. 17 The court
also noted that Justice Spina also agreed that express statutory
language would preclude same-sex marriage as part of his broader
reading of the statute, and therefore Marshall's construction
represented a "common denominator" of the court's reasoning. 18
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 207 §12 provides:
Before issuing a license to marry a person who resides and intends to
continue to reside in another state, the officer having authority to
issue the license shall satisfy himself, by requiring affidavits or
otherwise, that such person is not prohibited from intermarrying by
the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she resides.




16. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
17. Cote-Whitacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *3.
18. Id.
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The court also found support for this reading of the statute
within the rules of statutory construction; namely that a statute
in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. 19
The courts of Massachusetts have long held that a marriage that
is valid where it is contracted is valid everywhere, 20 therefore the
rules of construction require General Laws ch.207 §§11, 12 to be
construed strictly, as long as the construction is consistent with
the statutory purpose.2 1 The statutes were enacted based on the
Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, for the purpose to make uniform
the law of the states that enact the legislation. Here, as the
construction by the Chief Justice is in line with that of Illinois,
Louisiana, Vermont, and Wisconsin, the construction is consistent
with the statutory purposes. 22
Applying the construction that same-sex marriage will only be
prohibited if it is expressly deemed void by positive law, the court
finds no evidence of any positive Rhode Island law on the
matter.2 3 Therefore, with no positive law prohibiting same-sex
marriage, the court held that same-sex marriage is not prohibited
in Rhode Island, and declaratory judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs was entered as such.
COMMENTARY
The Superior Court of Suffolk County's construction and
application of the laws of Massachusetts as narrowly as possible
was the most legally sound manner in which to deal with the
controversial issue of same-sex marriages, especially when
considering that the court was, in essence, interpreting the laws of
another sovereign state. Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of
General Laws ch.207 §11, 12 complied most strictly with the rules
of statutory construction as was painstakingly pointed out by the
Superior Court. It is important to note the distinction between
Justice Spiro's and the Chief Justice's concurrences in the original
Cote-Whitacre decision.24  The Justices agreed on the use of
19. Id.
20. Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 463 (1873).
21. Cote-Whitacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *3.
22. Id. at *4.
23. Id.
24. Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Public Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass.
2006).
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positively enacted law as a means to decipher whether same-sex
marriage is precluded, however, Spiro went further to include the
general common law of the state as to its interpretation of the
institution of marriage, something the Chief Justice felt was too
broad an interpretation. 25 The distinction is important from a
political, as well as legal, standpoint it seems. Delving into
another state's body of common law on a issue as controversial as
same-sex marriage would seem to be too large of an intrusion of
sovereignty for another state's trial court to do. By complying
with established rules of construction and interpretation, the
Superior Court presents a sound legal rationale for the non-
prohibition of same-sex marriage without departing into the
political arena of the state of Rhode Island. The court merely
commented on what Rhode Island has not positively done in its
laws, not on what possible interpretations exist within the state's
body of common law.
Where this decision becomes most interesting is what
happens next. As it stands, without an express prohibition in law
by Rhode Island, Rhode Islanders are free to marry in
Massachusetts as they please, and then return to Rhode Island to
live as married partners. Without express prohibition, this
opinion presents a persuasive interpretation of law in Rhode
Island that could be advantageous to gay rights activists in future
confrontations in the courts of Rhode Island over the validity of
same-sex marriage within Rhode Island's borders. However, on
the other side of the coin, this decision could prove to be a catalyst
for enacting positive law in Rhode Island to establish same-sex
marriage as illegal, and therefore render the decision by the
Superior Court void under the terms of the Massachusetts statute.
CONCLUSION
The Superior Court of Suffolk County of Massachusetts held
that Massachusetts General Laws ch. 207 §§11, 12 are to be
interpreted on the most narrow of grounds and therefore finding
that same-sex marriage is only prohibited in Rhode Island by an
act of positive law in the form of constitutional amendment,
statute, or controlling appellate decision. As there was no
25. Cote-Whitacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *2.
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evidence presented to the court of the existence of any positive law
prohibiting same-sex marriage in Rhode Island, a declaratory
judgment was entered that same-sex marriage is not prohibited in
Rhode Island.2 6
Kevin Lewis
26. Id. at *4.
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Family Law. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2006). The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not apply to
proceedings to terminate the parental rights of cognitively limited
parents. Further, the court held that the lower court did not
abuse its discretion by (a) refusing to consider a direct consent
adoption petition before the Department of Children, Youth, and
Families (DCYF) petition to terminate parental rights, (b) finding
that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify by presenting, but
refusing to fund, multiple caseplans, (c) finding the parents unfit,
despite their compliance with DCYF, primarily due to their
cognitive limitations, and (d) finding that the termination of
parental rights was in the best interests of the child despite the
parents' demonstrated love for and efforts to parent their child,
who had been in non-relative foster care from birth.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Kayla N. was born to Dawn and Irving N. on April 13, 2000.1
Dawn had previously signed an open adoption agreement as to her
older daughter, Michelle, in response to DCYF's petition for
involuntary termination of parental rights. 2 The petition had
alleged that Dawn was unfit because she was homeless and
cognitively limited. 3 As a result of its previous involvement with
Dawn, DCYF removed Kayla from her parents and, failing to find
a suitable relative placement, 4 placed Kayla into non-relative
foster care. 5
DCYF developed several case plans for Dawn and Irving, each
1. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 1204 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id. at 1203. Open adoptions are common responses to involuntary
termination of parental rights petitions because they permit the parents to
preserve visitation rights with their children; termination petitions are also
common because DCYF is required by statute to bring them under certain
conditions of timing. See R. I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1204. Irving's sister Sandra N. was caring for two terminally
ill relatives at the time and therefore deemed unsuitable. Id.




of which claimed a goal of reunifying them with Kayla.6 The case
plans also required DCYF to provide certain services to Dawn and
Irving, most importantly a parent-aide program, provided by
Spurwink of Rhode Island, specializing in parents and children
with cognitive limitations.7  Spurwink oversaw weekly visits
between Kayla and her parents until December, 2000, when Dawn
and Irving admitted to dependency8 conditioned on their receiving
Spurwink-supervised home visits with Kayla, which the court
duly ordered. 9 Spurwink, however, refused to supervise home
visits, citing to an alleged threat made by Dawn, and as a result
DCYF withdrew funding for Spurwink.10
DCYF next referred Dawn and Irving to a second program at
John Hope Settlement House."I After a supervisor there provided
DCYF with a favorable progress report on Dawn and Irving, the
DCYF caseworker failed to disclose this report and DCYF
withdrew funding from the program. 12
Following that caseworker's reassignment on order of the
court, Dawn's and Irving's visitation with Kayla increased to twice
per week. They received three new referrals to programs with
which they substantially complied, and by August, 2001 the court
had granted weekly overnight visits between Kayla and her
parents under the supervision of Irving's sister Sandra. 13 In
January, 2002, Irving sought to have Kayla placed with Sandra;
less than a week later, DCYF filed a petition to terminate Dawn's
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see R. I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-3(6):
"Dependent" means any child who requires the protection and
assistance of the court when his or her physical or mental health or
welfare is harmed or threatened with harm due to the inability of
the parent or guardian, through no fault of the parent or guardian,
to provide the child with a minimum degree of care or proper
supervision because of:
(i) The death or illness of a parent; or
(ii) The special medical, educational, or social service needs of the
child which the parent is unable to provide.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1204-05.
11. Id. at 1205.
12. Id. at 1205, 1205 n.4.
13. Id. at 1205.
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and Irving's parental rights. 14 In February, Dawn and Irving
independently moved to have Kayla permanently placed with
Sandra; in April, Sandra filed an adoption petition. 15 From May
to December, 2002, the court held consolidated hearings on the
adoption and termination petitions.16
As a result of the hearings, Dawn and Irving were found unfit
to parent Kayla. Their parental rights were terminated, and the
adoption petition denied because (a) it had been filed in response
to DCYF's petition to terminate Dawn's and Irving's parental
rights and (b) Kayla and her half-sister Michelle had bonded over
the course of Kayla's time in foster care. 17 Dawn, Irving, and
Sandra all filed appeals before judgment was entered. 18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Dawn,
Irving, and Sandra contended that the hearing justice had
incorrectly found (a) that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to
reunify Kayla with her parents, (b) that Dawn and Irving were
unfit, and (c) that Kayla's best interests were served by
terminating Dawn's and Irving's parental rights. 19 -They also
argued that the hearing justice had erred in refusing to consider
the adoption petition before the termination of parental rights
petition.20 Finally, the Rhode Island Disability Law Center, Inc.
argued as an amicus curiae that the ADA applies to termination of
parental rights proceedings, precluding the court from
discriminating against parents on the basis of cognitive
14. Id. DCYF's petition relied on R. I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(vii): "The
parent has exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously detrimental to the
child, for a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the
child for an extended period of time," and R. I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(3):
The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the
department for children, youth, and families for at least twelve (12)
months, and the parents were offered or received services to correct
the situation which led to the child being placed; provided, that there
is not a substantial probability that the child will be able to return
safely to the parents' care within a reasonable period of time
considering the child's age and the need for a permanent home.
15. Id. at 1206.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1206 and n.6.
19. Id. at 1207.
20. Id.
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limitations or other disabilities.21 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the hearing justice's findings of fact were not
clearly erroneous, 22 the adoption petition was properly excluded
from consideration because DCYF had not agreed to the
adoption, 23 and the ADA does not apply to termination of parental
rights proceedings. 24
Findings of Fact
Because reasonable efforts to reunify, parental unfitness, and
the best interests of the child are broadly-defined standards which
afford great discretion to the hearing justice, the court ceded to
and upheld the hearing justice's findings on these issues. 25 Rhode
Island General Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1) requires that DCYF make
reasonable efforts to reunify a child and her parents before the
court may grant a petition to terminate the parental rights of the
parents. The court held that the numerous case plans DCYF
developed were sufficiently demonstrative of reasonable efforts to
pass statutory muster.26 Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-
7(a)(2) requires a showing of parental unfitness by clear and
convincing evidence as grounds for an order to terminate parental
rights. 27 The court held that testimony from various witnesses
who had examined Dawn and Irving both individually and
interacting with Kayla was sufficient basis for a finding of
unfitness regardless of both conflicting testimony and abundant
evidence of Dawn's and Irving's compliance with DCYF and love
for their child.28  Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-7(c)(1)
requires the hearing justice to find that a child's best interests
would be served by the termination of her parents' rights as to her
as grounds for such an order. 29  The court held that the
combination of a finding that Dawn and Irving were unfit and
evidence of Kayla's establishment in the home of her foster family,
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1209-1211.
23. Id. at 1211-1212.
24. Id. at 1208.
25. Id. at 1209-1212.
26. Id. at 1209.
27. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2).
28. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d. at 1210.
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(c)(1).
2007]
614 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:610
including bonding with her half-sister, provided sufficient grounds
to demonstrate that a termination of parental rights was in
Kayla's best interests despite Dawn's and Irving's persistent
efforts to create a normal family setting for Kayla, whom they
very evidently loved. 30
Adoption Petition
Because Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-14.1(b)(4), the
statute authorizing open adoptions, expressly requires the consent
of DCYF, and that consent was lacking here, the hearing justice
properly considered DCYF's petition for termination of parental
rights and was in fact required by statute to reject the adoption
petition.31
Americans with Disabilities Act
Because termination of parental rights proceedings are held
for the benefit of the child and not the parents, the ADA does not
protect disabled parents from discrimination in such
proceedings. 32  The ADA 33 prohibits any public entity from
discriminating against disabled persons with regard by denying
such persons the benefits of any services, programs, or activities.34
The court relied on cases from other jurisdictions35 in holding that
discrimination against disabled parents is permissible in
termination of parental rights proceedings because such
discrimination does not deny the parents of any benefit as
contemplated by the statute.36 This holding has been appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States; the certiorari petition is
still pending as of the time of writing.
30. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d. at 1211.
31. Id. at 1211-12.
32. Id. at 1208.
33. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134.
34. Id. at § 12132.
35. See generally M.C. v. Department of Children & Families, 750 So.2d
705, 706 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000); In re Anthony P., 84 Cal.App.4th 1112, 101
Cal.Rptr.2d 423 (Cal.Ct.App.2000); In the Interest of A.P., 728 A.2d 375, 379
(Pa. Super.Ct. 1999); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 (1999); In the Interest
of Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243 (Wis.Ct.App.1994).
36. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at 1208.
SURVEY SECTION
COMMENTARY
This case stands as a testament to some of the deep flaws
within and the child welfare system in general and specifically
those laws which led to its result. At the federal level, the
Adoptions and Safe Families Act ("ASFA")37 constrains state child
welfare proceedings by mandating termination of parental rights
as a function of time rather than unfitness per se.38 At the state
level, the vast discretionary authority vested in the hearing
justices, designed to permit flexibility in child welfare proceedings
for the greatest benefit to the child, instead places in the justices'
hands the extremely difficult task of sifting truth from an overly
adversarial proceeding in which the state reaps most of the
procedural benefits. 39 The combination of federal and state child
welfare laws effectively shifts the state's presumption from
parental fitness to parental unfitness. This shift is clearly
reflected in Dawn's and Irving's struggles to demonstrate their
fitness to a state which never gave them a valid chance.
The rigid structure imposed by the ASFA precluded Dawn
and Irving from overcoming the hurdles laid in their path by a
caseworker who undercut efforts toward reunification. 40 How is it
possible to reconcile the caseworker's conduct, which required her
dismissal from the case, with a finding that DCYF made
reasonable efforts to reunify? Only the time crunch mandated by
the ASFA provides any explanation: Kayla had spent two years in
uncertainty while her parents fought for her.4' That one year of
that time was wasted under the supervision of a contrarian
caseworker is no matter for concern under the ASFA, under which
quantity of time is considered more important than quality of
time.
The child welfare system places the best interests of the child
as its highest priority,42 but the best interests standard is
nebulous and at times intertwined with issues of parental fitness.
37. Pub. L. 105-89.
38. Id. at § 103.
39. See, e.g., R. I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1(b)(4), requiring DCYF to agree
to parents' petition for open adoption despite the department's stance adverse
to the parents in termination of parental rights proceedings.
40. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at 1204-05 n.4.
41. Id. at 1204-07.
42. See, e.g., R. I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(c)(1).
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Here, Dawn's and Irving's success even under the supervision of
the above mentioned caseworker calls into question not only the
court's ultimate finding of unfitness, but the very root of this case:
Kayla's removal at her birth, which was founded primarily on
Dawn's struggles with her older daughter Michelle. 43  One
parent's struggles with a previous child present only flimsy
ground on which to find that a second child's removal from both
parents is in her best interests-perhaps this removal was in
Kayla's best interests, but perhaps it was not. Where the best
interests of the child are not clear-cut, the question becomes
whether to err on the side of the state or the natural parents; this
case is a clear example of erring on the side of the state. The
legality and utility of this presumption of parental unfitness have
recently been called into question and are surely worthy of further
research. 44  Justice Robinson's pithy declaration that "John
Lennon was not entirely correct when he famously declared: 'Love
is all you need,' 45 may be correct, but the current system
underestimates the connection between children and their parents
and incorrectly seeks to interpose the state as a surrogate where
there is any question of fitness. The result here was, to use
Justice Robinson's own word, "tragic."46
The ADA has the potential, however, to alleviate for some
parents the problems inherent in the child welfare system.
Application of the ADA to this case would have at least raised
questions 'regarding Kayla's removal on grounds of Dawn's
cognitive limitations and DCYF's failure to provide adequate
services tailored to Dawn's and Irving's particular needs.
Furthermore, the court has previously held that the ADA applies
to the prison context.47 This holding seems to completely undercut
43. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at 1203-04.
44. See generally MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS (2005); Esme Noelle DeVault, Reasonable Efforts Not So Reasonable:
The Termination of Parental Rights of a Developmentally Disabled Mother, 10
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 763 (2005); Hilary Baldwin, Termination of
Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239
(2002); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the
Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L.REV. 1201 (1990).
45. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at n.10.
46. Id.
47. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)
("Petitioners contend that the phrase 'benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity,' creates an ambiguity, because state prisons do
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the court's argument here that a "termination-of-parental-rights
proceeding does not constitute the sort of service, program, or
activity that would be governed by the dictates of the ADA. ''48
Just as a prison provides "many recreational 'activities,'
medical 'services,' and educational and vocational 'programs,' all of
which at least theoretically 'benefit' the prisoners, '49 so does
involvement in the child welfare system provide such services as
parent education and sometimes even first month's rent
payments. 50 Just as the prison system generally exist for the
benefit of society, so does the child welfare system generally exists
for the benefit of children. Nevertheless, the ADA applies to
incidental benefits offered to prisoners, while Rhode Island would
deprive parents of that basic level of accommodation.
CONCLUSION
In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the hearing
justice is afforded considerable discretion in determining the
issues of reasonable efforts to reunify, parental fitness, and best
interests of the child, and in this case did not abuse such
discretion. 51 DCYF must approve a petition for open adoption
before the hearing justice may grant such a petition; the absence
of such approval here required the hearing justice to deny the
adoption petition. 52 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
does not apply to proceedings to terminate the parental rights of
cognitively limited parents.53
John Maxwell Greene
not provide prisoners with 'benefits' of 'programs, services, or activities' as
those terms are ordinarily understood. We disagree.").
48. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at 1208.
49. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
50. See, e.g., In re Nicole C., 760 A.2d 940, 942 (2000).
51. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at 1209-12.
52. Id. at 1211-12.
53. Id. at 1208.
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Insurance Law. Metropolitan Property and Casualty
Insurance Company v. Barry, 892 A.2d 915 (R.I. 2006). Under
Rhode Island General Laws § 27-7-2.1, the state of Rhode Island
(with limited exceptions) requires that the issuers of motor vehicle
insurance policies provide uninsured motorist coverage meeting or
exceeding a prescribed statutory minimum. In the context of
arbitration proceedings concerning underinsuredluninsured
motorist (UM) claims, prejudgment interest is to be calculated
from the date of the injury of the insured to the date of any partial
payment, at which point any such partial payment is to be
deducted from the total award and prejudgment interest is to
accrue on this reduced figure from the date of the partial payment
to the date that the judgment is satisfied. This formula,
mandated for use in all UM arbitration proceedings involving
prejudgment interest, is designed to harmonize into a uniform
rule, the means by which prejudgment interest is to be calculated,
effectuate the policy goals underlying Rhode Island General Laws
§ 9-21-10(a), and facilitate the ministerial computation of
prejudgment interest without judicial interference.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 8, 1998, the defendant, insured claimant, Collin
Barry, was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an
underinsured driver.1 The underinsured driver was covered under
a limited liability insurance policy issued by Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company. 2 On February 7, 2001, after consulting with
his insurer, plaintiff Metropolitan Property and Casualty
Insurance Company ("Metropolitan"), the defendant accepted a
settlement offer from Liberty Mutual for the underinsured driver's
$50,000 policy limit.3 When the defendant's remaining UM claim
was subsequently denied by Metropolitan on April 25, 2001, the
parties stipulated to arbitration for the determination of damages
1. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barry, 892 A.2d 915, 916 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 916-17.
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on the defendant's outstanding claim.4
The arbitration panel issued two separate awards: the first
award, for $49,125, reflected total damages less the payment
made by Liberty Mutual, 5 while the second award, for $8,351,
constituted the prejudgment interest on this modified award for
the period between April 25, 2001, (the agreed upon date that
Metropolitan denied the defendant's UM claim) and October 15,
2002 (the date the arbitration panel issued its award).6 When
Metropolitan sought confirmation of both awards in Rhode Island
Superior Court, the defendant filed a cross-petition seeking
modification of the prejudgment interest award on the ground that
the arbitration panel had incorrectly calculated the prejudgment
interest award. 7 The Superior Court confirmed both of the awards
and denied the defendant's cross-petition. 8  The defendant
appealed. 9  The case was brought before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court via the court's summary calendar where an order
was issued directing the case to proceed to full briefing and
argument.10
4. Id. at 917.
5. Id. The arbitration panel initially set total damages at $99,125. Id.
However, this award was downwardly adjusted to $49,123 to reflect the
$50,000 settlement payment made by Liberty Mutual. Id.
6. Id. The arbitration panel's prejudgment interest calculation utilized
the formula that the Supreme Court had previously mandated for use in all
UM arbitration cases following its decision in Geremia v. Allstate Insurance
Co. See 798 A.2d 939 (R.I. 2002). This formula, while paralleling the basic
computational structure of the calculation method that had previously been
adopted by the Court in Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305 (R.I. 1998), departed
from this model in one substantive respect. Rather than starting the interest
clock running at the time of the claimant's injury (as was the case in Trenn),
the Geremia formula required that prejudgment interest "accrue on the date
that the UM carrier [denied] the claim or [failed] to pay the same within a
reasonable period . . . until settlement [was] made or until a valid and final
award or judgment in favor of the claimant [was] satisfied." See Geremia, 798
A.2d at 941. Thus, application of the Geremia formula by the arbitration
panel, rather than the Trenn formula, naturally produced a quantitatively
different result.
7. Barry, 892 A.2d at 917.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barry, 857 A.2d 761 (R.I. 2004)
(mem).
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Due to the "Byzantine nature"11 of Rhode Island's past UM
claims jurisprudence and the meandering development of the case
law, 12 the issues presented in this case were numerous and
complex. 13 However, the basic issue to be determined, from a
practical standpoint, was relatively straightforward: "when and
how prejudgment interest should be added to an arbitration
award." 4 In seeking a solution that would "best [harmonize] the
policy goals of (1) promoting swift settlement and (2)
compensating the insured for any delay in benefits that the
insured, who purchased the UM policy, is legally entitled to
collect,"' 5 the court settled on a method of prejudgment interest
computation that it had previously adopted several years earlier
in Trenn, yet had curiously abandoned in subsequent decisions.
Taking these policy objectives into consideration, the court held
that:
[I]n all pending and future UM arbitration cases,
prejudgment interest shall accrue on the total damages
fixed by the arbitrator(s), computed from the date of the
injury to the date of any partial payment; at which point
the partial payment shall be deducted from the first
calculation and prejudgment interest shall accrue on the
reduced amount from the date of the partial payment to
the date that the judgment is satisfied. 16
Because the court's holding was incapable of being reconciled
with the prejudgment interest award the arbitration panel had
issued, 17 and the Superior Court had confirmed, 18 the judgment of
the Superior Court was vacated and an order was issued to have
prejudgment interest recalculated in accordance with the
11. See Barry, 892 A.2d at 918.
12. See generally Geremia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 798 A.2d 939 (R.I. 2002);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tavarez (Tavarez II), 797 A.2d 480 (R.I. 2002);
Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305 (R.I. 1998); Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Tanasio, 703 A.2d 1102 (R.I. 1997).
13. See Barry, 857 A.2d at 761-62.
14. Barry, 892 A.2d at 918.
15. See id. at 924.
16. Id.
17. See supra note 6.
18. Barry, 892 A.2d at 917.
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opinion. 19
Interest in Civil Actions as Governed by Rhode Island General Law
§ 9-21-10
Prejudgment interest in civil actions in Rhode Island is
governed by statute. 20 Rhode Island General Laws § 9-21-10
provides that:
In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a
decision made for pecuniary damages, there shall be
added by the clerk of the court to the amount of damages
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
thereon from the date the cause of action accrued, which
shall be included in the judgment therein.2 1
Prejudgment interest 'is not an element of damages but is
purely statutory, peremptorily added to the award by the clerk.' 2 2
Thus, rather than being a "function of the Superior Court to add
interest to an arbitration award,"'23 'arbitrators should add
prejudgment interest to their awards unless the parties
specifically provide otherwise by agreement.' 24  Because the
requirement that prejudgment interest be added to arbitration
awards is statutory in nature, the underlying issue for the court in
this case was not whether interest should be added at all, but
rather when prejudgment interest should begin to accrue in the
UM arbitration context.
In establishing the date of the injury as the initial starting
point, the court based its decision on its reading of Rhode Island
General Laws § 9-21-10 in conjunction with § 27-7-2.1. The court
first noted that § 27-7-2.1(a) "requires that a UM policy provide
'for the protection of persons insured under the policy who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
19. Id. at 926.
20. See R.I. GEN LAws § 9-21-10 (1956).
21. Id.
22. Barry, 892 A.2 at 919 (quoting Barbato v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,
794 A.2d 470, 471-72 (R.I. 2002)).
23. See id.
24. See id. (quoting Paola v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 461 A.2d
935, 937 (R.I. 1983)).
2007]
622 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:618
uninsured motor vehicles ... .,-'25 The court next pointed out that
in Rhode Island, "an injured plaintiff who recovers damages in
any civil action, is legally entitled to collect, both pecuniary
damages, and 'interest . . . from the date the cause of action
accrued[.]' ''26 Keying in on this language, the court reasoned that
because the defendant insured was legally entitled to collect under
the terms of his policy, 27 prejudgment interest should naturally
have begun "from the date the cause of action accrue[d], which...
[was] the date of the injury. '28 Because the Trenn formula best
modeled this approach, the court mandated its use for
prejudgment interest computation in all future UM arbitration
proceedings.29
The Trenn Formula: Uniformity, Fairness, and Administrability
In re-establishing the Trenn formula as the "new" standard by
which to compute prejudgment interest in UM arbitration cases,
the court based its decision on a number of policy considerations.
First, the court noted that the implementation of different
methods of computation in the past, had led to "inconsistent
results" in the "numerous UM arbitration cases that [had] come
before [the] Court .... -30 Thus, one of the principal rationales
behind the establishment of a singular standard was to "provide
fairness to all interested parties" through the enunciation of a
"mandatory, clear and uniform" rule.31 In addition to providing
for a uniform method of interest computation, the court also
concluded that the Trenn formula provided the "fairest and best
way to calculate prejudgment interest in UM arbitration claims. '32
25. See id. at 923 (quoting R.I. GEN LAWS § 27-2-2.1(a) (1956)).
26. See id. at 923-24 (quoting R.I. GEN LAws § 9-21-10(a) (1956)).
27. See id. at 923.
28. See id. at 924. The court noted that under Rhode Island law, a "cause
of action accrues on the first date an injured has a right to seek judicial
relief." Id. at n.5 (citing Cardi Corp. v. State, 561 A.2d 384, 387 (R.I. 1989)).
29. See id. at 924.
30. Id. at 918.
31. Id. at 922.
32. Id. at 925-26. In Merrill v. Trenn, the court considered, but
ultimately rejected, another more actuarially sophisticated method of
calculating prejudgment interest in favor of the approach it adopted. See 706
A.2d 1305, 1310-13 (R.I. 1998). In that case, the court noted that its formula
was "preferable to [this] commendable but perhaps more-difficult-to-
administer" method because it provided "a simpler and relatively more
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In arriving at this determination, the court pointed out that the
formula "[protected] the injured insured by encouraging early
settlement or providing for prejudgment interest in the event of
delay, while at the same time [recognized] the contractual rights
of the UM carrier. '33 Finally, the court articulated the need to
adopt a rule that would streamline the administration of
prejudgment interest in UM arbitration cases. The court noted
that because the inconsistent application of different interest
formulas in the past had "given rise to numerous appeals ' 34 and
"[had] become anything but simple and straightforward in the
arbitration context, ' 35 a uniform rule was necessary so as to
facilitate the court's "oft-cited holding that the award of
prejudgment interest is a ministerial act to be performed by the
clerk without judicial intervention. '36 In settling on the Trenn
formula as the means to calculate prejudgment interest, the court
concluded that it sufficiently met all three criteria: uniformity,
fairness, and administrability
COMMENTARY
This case represents the culmination of a rather circuitous
journey that began nearly a decade ago with the court's decision in
Trenn. The Trenn formula, adopted as the now uniform standard
for prejudgment interest computation in all UM arbitration
claims, does an effective job at facilitating the several policy
objectives laid out by the court. First, by providing a uniform
method of prejudgment interest calculation for all UM arbitration
claims, the formula contributes to the efficiency of the claims
settlement process while at the same time helping to avoid
protracted, costly and unnecessary litigation. Additionally, the
formula also strikes a balance by recognizing and enforcing the
legal obligations of both insurance carriers and policy holders. As
the court explained, "because ... a UM carrier is liable in contract
workable calculation while still meeting the policy goals of [Rhode Island's]
prejudgment-interest statute .... See id. at 1313.
33. Barry, 892 A.2 at 924. The court also expressed agreement with the
Rhode Island Trial Lawyers Association's amicus brief that the formula "best
approximated the compensation due an injured plaintiff had [an
underinsured tortfeasor] been adequately insured." See id. at 923
34. See id. at 919.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 918.
2007] 623
624 ROGER WILLIAMS UNJVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:618
to pay UM benefits pursuant to the terms of its contract, a
mandatory rule that the prejudgment interest clock starts at the
time of the incident, is fair to both sides. '37 Finally, the Trenn
formula spares arbitrators and courts from the perplexing and
unenviable task of applying different interest formulas depending
on the specific facts of a particular case. While a more nuanced
approach in this regard might have been preferential to insurance
carriers,38 the court nevertheless concluded that 'a simpler and
relatively more workable calculation"'39 was preferable so long as
it still met the policy goals of Rhode Island's prejudgment interest
statute. 40
CONCLUSION
The court's opinion in this case was issued largely in response
to the need for a uniform prejudgment interest formula that would
facilitate the policy objectives underlying Rhode Island General
Laws § 9-21-10 while at the same time lend itself to
straightforward judicial administration. This end was
accomplished through the re-adoption of a rule that takes into
account the attendant legal obligations of both insurance carriers
and policy holders in the UM arbitration context. By resolving the
issue of how prejudgment interest is to be calculated once and for
all, the court's opinion in this case will undoubtedly assist in
streamlining the process of UM claims settlement in Rhode
Island.
Micah J. Penn
37. See id. at 924.
38. See id. at 924-25.
39. See id. at 920 (quoting Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305, 1313 (R.I.
1998)).
40. See id. at 920, 925.
Property Law. East Bay Community Development
Corporation v. Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Barrington,
901 A.2d 1136 (R.I. 2006). The State Housing Appeals Board
(SHAB) will normally give deference to decisions rendered by a
municipal zoning board, given their superior knowledge of the
municipality's local requirements and needs. However, Rhode
Island's Low and Moderate Income Housing Act mandates that all
municipalities have a ten percent affordable housing quota. Thus,
zoning decisions of municipalities that do not meet the statutorily
proscribed quota will be held to a level of higher scrutiny by the
SHAB. If a municipal zoning board is unable to persuade SHAB
that its local requirements and needs are reasonable in light of the
State's need for affordable housing, its decisions will be reversed.
So long as the SHAB does not act in excess of its authority under
the Act, the Supreme Court is compelled to affirm such judgments.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
East Bay Community Development Corporation (East Bay), a
private non-profit organization, applied for a comprehensive
permit to develop low or moderate income housing in the Town of
Barrington, Rhode Island (Town).1 "Sweetbriar," the project's
proposed name, called for the development of 8.64 acres of land for
the construction of twenty-three duplexes which created forty-
seven units available for households earning at or below sixty
percent of the area's median income.2 In addition, three single
family homes would be constructed. One would be available for a
family earning at or below eighty percent of the area's median
income and the remaining two would be available for families
earning at or below 120 percent of the area's median income.
3 All
together "Sweetbriar" would include fifty housing units.
4
1. East Bay Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of
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The Zoning Board of Review for the Town of Barrington
(zoning board) unanimously denied East Bay's application because
the application did not conform to the Comprehensive Plan for the
Town of Barrington which called for the site to be used for
business or elderly housing.5 Furthermore, the application was
inconsistent with the Town's local needs including safety concerns
such as traffic, fire, and density.6  East Bay subsequently
appealed to the SHAB which vacated the decision of the zoning
board denying East Bay's permit. 7 The Town appealed to the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island which affirmed the decision of the
SHAB.8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
SHAB's Standard of Review
The SHAB must determine whether a municipal zoning
board's decision is 'reasonable and consistent with local needs."' 9
However, SHAB's "threshold inquiry" is whether or not the Town
has met the ten percent quota for low income housing mandated
by Rhode Island's Low and Moderate Income Housing Act (Act)., 0
The purpose of the Act, passed by the General Assembly in 1991,
was to address the 'acute shortage of affordable, accessible, safe,
and sanitary housing for . . . citizens of low and moderate
income. ' 11 Thus, a determination of whether a municipal zoning
board decision is 'consistent with local needs"' depends upon the
municipality's compliance with the statutorily mandated quota. 12
'[I]t is incumbent upon SHAB to examine the decision and the
[local requirement] on which it rests and determine whether the
[local requirement] is reasonable in light of the state's need for low
income housing."' 13 Furthermore, SHAB is authorized to apply "a
higher level of scrutiny" and give less deference to the decisions of
5. Id. at 1141-42.
6. Id. at 1142.
7. Id. at 1143.
8. Id. at 1163.
9. Id. at 1146 (quoting Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review v. Omni Dev.
Corp., 814 A.2d 889, 898 (R.I. 2003)).
10. Id.; see generally R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-53 (1956).
11. Id. at 1144 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWs § 45-53-2).
12. Id. at 1146-47 (quoting Omni Dev. Corp., 814 A.2d at 899).
13. Id. at 1147 (quoting Omni Dev. Corp., 814 A.2d at 899).
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municipalities that have failed to meet this quota.'4
Decision of SHAB
SHAB found that the Town of Barrington "had only 1.48%
affordable housing units of the town's total units ascertained in
the last decennial census."15 Similarly the town had no existing
strategy to meet the ten percent quota mandated by the Act.
16
Next, SHAB determined the Town's Comprehensive Plan, argued
in denial of East Bay's application, was indeed a local requirement
under the Act. 17 These findings were sufficient 'for SHAB to
assess the reasonableness of the obstacles to affordable housing
that the plan contains," given that the "[A]ct essentially delegates
to SHAB the authority to override unreasonable local
requirements, the overtly strict application of which frustrate the
development of affordable housing in municipalities that need it
most."18
The Town's Comprehensive Plan reserved the "Sweetbriar"
site for elderly housing and a business district to expand the
Town's economic base. 19  The SHAB found these arguments
unpersuasive when "measured against the town's failure to have
satisfied its statutory quota of affordable housing. '20 SHAB noted
that certain lots had been vacant for thirty years and that
highway access was 'extremely limited"' for the area to be used
effectively as a business district.2 1 In terms of the elderly housing
argument posed by the Town, SHAB "failed to uncover a rational
explanation for why the parcels were suitable for elderly housing.
but not affordable non-elderly housing. '22  Thus, SHAB
concluded "the local requirement was an unreasonable restraint
on affordable housing."23
SHAB next determined whether the zoning board's decision
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1152.
16. Id.






23. Id. at 1156.
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"was consistent with local needs. ' 24 The zoning board based their
denial of East Bay's application on four safety issues: traffic levels,
fire safety, the desire to maintain current density levels, and the
need for granite curbing.25 The final issue was not brought up in
appeal, but the former three were addressed by SHAB. 26 In
regards to the zoning board's concern with traffic levels, SHAB
found that the evidence presented by the Town was insufficient.
This evidence included the personal observations of municipal
council members and the comments of a single spectator. 27 In
regards to the zoning board's concern with fire safety, SHAB
found "fire risks could not be adequately addressed at the building
permit stage. ''28 Finally, the density argument posed by the Town
was rejected by SHAB because the contention lacked specificity.29
Supreme Court's Standard of Review
The Supreme Court will 'reverse a SHAB decision [only] if it
violates constitutional or statutory provisions, was made in excess
of statutory authority or upon error of law, or was otherwise
clearly erroneous in view of the evidence or was otherwise
arbitrary or capricious.' ' 30
Supreme Court's Decision
SHAB's finding that "the town, lacking fulfillment of its
statutory quota, unreasonably relied upon a local requirement
that frustrated the development of much-needed affordable
housing" was affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 31 The
court found SHAB "adequately evaluated the arguments
presented by the parties and sufficiently searched the voluminous
record for facts to support its conclusion" and was "satisfied that
SHAB did not make its determination in excess of statutory
24. Id. at 1157.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1157 n.20.
27. Id. at 1157-58.
28. Id. at 1161.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1151-52 (quoting Housing Opportunities Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of
Review of Johnston, 890 A.2d 445, 449 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Omni Dev. Corp.,
814 A.2d at 898)).
31. Id. at 1156.
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authority, nor was it clearly erroneous or otherwise arbitrary or
capricious. '3 2 Using this same standard of review, the court
likewise affirmed SHAB's conclusion "that the development would
not have a negative impact on traffic safety, did not exhibit fire
risks .. .was not excessively dense, and that the zoning board
unreasonably found otherwise. '3 3 The court noted, however, that
the zoning board is not prohibited by the Act to "impos[e]
conditions and requirements" upon East Bay's project provided
that they do not "make the building or operation of the housing
infeasible., 34
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court gives great deference to the
findings of SHAB noting that "the zoning board is constrained, as
are we, by the [Low and Moderate Income Housing Act]., 35 Given
that the Town of Barrington was gravely non-compliant with the
ten percent affordable housing quota mandated by the Act, the
SHAB was able to assess the local requirement and needs argued
by the zoning board with a "higher level of scrutiny. '36 In the
absence of a showing that SHAB acted in "excess of statutory
authority" or in a manner that was "arbitrary or capricious," the
court was compelled to affirm its judgment. 37
The Town of Barrington has only 1.48% affordable housing. 38
Furthermore, its arguments in denying East Bay's permit were
futile at best. The Town relied upon poorly conceived economic
and housing arguments, and based its traffic, fire, and density
concerns on evidence that was both incompetent and unreliable. 39
An often quoted remark in property controversies dealing with
racial or economic discrimination states, "clever men may conceal
their motivations. '40 The decisions of the zoning board surely
cannot be classified as "clever" given the nature of their
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1161.
34. Id. at 1162.
35. Id. at 1161.
36. Id. at 1147.
37. Id. at 1161.
38. Id. at 1152.
39. See generally id. at 1155, 1157-61.
40. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir.
1974).
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arguments in support of local requirement and needs, but their
"motivations" are clear. A municipality that seeks to maintain an
affluent population while excluding those with low to moderate
incomes from its boundaries should not be given such freedom.
Given Rhode Island's "'acute shortage of affordable, accessible,
safe, and sanitary housing for . . . citizens of low and moderate
income"' the court accurately concluded that the decision of the
SHAB, reversing the zoning board's denial of East Bay's
application, was within its authority under the Act.41 Likewise,
and although not explicitly mentioned in the opinion, the Court's
disposition is consistent with ideals of justice and equality.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held SHAB did not act in
excess of its statutory authority under the Low and Moderate
Income Housing Act in reversing the decision of the zoning board
denying East Bay's application.42 In doing so, it affirmed SHAB's
finding that Barrington's local requirements and needs were
unpersuasive in light of the Town's failure to meet the ten percent
affordable housing quota mandated by the Act.43
Monica Rose Fanesi
41. East Bay Cmty. Dev. Corp., 901 A.2d. at 1144.
42. Id. at 1156, 1161.
43. Id. at 1161.
Property Law/Constitutional Law/Debtor Creditor/
Mechanics' Lien Law. F.C.C., Inc. v. Reuter, et al., 867 A.2d 819
(R.I. 2005). The Mechanics' Lien Law, as amended through the
enactment of section 34-28-17.1 (the "Statute"), that provides
owners of real estate the opportunity for an immediate hearing on
the validity of a lien to be filed against the real estate, is
constitutional; it does not violate the owners' due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution. Further, the
retroactive provision of section 34-28-17.1, as provided for by the
Rhode Island General Assembly, permits the Rhode Island
Supreme Court to examine all pending mechanics' liens as of the
date of the enactment of section 34-28-17.1.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In October, 1998, Richard and Rhonda Reuter (the "Reuters"),
the owners of real estate located in Barrington, Rhode Island (the
"Property"), contracted with F.C.C., Inc. ("FCC") to construct a
single-family dwelling thereon. 1 A dispute arose between them
prior to the completion of the construction project on the
Property.2 The Reuters alleged that FCC failed to perform the
contract as agreed, and that the work actually completed was done
negligently, in an unworkmanlike manner, in violation of state
and local law and ordinances.3 As a result, the Reuters denied
FCC further access to the Property to continue the planned
construction. 4
On May 17, 1999, FCC filed in the land evidence records,
Barrington, Rhode Island, a "notice of intention" under the
Statute.5  Pursuant to those pertinent provisions under the
1. F.C.C., Inc. v. Reuter, et al., 867 A.2d 819, 820 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id. at 820.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-28-4 (1995)).
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Statute, FCC then filed with the Providence County Superior
Court a petition to enforce mechanics' lien on August 31, 19996
(the "Petition"), and two days later, recorded a notice of lis
pendens against the Property. 7
In response to the Petition, the Reuters moved for summary
judgment (the "Motion") and also counterclaimed, asserting,
among other things, breach of contract, unworkmanlike and
unlawful performance, negligence, slander of title, abuse of
process, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, deceptive
trade practices, intentional interference with contractual
relations, and breach of implied warranty of habitability.8 They
further alleged in the Motion that the Statute was
unconstitutional and the FCC failed to comply with the
mandatory directives thereunder, arguing that the lien was
invalid both as a matter of law and because of FCC's failure to
comply with the stringent statutory requirements of the Statute.9
Following the hearing, the Motion was granted before the
trial justice on September 23, 2003.10 The trial justice based his
decision upon his holding in another case seeking a determination
of the constitutionality of the Statute, 1 in which case he held the
Statute unconstitutional. 12
Prior to its 2003 amendment, the Statute did not provide for a
hearing either before or immediately after the perfection of the






11. Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, et al., No. Civ.A. PB 02-1019,
Civ.A. PB 02-2778, 2003 WL 21018168 (R.I. Super. April 23, 2003).
12. F.C.C., 867 A.2d at 820.
Issued just five months before the hearing [in F.C.C.], the Superior
Court decision in Gem Plumbing determined that the filing of a
mechanic's lien constitutes a significant deprivation of a property
interest. As the Superior Court decision states, "A mechanics' lien is
a claim created by law for the purpose of securing payment of the
price or value of work performed and materials furnished in
errectinig or repairing a building or other structure or in the making
of other improvements on land, and as such it attaches to the land as
well as the buildings erected thereon.
Id. at 821 (quoting Gem Plumbing, 2003 WL 21018168, at *3).
13. Id.
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removing the lien would be to provide a bond or deposit cash equal
to the amount claimed by the lienholder. 14 Based upon the
Statute at the time of the hearing on the Motion, the trail justice,
citing Gem Plumbing, determined that the Statute implicated a
significant property interest, and that it failed to provide the
necessary procedural due process safeguards required by the
Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Rhode
Island. 15
The Trial Justice entered an order on October 10, 2003,
granting the Motion based solely upon the unconstitutionality of
the Mechanics' Lien Statute. 16 FCC appealed.
HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
The court took notice that in July, 2003, the Rhode Island
legislature enacted section 34-28-17.1,17 providing an opportunity
for an immediate hearing before the Superior Court to show cause
why the lien is invalid. 18 Although the events giving rise to the
matter before the court took place in 1999, well before the
enactment of section 34-28-17.1, the amendment became effective
two months before the hearing which summary judgment was
granted. 19 Although the trial justice made no reference to the
newly amended law, its enactment is important, Justice Flaherty
concluded:
As we have just articulated in our Gem Plumbing opinion,
when the law changes while a case is pending appeal, we will
apply the law in effect at the time of the appeal, particularly when
the Legislature has indicated that the statutory provision is to
have retroactive effect .... 20
Having noted that the amendment to the Statute applied to
all pending mechanics' lien, Justice Flaherty deemed that for
14. Id. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-17 (1995).
15. F.C.C., 867 A.2d at 820.
16. Id. at 821-22.
17. R.I Pub. L 2003, ch. 299 § 1. Note: R.I. Pub. L. 2004, ch. 402 § 1
technically amended the 2003 enactment to provide the accurate title and
chapter.
18. F.C.C., 867 A.2d at 822.
19. Id.
20. Id. See generally Solas v. Emergency Hiring Counsel of R.I., 774 A.2d
826 (R.I. 2001); Dunbar v. Tammelleo, 673 A.2d 1063, 1067 (R.I. 1996);
O'Reilly v. Town of Gloucester, 621 A.2d 697, 704-05 (R.I. 1993).
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purposes of appeal, the constitutionality of the amended Statute,
specifically section 34-28-17.1 would be considered. 21
The court concluded that the Statute, as amended, did not
violate the constitution; it reversed the decision of the Superior
Court and remanded the matter for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the court's opinion. 22
COMMENTARY
Justice Flaherty affirmed the decision of the court earlier in
the day23  remedying what the court deemed a prior
unconstitutional deprivation of one's property rights by affirming
legislation which established the statutory right to a hearing by a
homeowner either before or immediately after the perfection of a
mechanic's lien against the homeowner's property. The decision
also upheld the retroactive provisions of the amendment to the
Statute to extend the due process procedural safeguards to any
lien in existence on the effective date of the amendment. But
technicalities aside, this case, along with Gem Plumbing, further
extends procedural due process safeguards traditionally reserved
to "fundamental" rights, including, but not limited to race, the
right to travel and to vote, among others, to the right to own
property.
The question arising from the court's decision will be the
court's determination of the extreme at which one's property
rights will be afforded the same procedural due process safeguards
provided for in the Statute. This decision, Gem Plumbing and a
recent holding from the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island (involving the constitutionality of the
Rhode Island Tax Sale statute)24 all provide for property rights to
enjoy expanded due process safeguards. What this case and the
others present to commercial, real estate and creditors' rights
practitioners is that they need to "dust off' their bar review notes
on procedural due process to ensure they may competently counsel
21. F.C.C., 867 A.2d at 822. ("Because we articulated a great length at
process by which we reached this conclusion in our Gem Plumbing decision,
we shall not repeat that reasoning here, but refer the reader to it for it's
applicability to the instant manner.")
22. Id. at 823.
23. See Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, et al., 867 A.2d 796 (R.I.
2005).
24. See In re Pontes, 310 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.R.I. 2004).
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their respective clients on the pratfalls facing the creation (and
perfection) of mechanics' liens consistent with the Statute.
CONCLUSION
In the second of two cases issued on February 22, 2005
concerning the constitutionality of the Mechanics' Lien Statute,
the court once again upheld that law's validity as it pertains to
constitutional due process procedural safeguards established for
the benefit of homeowners to deal with encroachments/liens
perfected (or pending perfection) against their properties. 25
William J. Delaney*
25. In response to the decision, the Presiding Justice of the Rhode Island
Superior Court issued Administrative Order No. 2005-18, which established a
hearing schedule for objections to Petitions to Enforce Mechanics' Liens. The
hearing would be scheduled for the first Friday following the fourteenth
calendar day from the date of the filing of the mechanics' lien.
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. A.B.,
University of Notre Dame, 1976; M.B.A., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
1979; J.D., Albany Law School of Union University, 1983; LL.M., American
Banking Law Studies, Morin Center for Banking and Financial Law, Boston
University School of Law, 1991. The author would like to acknowledge his
appreciation of Mary H. Hayes, a student in his 2005, spring semester
Bankruptcy Class, for the invitation, opportunity, and honor to participate in
this Survey of Rhode Island Law.
Property Law. Haydon v. Stamas, 900 A.2d 1104 (R.I. 2006).
A seller who gives a buyer the option to purchase his property
within a specified time, can by his words, acts, or conduct orally
waive the requirement of exercising the option within the
stipulated time.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This dispute revolves around the viability of an oral
modification to an option contract which purportedly extended the
time in which the defendant, Mr. Leon G. Stamas, could exercise
the option to purchase a tract of land in Warwick, Rhode Island
from the plaintiff owner, Ms. Barbara B. Haydon (seller).1 The
relationship between the parties began when Mr. Stamas first
expressed an interest in purchasing the property from Ms.
Haydon.2 Ms. Haydon arranged for a real estate agent to negotiate
a sales price with Mr. Stamas, and shortly thereafter Mr. Stamas
made an offer to buy the property for $179,000.3 Ms. Haydon
found the amount acceptable and on February 8, 2004, with the
assistance of the real estate agent, an agreement was prepared
and signed the following day.4 The February 9 agreement
provided in full:
The document confirms receipt of $2000. from Leon
Stama [sic], as a good faith deposit for purchase of Lot
#_242-, Plat # _235_currently owned by: Purchase
Price for Lot 242 $179,000. Barbara Haydon, of 81
Crestwood Road [ ] (property has had ground water
analysis by R.I. DEM, dated 4.10.00, copy attached.)[.]
Deposit is valid to hold property off the for sale market,
contingent on a 'purchase & sales' agreement signed by
both parties by Feb. 23, 2004. Deposit will be returned
and property will be put back on the [p]ublic market if
said 'purchase & sales' agreement is not executed by
1. Haydon v. Stamas, 900 A.2d 1104, 1106 (RI 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.




The contract was signed, and on February 17, 2004 Mr.
Stamas contacted seller and informed her that his lawyer,
Kathleen DiMuro, was currently vacationing out of state but
would return on Monday, February 23, 2004, the day the contract
required the completed purchase-and-sales agreement to be
received by the seller.6 When Ms. DiMuro arrived in town on the
morning of February 23, 2004 she telephoned the seller who was
unavailable, and she left a detailed message requesting a return
phone call. 7 Having yet received a return phone call, Ms. DiMuro
called Ms. Haydon again at 4 p.m. the same day.8 This time Ms.
Haydon answered and Ms. DiMuro informed her that she had
prepared the purchase-and-sales agreement, and she was going to
send it via overnight mail to Mr. Stamas that afternoon and would
forward it to seller's attorney, John Comery as soon as she
received it. 9 Seller informed Ms. DiMuro that her attorney would
examine the proposed agreement before it was signed and would
prepare the deed of sale. 10 Ms. DiMuro then asked whether she
could fax Mr. Comery a copy of the purchase-and-sales agreement,
and Ms. Haydon responded in the affirmative. 1
Shortly after speaking with seller, Ms. DiMuro faxed a copy of
the purchase-and-sales agreement to Mr. Comery and sent two
copies to Mr. Stamas by over-night mail. 12 Once Ms. DiMuro
received the signed copies, she forwarded the sign copies via
regular mail on February 25; however, they were not post-marked






11. Id. Ms. Haydon's deposition reads as follows:
' Q. * * * I think you said Ms. DiMuro said that she would prepare
the purchase and sales agreement; she would overnight it to Mr.
Stamas, who was in Florida, and would fax a copy of it to Mr.
Comery, is that correct?
That's correct.
Q. Okay. And what did you say to her?
A. 'Okay.'
Id.
12. Id. at 1107.
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until February 26, and seller's attorney did not receive them until
March 1, 2005.13 In the mean time, on February 27, while the
agreement was in the process of being delivered, Ms. Haydon
signed a purchase-and-sales agreement with another buyer,
Centerville Builders, for $200,000.14
Mr. Stamas then filed a notice of lis pendens in the records of
land evidence for the city of Warwick notifying prospective
purchasers of the February 9 agreement. 15 In response, on March
17, 2004, seller filed the instant action in superior court seeking:
"(1) a temporary restraining order preventing Mr. Stamas from
interfering in the sale of the property to a third party; (2) a
preliminary and permanent injunction to remove the cloud of[fl
title of plaintiffs property; and (3) damages costs, and attorney's
fees."' 6 Mr. Stamas answered and counterclaimed for specific
performance of Ms. Haydon's obligations under the February 9
agreement and for breach of contract for her failure to fulfill those
obligations. 17
On April 26, 2004, a justice entered an order denying Ms.
Haydon's request for a temporary restraining order.' 8 On October
14, 2004, at the hearing on the motions for preliminary and
permanent injunctions and on Mr. Stamas's counterclaims, the
parties agreed to have the trial justice decide the matter based on
the depositions and documents submitted, and they stipulated to
certain facts not at issue. 19
On December 1, 2004 the trial judge issued a written decision
striking the notice of lis pendens and rejecting the defendant's
counterclaims. 20 The trial justice determined that the February 9
agreement was an option contract, not an agreement for the
conveyance of land, and that time was of the essence.2 1 After
making this determination, the trial judge went on to determine
the primary issue: 'whether an oral extension of an option
13. Id. at 1107-08. The year 2004 was a leap year. Id. at n.2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Haydon, 900 A.2d at 1108.




21. Haydon, 900 A.2d at 1109.
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agreement to purchase real property is enforceable.' 22 The justice
found that Ms. Haydon did not expressly state that she would
extend the deadline, and even if she did, an oral extension of an
option deadline in a written option to purchase real estate was not
enforceable. 23 It found seller's response was an affirmative
response to review the proposed purchase-and-sales agreement
and not an affirmative response to extend the deadline.24 It also
found that 'because timeliness of an option contact is its ventral
component, the expiration date of an option cannot be modified
orally.' 25
Judgment was entered on December 29, 2004, striking the lis
pendens, denying Mr. Stamas' request for specific performance,
and ordering Mr. Stamas to remove the cloud on seller's title. 26
Mr. Stamas filed a notice of appeal on December 21, 2004 and this
appeal ensued. 27
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that it was
proper to review the case de novo because the interpretation of the
agreement is a question of law.28 The court determined there was
no ambiguity, and it was clear that in consideration of a
refundable $2,000, Mr. Stamas purchased an option to buy Ms.
Haydon's property, and the option had to be exercised by February
23, 2004.29 Ms. Haydon, the optionor, was not allowed to sell the
property to any person other than Mr. Stamas, the optionee,
during the option period, and Mr. Stamas retained the exclusive
power, although not an obligation, to purchase during the
specified period.3 0 However, Mr. Stamas was able to exercise his
power or option only after fulfilling the condition precedent which





26. Id. at 1109-10.
27. Id. at 1110 and n.3. Although the defendant filed a notice of appeal
several days before judgment was entered, it was nevertheless valid. Id. at
n.3.
28. Id. (citing Lajayi v. Fafiyebi, 860 A.2d 680, 686 (R.I. 2004)).
29. Id. at 1111.
30. Id.
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purchase-and-sales agreement to seller.31 Accordingly, the court
agreed that the February 9 agreement was an option contract and
not a contract for the sale of land.32 The judgment is affirmed to
the extent it denied defendant's request for specific performance. 33
However, the Supreme Court did not agree that the February
9 agreement fell within the strictures of the statute of frauds.34 To
come to this conclusion the court relied on precedent which
previously held that an option contemplating the purchase of land,
like a contract for the sale thereof, was enforceable if there was a
sufficient memorandum in writing.35 The court found that:
[A] note or memorandum satisfies the statute if it
provides the "[identity] of the seller and the buyer, their
respective intention to sell and to purchase, such a
description of the subject matter of sale as may be applied
to a particular piece of land, the purchase price, and the
terms of payments if the sale is not for cash. '36
Relying on this, it determined that Ms. Haydon wrote the
terms of the option contract, and held that because she chose to
leave out the purchase price, she could not now claim invalidity of
the contract because of the lack of such term. 37
The court agreed with the trial court's finding that time is
generally of the essence in option contracts;38 however, it held that
an expiration date could be modified orally.39 The court looked to a
1983 Rhode Island case which held that once an agreement
satisfied the statute of frauds, other elements may be supplied by




34. Id. The Rhode Island Statute of Frauds is governed by Rhode Island
General Law §9-1-4. R.I. GEN. LAws §9-1-4 (1956).
35. Haydon, 900 A.2d at 1111 (quoting Durepo v. May, 54 A.2d 15, 18
(R.I. 1947)).
36. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Vigneaux v. Carriere, 845 A.2d
304, 306 (R.I. 2004)).
37. Id. (citing Vigneaux, 845 A.2d at 307). "We refuse to allow plaintiff to
assail the viability of that agreement based on the absence of terms she and
Mr. Bard shoes, for whatever reason, chose not to include in the option
contract." Id.
38. Id. at 1111-12 (citing Moulson v. lannuccilli, 121 A.2d 662, 664 (R.I.
1956); Hicks v. Aylsworth, 13 R.I. 562, 566 (1882)).
39. Idat 1112.
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agreement which may be so essential to the heart of the
transaction that they cannot be modified orally.4 0 Based on the
fact that the plaintiff supplied no support for the supposition that
an explicit time requirement was so essential, the court concluded
that the expiration date was an element that could be modified
orally.41
To lend further support to its conclusion, the court cited cases
in other jurisdictions that held time is generally of the essence in
option contracts, but excused a delay in the exercise of an option if
the delay was attributable to the optionor's oral representations. 42
The court then found that option contracts should be treated
like contracts for the sale of real estate in which the expiry date,
or time is of the essence provision, is susceptible to waiver, either
expressly or impliedly.43 The court found no reason why timeliness
of an option contract is any less susceptible to waiver than the
performance date of a contract for the sale of land in which time is
of the essence.44 Applying its conclusion to the fact at hand, the
court held that the oral modification lengthened the time in which
Mr. Stamas could exercise his option to purchase Ms. Haydon's
property beyond February 23, 2004; however, it remanded the
case to the Superior Court for a factual determination of the
length of the extension, and whether Mr. Stamas exercised the
option within the extended period.45
The court noted that it would not disturb the findings of a
trial justice unless the findings are clearly erroneous or unless the
40. Id. (citing Berube v. Montgomery, 463 A.2d 158, 159-60 (R.I. 1983)).
41. Id.
42. Id. "Optionor's statement, disclosed to the optionee through a third
party, that a 'few more days would not make a difference,' excused optionee's
delay." Id. (citing Wilson v. Bidwell, 199 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1948)). "Disclosure to the optionee that the optionor was about to enter upon
the observance of sacred religious holiday that would extend beyond the
option term excused the optionee's delay." Id. (citing Unatin 7-Up Co. v.
Solomon, 39 A.2d 835, 836-47 (Pa. 1944)). "Notwithstanding that time is of
the essence, the optionor, by his words, acts or conduct may waive the
requirement of acceptance or exercise of the option within the time
stipulated." Id. (quoting Lusco v. Tavitian, 296 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Mo. 1956)).
43. Id. Waiver applies to contracts for the sale of land that have
otherwise satisfied the statute of frauds. Id. (citing Fracassa v. Doris, 814
A.2d 432, 437 (R.I. 2003)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1113.
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trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence, 46
however, the court found that the trial justice misconceived
material evidence.47
The court found that on February 23, 2004, Ms. Haydon
intended to extend the deadline when she said 'okay' to Ms.
DiMuro's statement that she would 'overnight' the purchase-and-
sales agreement to defendant, who, at the time was in Florida.48
In addition, during the conversation, Ms. Haydon informed Ms.
DiMuro that her attorney would review the proposed agreement
before it was signed, and she permitted Ms. DiMuro to transmit a
copy to her attorney for such a purpose.49
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment denying the
defendant's request for specific performance, vacated the
judgment striking the lis pendens, ordered the defendant to
execute all documents necessary to remove the cloud on seller's
title, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 50
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that notwithstanding
the fact that time is of the essence in an option contract, an
optionor, by his words, acts, or conduct may orally waive the
requirement of exercising the option within the stipulated time.51
The court relies on a Rhode Island case which held that although
a contract for the sale of land falls within the statute of frauds,
oral modification of the time for performance is permissible;
however, it notes that some elements "are so essential to the heart
of the transaction as to be not susceptible to modification by
parol. ' '52 Similarly, in the present case the court found that the
date of performance in an option contract was not such an
essential element, and therefore oral modification was
permissible. 53 Although, the holding could have been reached by







52. Id. at 1112. (quoting Berube, 463 A.2d 158, 159-60 (R.I. 1983)).
53. Id. In contrast to a contract for the sale of land, in which the statute
of frauds is satisfied even if there is no performance date in the contract, an
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relying solely on this case, the court goes on to point to other
jurisdictions which have "excused an optionee's delay in exercising
his or her option, if attributable to, inter alia, an optionor's oral
representations." 54
However, the cases relied upon contain facts that are
distinguishable from the case at hand. Each case involved option
contracts, but in each one the optionee, or the buyer of the
property, was ready and willing to perform by the expiration date
and made affirmative actions in an attempt to perform before the
expiration date, but due to the optionor's oral statements, the
optionees were either prevented from performing or were
encouraged not to perform in time. 55 The cases cited held that
equity does not allow an optionor to take advantage of the
optionee's failure to exercise the option within the stipulated time
when the optionor acted in a way duly calculated to cause the
optionee's delay in exercising his privilege. 56
The issue is each case cited was not whether there was an
oral modification of the expiration date, but was whether or not
the optionors, through their words or actions, caused the
optionees' delay in exercising the option.5 7 In the present case, the
fact that the buyer was not going to be able to perform in time was
not caused by Ms. Haydon saying "okay" when she was informed
of the fact that the agreement was going to be sent to Mr. Stamas.
option contract necessarily presumes the inclusion of a performance date. See
e.g., Berube, 463 A.2d at 159.
54. Id.
55. In the first case the optionee went to the optionor with the purpose of
accepting the option and completely the transaction but the optionor's agent
told him that the optionor had gone home to observe a religious holiday that
would extend past the expiration date and informed him to come back on a
date, which was beyond the expiration date, to settle the transaction. Unatin
7-Up Co. v. Solomon, 39 A.2d 835, 836 (Pa. 1944). In the second case the
optionee tried multiple times to exercise the option by paying the purchase
price but due to a mistaken belief that the option could not be exercised until
a future time, the optionor told him he could not exercise the option yet, and
eventually optionee failed to exercise the option in time. Lusco v. Tavitian,
296 S.W.2d 14, 19 (Mo. 1956).
56. Lusco, 296 S.W.2d at 17; Unatin 7-Up Co., 39 A.2d at 836 are cited as
support for the following proposition: "If an optionor who has been given the
right to purchase property within a specified time does any act, or fails to
perform any duty, so as to cause the optionee to delay in exercising the right,
the optionee may be excused from exercising the option within the stated
time." See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §80.
57. See Lusco, 296 S.W.2d at 17; Unatin 7-Up Co., 39 A.2d at 836.
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It was caused by the fact that the optionee was unable, given the
time restraints involved when sending items through the mail, to
fulfill the condition in time.58 Although the cases relied upon from
other jurisdictions are distinguishable, the same outcome could
have been reached by relying solely on Berube.59
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in an option
contract, an optionor, by his words, acts, or conduct may orally
waive the requirement of exercising the option within the
stipulated time even in a situation where the optionee is
technically unable to exercise the option within the specified
period.
Ashley Taylor
58. Mr. Stamas's attorney did not contact Ms. Haydon until the final day
the option could be exercised, and in order to exercise the option the condition
of completing the purchase-and-sales agreement was necessary, which at this
point was impossible because Mr. Stamas was in Florida. Haydon, 900 A.2d
at 1107.
59. 463 A2d 158 (R.I. 1983).
Property Law. Rhode Island Economic Development Corp.
v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006). Superior court orders
granting condemnation of real property pursuant to Rhode Island
General Law § 42-64-9 are immediately appealable to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. Additionally, § 42-64-9 is not facially
unconstitutional because it does not grant the Rhode Island
Economic Development Corporation unreviewable power to
determine the public purpose of takings executed in accordance
with the statute. Indeed, the judiciary has the power to review
whether takings pursuant to § 42-64-9 were for a public purpose.
Moreover, § 42-64-9 is not unconstitutional for failing to provide a
pre-deprivation hearing and notice to landowners before their
property is seized. Finally, a taking is not for a public purpose if it
is only to acquire property at a discounted price.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In December 1986, the Rhode Island Department of
Transportation ("RIDOT') entered into a concession and lease
agreement ("CIA") with Downing Airport Associates, L.P.
("Downing"), whereby Downing would build a parking garage
("Garage B") to service the Theodore Francis Green Airport in
return for the exclusive right to operate it and all other parking
facilities for twenty years. 1 The CLA provided RIDOT with an
option to purchase Garage B before the end of the twenty year
term, but in the event that RIDOT declined to exercise its option,
Downing was to convey Garage B to RIDOT for no consideration
after the CLA expired. 2 Several years after the agreement was
executed, the parties to the CIA changed: RIDOT transferred its
management authority of the airport to the Rhode Island Airport
Corporation ("RIAC"), and The Parking Company, L.P. ("TPC"),
purchased Downing's interest.3
1. R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 91-92 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id. at 92.
3. Id.
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As a result of rapid growth and prosperity in the late 1990's,
the parties formed new agreements to capitalize on the market. 4
One such agreement, the valet amendment, granted TPC the
exclusive right to use the first four levels of Garage B for valet
parking throughout the CLA's term.5 Unfortunately, the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 stunted the prosperous times. 6
Concerned with the decline in parking revenues and unused
parking spaces, RIAC sought to remove valet parking from Garage
B and turn it into a daily parking garage.7
When negotiations with TPC concerning RIAC's plan stalled,
RIAC asked its parent, the Rhode Island Economic Development
Corporation ("EDC"), to condemn the valet amendment. 8 The
EDC ultimately voted to condemn a "temporary easement" in
Garage B, giving EDC exclusive use of the garage for the rest of
the CLA.9
Pursuant to Rhode Island General Law § 42-64-9
("condemnation statute"), EDC filed an ex parte petition in
Superior Court to condemn the property. 10 The Superior Court
approved EDC's proposal for just compensation to TPC and
ordered the condemnation. 11 TPC, Fleet National Bank,12 and
Fleet Real Estate, Inc., subsequently received notice of the
condemnation. 13  The parties appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, claiming that both § 42-64-9 and EDC's taking
was unconstitutional. 14
4. Id.
5. Id. at 92-93.
6. Id. at 93.
7. Id.
8. Id. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64-9 (1998) grants EDC the authority to take
real property.
9. Parking Co., 892 A.2d at 93.
10. Id. at 94. Before its petition to the superior court, EDC made filings
in the Warwick land evidence records in accordance with § 42-64-9(d). Id.
The EDC filed its petition to superior court in 2004. Thus, approximately two
years were left under the CIA.
11. Id.
12. Fleet National Bank financed TPC's operation and held a mortgage
interest in Garage B. Id. at 92 n.4.




The EDC initially attempted to avoid any decision on the
merits by averring that the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case. It argued that a final judgment
on the issue of just compensation was not rendered by the
Superior Court. 15 The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected
EDC's contention and held that it had jurisdiction. 16 Overcoming
the jurisdictional hurdle, TPC attacked the constitutional muster
of the condemnation statute. First, TPC argued that the statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the Takings Clause 17 by
failing to provide a procedure to challenge EDC's public use
determination, 18 and it violated the separation of powers doctrine
by depriving courts of judicial review. 19 Second, TPC claimed that
the condemnation statute lacked due process by failing to provide
a pre-deprivation hearing on the public use issue.20 The court
disagreed with TPC and held that § 42-64-9 was constitutional. 2 1
On its final leg, TPC argued that the taking was not for a
public use. The court, in a thorough analysis, held that EDC's
taking was not for a public purpose, and thus violated the Takings
Clause.2 2
Jurisdiction
In cases involving eminent domain there are two potential
issues: "(1) whether a taking is for public use; and (2) whether just
compensation has been paid to the property owner."23 The court
agreed with EDC that "in the strict sense a final judgment of just
compensation has not been rendered in this case. '24 However, §
15. Id. at 95.
16. Id. at 95-96.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation"); R.I. CONST. art. 1, §16.
18. Parking Co., 892 A.2d at 100.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id. at 100-02.
22. Id. at 104-08.
23. Id. at 95.
24. Id. at 95; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-64-90) (1998) (giving the owner
of real property that has been condemned by EDC the right to petition to
superior court if the owner disagrees with the amount of compensation). TPC
had the statutory right to petition to the superior court to receive more
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42-64-9 does not mention any litigation concerning the public use
issue in conjunction with just compensation. Furthermore, while
it provides a post-condemnation proceeding to challenge the just
compensation issue, it does not for the public use requirement. 25
Additionally, EDC dispossessed TPC of Garage B without an
adequate remedy, and the condemnation order contained a
sufficient element of finality concerning the public use issue.26
Accordingly, the court found that the public use issue was
immediately appealable. 27
Whether § 42-64-9 unconstitutionally grants EDC the exclusive
right to determine the issue of public use
A statute is presumed to be constitutional and valid unless it
is contrary beyond a reasonable doubt to the express or implied
provisions of the state constitution. 28 The pertinent provision of
the condemnation statute provides:
If, for any of the purposes of this chapter, [EDC] shall
find it necessary to acquire any real property, whether for
immediate or future use, [EDC] may find and determine
that the property, whether a fee simple absolute or a
lesser interest, is required for the acquisition,
construction, or operation of a project, and upon that
determination, the property shall be deemed to be required
for public use until otherwise determined by [EDC] ... 29
The court found that the provision did not make EDC's public
use determination conclusive and unreviewable. 30 Indeed, "a
legislative declaration of public use is instructive, and entitled to
deference, but not conclusive. ''31  Therefore, when a property
owner challenges EDC's public use determination, courts have the
power to review it.32
compensation See id.
25. Parking Co., 892 A.2d at 95.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 100.
29. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws §4 2-64-9(a)) (emphasis in original).




Procedural Due Process Challenge to § 42-64-9
The court noted that "[t]he Due Process Clause does not
guarantee a property owner any particular form or method of
state procedure. . . . Rather, the procedural protections due a
landowner... are met if the condemnee is afforded an opportunity
to challenge the public use aspect of the taking. '33 In this case,
TPC had two options to obtain judicial review of the public use
determination. First, TPC could have - and in fact did - appealed
the Superior Court's condemnation order.34  Because the
condemnation proceeding was initiated ex parte, TPC may raise
objections on appeal that could have been raised in Superior
Court. 35 Second, TPC could have initiated a collateral action to
attain declaratory or injunctive relief from the condemnation. 36
Therefore, § 42-64-9 is not unconstitutional just because it does
not provide a pre-deprivation proceeding for the public use issue
because TPC's procedural due process rights were properly
afforded. 37
Public use
The determination of "what constitutes a public use is a
judicial question. '38  A taking that is exercised arbitrarily,
capriciously, or in bad faith violates the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Although courts are
to give deference to EDC's findings in condemnation actions
pursuant to § 42-64-9, such "findings are far from dispositive. 40
Public use issues are to be determined in light of the facts and




37. Id. The court distinguished procedural due process afforded to
creditors from a sovereign's power of eminent domain. Id. at 99. TPC
attempted to support its procedural due process argument with creditors'
rights cases, but the court noted that such cases were not material in
deciding this case. Id. at 99 n.13.
38. Id. at 103 (quoting Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254
A.2d 426, 434 (R.I. 1969)).
39. Id. at 103-04.
40. Id. at 104.
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circumstances of each. case, and the 'principal purpose and
objective in a given enactment [must be] public in nature"' and
'designed to protect the public health, safety and welfare."' 41 If
these conditions are met, the public use requirement is satisfied
even if the taking benefits some incidental private interests. 42
Much of the court's analysis of the public use issue revolved
around RIAC's option to purchase Garage B. Under the terms of
the CLA, RIAC reserved the right to purchase Garage B before the
CLA expired in accordance with an agreed upon fee schedule.4 3
Alternatively, RIAC could have waited until the CIA expired and
then have acquired the property for no consideration.44 However,
through EDC's condemnation proceeding, RIAC was able to gain
control over Garage B before the CLA expired at a price
considerably less than what it would have been required to pay
under the agreement. 45 The option to purchase required a price
adjustment, and because the parties were unsuccessful in
negotiating it, EDC cut corners and condemned Garage B.46
Moreover, EDC conveniently failed to inform the Superior Court of
the option to purchase the property.47
EDC unsuccessfully argued that the taking served the public
purpose of increased parking.4 8 However, the court noted that no
additional parking spaces were created.49  Instead, the valet
parking spaces were converted into daily parking, which EDC
initially told TPC would result in increased revenue.5 0
Furthermore, "there was no finding that [prior to the taking] there
was a shortage of parking spaces at RIAC's garages, or that the
motoring public was unable to park at the airport or was
inconvenienced in any way. '51 Accordingly, the court rejected
41. Id. at 104 (quoting In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 324 A.2d




45. Id. at 105. When EDC exercised its eminent domain power, the
purchase price under the CLA was $2,751,300. Id. However, the superior








EDC's contention "that the public interest was better served by a
loss of valet parking instead of self-parking."52
Moreover, the court determined that EDC's only goal in
taking the property was to increase revenue without having to
meet TPC's demands. 53  Indeed, during the condemnation
proceeding in Superior Court, EDC's counsel admitted that after
condemning Garage B, EDC would gladly negotiate a solution
with TPC. 54 The EDC's goal was merely to swing the bargaining
power in their favor.55 Thus, EDC's taking of Garage B was
deemed to be arbitrary, in bad faith, and not for a public
purpose. 56
Finally, the court discussed the alleged "temporary easement"
that EDC obtained through its eminent domain powers. The court
defined an easement as:
An interest in land owned by another person, consisting
in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or
below it, for a specific limited purpose (such as to cross it
for access to a public road). * * * Unlike a lease or license,
an easement may last forever, but it does not give the
holder the right to possess, take from, improve, or sell the
land.57
Contrary to the above definition, EDC's "temporary easement"
in Garage B effectively granted it complete control of the property
52. Id.
53. Id. at 106.
54. Id. When asked by the trial judge what would happen after the
garage is taken, EDC's counsel replied:
[We will] [a] sk [TPC] to vacate [the premises] so that the garage can
be reconfigured so that it could be used more extensively. Now, at
that point, if you will, the ball is in their court. We would love if they
negotiated with us at that point and all were resolved. We are happy
to negotiate with them.
Id. (emphasis in original).
55. Id.
56. Id. The court also distinguished EDC's actions from the facts of Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld New Haven's taking of private property in part
because it was pursuant to a comprehensive and thorough economic
development plan. Id.
57. Id. at 107 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 548 (8th ed. 2004))
(emphasis in original).
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by forcing TPC to vacate the premises.58 This further supported
the court's conclusion that EDC failed to take Garage B for a valid
public purpose.
COMMENTARY
In Parking Co., the Rhode Island Supreme Court acted as a
guardian to the rights of private landowners. It is clear that EDC
exceeded its eminent domain authority in obtaining Garage B for
its own interest of increased revenue. Unable to reach an
agreement with TPC, RIAC and EDC avoided the costs of further
negotiations and the purchase option - which would have cost
RIAC over two million dollars - by exercising EDC's eminent
domain power. This case demonstrates that although EDC has
substantial authority under § 42-64-9 in exercising its eminent
domain power, the Rhode Island judiciary will protect private
landowners from takings that violate the Constitution.
The Parking Co. court strictly adhered to precedent on the
question of whether the condemnation statute complies with
procedural protections under the Takings Clause. As already
discussed, § 42-64-9 does not grant property owners a right to a
deprivation hearing and notice before their property is taken by
EDC.59 The court reiterated its holding in Golden Gate Corp. v.
Sullivan,60 in which it held that "the right to a hearing before the
taking of private property by eminent domain is not a right
encompassed within the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment."'1 The court
further held that "[t]he necessity and expediency of taking private
property for public use is a legislative question, and a hearing
thereon is not essential to the due process guaranteed in the
58. Id. "Generally, an easement does not grant its holder the right to
exclusive possession of the servient estate or the right to deprive the owner of
his or her beneficial interest in the land that is subject to the easement." Id.
59. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-64-9
60. 314 A.2d 152 (R.I. 1974).
61. Id. at 154; see also Paiva v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 356
A.2d 203, 206 (R.I. 1976) (to claim a denial of due process, "one must show
that he had been illegally deprived of a 'legally protected right.' This court
has held that the right to a hearing attaches only to the deprivation of an
interest encompassed within the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and that the
right to a hearing prior to the taking of property by eminent domain is not
such a right").
SURVEY SECTION
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment. ''62 Therefore, landowners who lose
their property to EDC's eminent domain power cannot bring
constitutional claims for lack of due process just because they
were not afforded a hearing before their property was taken.
Rather, their constitutional rights to due process are violated if
they are not afforded any opportunity to challenge the taking.
Although § 42-64-9 does not specify any procedures in which
landowners could challenge the public purpose of a taking, the
court found that they are afforded their constitutional rights by
appeal or by instituting a collateral action.63
Although landowners can appeal the public use issue after
EDC condemns their property, the question remains whether a
takings victim can immediately appeal both issues of public use
and just compensation, or only the just compensation issue.
Because § 42-64-9(j) expressly permits property owners to petition
to the Superior Court to assert their rights to adequate
compensation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court may lack
jurisdiction before such petitions are implemented.
62. Golden Gate Corp., 314 A.2d at 154. This is the majority view. See
27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 417 (2006).
63. Parking Co., 892 A.2d at 102; See R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-64-9 (1998).
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CONCLUSION
The Parking Co. court held that the public use issue of
condemnation orders pursuant to § 42-64-9 is immediately
appealable to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The court also
held that the condemnation statute is constitutional on its face
because there is no right under the Fourteenth Amendment to a
pre-deprivation hearing to a state's eminent domain power, and
because the statute does not clash with the court's power of
judicial review. Moreover, the court concluded that EDC
unconstitutionally exercised its eminent domain authority by
failing to "meet the legitimate public purposes in the EDC Act"
and to satisfy the public use requirement under the Takings
Clause.64 Accordingly, TPC's ownership of Garage B and its
contractual rights under the CLA were restored.
Aaron L. Shapira
64. Parking Co., 892 A.2d at 108; see R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-64-2(1998)
(listing problems that the state wishes to correct, such as unemployment and
underemployment); see also R.I. GEN LAws § 42-64-5 (1998) (stating EDC's
purposes and goals).
Property Law. Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178 (R.I. 2006). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court resolved a matter of first impression
as to whether joint tenancy real estate purchased before a
marriage is part of tle marital estate and thereby subject to
equitable distribution. In determining that such assets are
included as marital property, the court received guidance froip the
common law property rules governing joint tenancy interests.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Rosemarie and Lance were married on July 26, 1997. 3 Their
short-lived marriage was filled with arguments, failed attempts at
counseling4 , and alleged physical and emotional abuse by the
plaintiff, Rosemarie. 5  Prior to the marriage Lance gave
Rosemarie several items of jewelry and a royalty interest in
Alliance, an oil well.6 A few months before the marriage, the
couple purchased a home and placed title in both of their names as
joint tenants.7
As a separate investment before the marriage, Lance obtained
interests in Lance Ruffel Oil & Gas Corporation and Rolling Rock,
LLC, the earnings of which served as the couple's primary source
of income throughout the marriage. 8  Although Lance had
increased Rosemarie's earning power by paying for her schooling,
she did not work outside of the home, though she did contribute to
the marriage in other non-economic ways.9 After a bifurcated
trial, the marital dissolution was settled on December 16, 2002,
and the financial dissolution was settled a year later on December
29, 2003.10 In determining the equitable distribution, the family
court awarded Rosemarie twenty percent and Lance eighty
1. Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 1188 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1182.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1190.
6. Id. at 1182.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1182-83.
9. Id. at 1183-84.
10. Id. at 1182.
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percent of the marital estate, which was valued at
$1,220,310.07.11 After granting Rosemarie her interest in
Alliance, jewelry, and fur coats, the magistrate determined that
she owed Lance $27,530 in cash for the amount in excess of her
allotted twenty percent. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Vacating the family court's holding, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the valuation of the
marital estate and the assets contained therein must be
reassessed upon remand. 13 In a divorce proceeding determining
the equitable-distribution of marital property, the judge must first
set the "terminal date" upon which the marital estate valuation is
based; second, the court must separate the marital property from
the non marital property; third, the court must evaluate the
equitable factors set forth in G.L.1956 § 15-5-16.1(a); and lastly
the court may distribute the marital property accordingly. 14 On
appeal Rosemarie challenges: the family court's rulings on the
proper terminal date, the assets included as part of the divisible
marital estate, the exclusion of certain evidence, and the court's
failure to award her alimony or council fees. 15
The first issue is the proper terminal date upon which the
value of the marital assets will be determined. 16 The general rule
is that a couple will legally remain husband and wife until the
entry of the final divorce decree. 17 The parties to a divorce may,
however, agree upon an alternative terminal date if said
agreement is either (a) in writing or (b) an oral statement made in
the presence of the court and reduced to a written record.' 8 Here,
the magistrate relied on the defendant's attorney's assertion of an
orally agreed upon terminal date, December 31, 2001.19 The
record presents no evidence of a written agreement and therefore,
11. Id. at 1184.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1193.
14. Id. at 1184.
15. Id. at 1182.
16. Id. at 1184.
17. Id. at 1185 (citing Vanni v. Vanni, 535 A.2d 1268, 1270 (R.I. 1998)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1185-86.
SURVEY SECTION
the court held that this oral terminal date agreement was void.20
Following Cardinale v. Cardinale, which also had a bifurcated
divorce proceeding, the court held that a divorce is not truly final
until both the dissolution of marriage and the equitable
distribution of the marital finances are complete. 21 As a result,
December 29, 2003, the date the magistrate issued the final order
of equitable-distribution, is the proper termination of marriage
date.22
As a matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court determined that joint tenant property purchased before the
marriage must be included as part of the marital estate.23 It is
well established that the family court is prohibited from including
in the divisible marital estate "property or an interest in property
held in the name of one of the parties if the property was held by
the party prior to marriage. '24 Here, the court received guidance
from the common law definition of joint tenancy, which clearly
defines such ownership as conferring an equal and undivided
interest in the property. 25  The court reasoned that such
undivided property does not fall within the statutory exception for
premarital property held in only one name. 26 The court's decision
to include the real estate as marital property is also supported by
the fact that the purchase was made shortly before the marriage,
both parties made improvements to the home during the
marriage, and the property was used as the marital home.27 In
affirming the family court holding on this matter, however, the
court noted that the magistrate may still allocate the 80/20
equitable-division of the estate differently upon a revaluation of
the marital assets. 28
Rosemarie also contested the inclusion of specific property as
part of the equitably divisible marital estate. The court held that
20. Id. at 1186.
21. Id. at 1186-87 (citing Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210 (R.I.
2006)).
22. Id. at 1187.
23. Id. at 1188.
24. Id. at 1187 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws §15-5-16.1(b) (1956) (emphasis
added)).
25. Id. at 1188; See Knibb v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 399 A.2d
1214, 1216 (R.I. 1979).
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jewelry given to Rosemarie before the marriage is pre-marital
property and thus exempt from the marital estate. 29  The
engagement ring, on the other hand, which was lost and
subsequently replaced during the marriage with insurance
proceeds, must be included because it was purchased with marital
funds.30 Next the court concluded that Rosemarie's interest in
Alliance oil is not part of the marital estate because it was given
to her as a pre-marital gift.31 Lastly, Rosemarie contested the
appreciation value of Lance's separately owned oil and gas
holdings, but the court determined that because the value of the
marital estate must be recalculated on remand, they need not
decide on this matter.32
Rosemarie asserted that the magistrate abused its discretion
by excluding certain evidence. The court held that because the
rebuttal evidence she wished to introduce did not relate to a new
matter raised by the defendant, its exclusion was properly within
the family court's discretion. 33  The magistrate also properly
excluded evidence of the couple's relationship problems that
existed before the marriage because such pre-marital issues are
irrelevant in determining the assignment of property.34 Next the
court refused to reassess the 80/20 split of the marital estate
because the value of which must already be recalculated on
remand.35 Finally, the court deferred to the family court on the
issues of alimony and awarding council fees, because both issues
must be determined after the distribution of the marital property
is decided on remand.36
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court decision marks the first
time the court has been called upon to decide how premarital joint
tenancy property is divided as a result of divorce. As a general
29. Id. at 1189.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1189-90.
33. Id. at 1191.
34. Id. at 1192.
35. Id. at 1193.
36. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
rule, family courts may exercise their discretion in dissolving a
marital estate under the principals of equitable distribution.3 7
The question here is whether the real estate falls under the
statutory exception, which prohibits the family court from dividing
property if both the ownership predates the marriage and the title
of such property is held in the name of one party.
In determining whether the property fell under this statutory
exemption, the court received guidance from the common law
"four unities" of joint tenancy which are: equal interests, acquired
by the same conveyance, at the same time, with the same
undivided possession. 38  The court first compared the plain
meaning of the of joint tenancy element, "undivided possession,"
against the statutory exception language, "property held in the
name of one of the parties." The logical deduction that follows is
that undivided property does not fall within the definition of
property held in one party name, and thus the exception does not
apply.
In addition, the court made clear that it is important to not
only look to the title of the property, but to also look to the
underlying substance of how the property is treated.39 As support
of the holding, the court recognized that the couple treated the
property as a marital home because they jointly made
improvements to the home and it was purchased only a few
months before their wedding.40
Like the majority of states, Rhode Island follows the equitable
distribution theory, which is designed to ensure that the parties to
the marriage receive what is fair and just based on the totality of
the circumstances in the event of divorce. Had the court
determined that the premarital joint tenancy property was
excluded from the marital estate, the couple could evenly split the
property in the event of a sale, the result of which aligns itself
more with the community property principals of equal division.
Not only is the court's holding supported in the plain meaning of
the statute and by the substantive treatment of its property, but
more importantly this holding aligns itself with the principals of
the equitable distribution theory.
37. Id. at 1187.
38. Id. at 1188.
39. Id. at 1187-88.
40. Id. at 1188.
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CONCLUSION
As a matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that even though real estate property is purchased
before a marriage, it shall be included as part of the marital estate
if the parties to the marriage place the title as joint tenants. The
court looked both to the substance of the real estate, that the
property was treated as the marital home, and to the elements of
the joint tenancy relationship, specifically the undivided equal
ownership.
Allison Conboy
Statutory Interpretation. Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc. and
Mendoza et al. v. Midland Hyundai, Inc., 893 A.2d 216 (R.I. 2006).
Two civil suits challenging a Department of Transportation
regulation which placed a twenty-dollar limit on all "title
preparation fees" charged by licensed motor vehicle dealers, were
held to be properly dismissed by the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island. Although the court recognized the "ineptitude exhibited by
the state agencies in this case," the clear language of Rhode Island
General Law § 42-35-3(b) and the rules of statutory construction,
dictate that the regulation had been enacted as an emergency
regulation, even though it was not explicitly stated as such, and
therefore expired by operation of law after 120 days.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1992, the Rhode Island Department of Transportation
("RIDOT") adopted a Department of Transportation ("DOT')
regulation, which included the following language:
'Preparation Fee' or 'Documentary Fee': a motor vehicle
dealer licensed by the Department may, in connection
with the sale of a motor vehicle, impose a fee for the
service of registering and titling said vehicle with the
Division of Motor Vehicles. Said fee shall be separately
itemized on the bill of sale and designed 'Title
Preparation Fee' and shall not exceed twenty dollars
($20.00).
A motor vehicle dealer who, in connection with the sale of
a motor vehicle imposes a 'Title Preparation Fee' shall
provide to the purchaser a written statement which fully
discloses the services to be rendered pursuant to the
payment of the 'Title Preparation Fee.' ...
On January 23, 1992, the RIDOT filed the DOT regulation
with the Secretary of the State.2 The cover letter attached to the
regulation and dated January 15, 1992 outlined the reasons for
1. Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc., 893 A.2d 216, 217 (R.I. 2006).
2. Id. at 218.
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the DOT regulation, stating that "'the Department of
Transportation finds that their [sic] is imminent peril to the
public, health, safety, and welfare in that it is the duty of the
Department to license, regulate and enforce all of the Sections of
Chapter 31-5, 31-5.1.' '3 Although, language evidencing that it was
an emergency regulation was not contained in the regulation
itself, the cover letter was written, "'[p]ursuant to Chapter 31-5,
31-5.1, 42-35-3(b) and 42-35-4(B)(2) of the Rhode Island General
Law.Y'4 The public was not notified nor given an opportunity to
comment on this regulation. 5 To be given the force of law, all
applicable regulations must be enacted pursuant to either the
formal adoption procedure or the emergency adoption procedure
outlined in the statute.6
The plaintiffs separately purchased motor vehicles from the
respective defendants and alleged that defendants charged them
various fees in contravention of the DOT regulation. 7  The
plaintiffs sought actual damages, attorneys' fees, litigation
expenses, declaratory and injunctive relief. Lastly, they moved to
certify a class of individuals who were charged any prohibited fees
while purchasing a vehicle from either of the defendants within
four years on the filing of the action. 8
The motion justice, after finding that the DOT regulation was
an emergency regulation that had expired 120 days after being
enacted, granted defendants' motion to dismiss.9 The plaintiffs
appealed that judgment.10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews the granting of
summary judgment de novo and applies the same standard that
the motion justice applies." The defendants had originally filed a
motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of
3. Id.
4. Id. (42-35-3 is the Emergency Regulation).
5. Id.
6. R.I. GEN. LAws, § 42-35-3 (1956).




11. Id. (citing DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. 875 A.2d 13, 20 (R.I.
2005)).
SURVEY SECTION
Civil Procedure, but the motion justice had properly treated it as
one for summary judgment based on the defendants' reliance on
evidence outside the pleadings. 12
Emergency Regulation
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that because the language
evidencing that it was an emergency regulation was not contained
in the regulation itself, that the trial justice committed reversible
error. 13 Part (a) of the General Laws § 42-35-3 sets out the
procedure for "the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule."1 4
This includes, at least thirty days notice, afford all interested
persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or
arguments, demonstrate the need for adoption, and ensure that
any proposed changes to other amendments be clearly marked. 15
Part (b) it the emergency procedure, which states "if an agency
finds that an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or
welfare requires adoption of a rule upon less than thirty (30) days
notice, and states in writing its reasons for that finding, it may
proceed without prior notice or hearing ... to adopt an emergency
rule," that rule "may be effective for a period of not longer than
one hundred twenty days. 16 A regulation has to be enacted either
through the procedure of part (a) or part (b).
In reviewing the cover letter and the regulation de novo, the
court found that the DOT regulation was clearly enacted as an
emergency regulation, based on three reasons. 17 First, the cover
letter and the regulation both states that the DOT regulation was
enacted pursuant to the statutes that created the emergency
regulation procedure.1 8 Second, the cover letter used the language
"imminent peril to the public health, safety, and welfare," which is
the same language as used in the emergency regulation § 42-35-
3(b). 19 Third, the cover letter made the finding of imminent peril,
that, the public would be without a forum to redress infractions
12. Rizzo, 893 A.2d at 219.
13. Id.
14. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-35-3 (1956).
15. See id.
16. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-35-3 (1956).
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and the industry would be unregulated.20
Expiration of an Emergency Regulation
When the motion justice found that the DOT regulation was
an emergency regulation, he then found that it expired after 120
days of its filing, and had been invalid for a long period of time
before the defendants allegedly charged the fee to the plaintiffs.21
On appeal the plaintiffs challenged this, that if the DOT
regulation was enacted as emergency regulation, then § 42-35-3(c)
prohibits defendants from challenging the enactment of the DOT
regulation two years from its effective date.22 The court then
began a statutory construction analysis, namely that .'.[w]hen the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce
the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their plan
and ordinary meaning.' ' 23 The rules of statutory construction are
applied only if the language is ambiguous and the statute will
never be construed to reach an absurd or unintended result.24
The court held that § 42-35-3(c) was not applicable based on a
literal reading because the defendants did not contest the validity
of the DOT regulation; they were in fact arguing that it was
enacted in precise accordance. 25 If the court was to follow the
plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute it would lead to an absurd
or unintended result, which the court has always refused to do. 26
A motion to dismiss based on a duly enacted regulations
expiration could not be construed to be a challenge on the "ground
of noncompliance" and therefore the two year window of
subsection (c) is not applicable. 27
20. Id.
21. Id. at 221.
22. Id. 42-35-3(c) limits the time frame in which one may challenge the
validity of a regulation of procedural grounds, which pertinent part states "no
contest of any rule on the ground of noncompliance with the procedural
requirements of this section may be commenced after two (2) years from its
effective date." Id.








The Rhode Island Supreme Court was justified in interpreting
the DOT regulation in the manner they did based on statutory
construction and the plain language of the statute; however, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Williams, a tone of unfairness permeates
throughout. "Justice" is defined as, "the administering of deserved
punishment or reward. '28 If "justice" had been administered here,
then the "disgraceful ineptitude of certain state administrative
agencies" should have felt some backlash, which aside from that
statement, they did not.29 However, because the statute at issue
was clear and unambiguous, the court could ultimately only reach
one conclusion, the one that they reached here, leaving many
suffering in its wake.
For example, a car dealership that believed the twenty dollar
limit on all "title preparation fees" was still in existence, would
have been adhering to that regulation since 1992. Another
dealership, who knew that the regulation was only in force for 120
days, may have been charged in excess of twenty dollars for each
title preparation fee, since 1992 as well. That difference, for each
car, sold each day, for over fourteen years, amounts to a huge
amount of revenue discrepancy. Neither dealership was wrong,
they were acting in good faith on what they believed to be the law,
but the end result is unfair.
Had the RIDOT or the Department of Administration followed
up and enacted he same regulation or a permanent regulation,
this all could have been avoided. Instead, the public suffered,
especially the plaintiffs here who brought the suit seeking justice,
not only for themselves, but for all the citizens of Rhode Island.
The wrong was not redressed here.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the DOT
regulation had been enacted as an emergency regulation, even
though it was not explicitly stated as such, therefore expiring by
operation of law after 120 days. 30 The court also held that the
dealers were not prohibited from challenging the regulation on
28. Dictionary.com, (2006), http://dictionary.reference.com/.
29. Rizzo, 893 A.2d at 222.
30. Id. at 216.
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ground that it had expired, even though regulation was not
challenged within two years of the effective date, and that a
challenge to a regulation on the ground that it is an expired
emergency regulation need not be made within the two year
window usually applied when challenging the validity of a
regulation on procedural grounds.31 Here, although expressing
sympathy towards the plaintiffs, the court held that the motion
justice properly dismissed their suit based on the expiration of the
duly enacted emergency regulation.
Christina Paradise
31. Id.
2006 PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2006 R.I. Pub. Law ch. 547. An Act Relating to Abused and
Neglected Children. Legislation establishing a statewide initiative
to reduce death and disability resulting from shaken baby
syndrome. The legislation directs the department of health,
department of children, youth and families, as well as other state
agencies including law enforcement, child advocacy organizations,
and human service providers to collaborate to establish a patient
education program, surveillance, data collection on the incidence
of shaken baby syndrome, and rules and regulations to implement
these programs. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-17.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 324. An Act Relating to Courts and
Civil Procedure - Courts. This legislation modifies the existing
domestic violence statute by expanding the definition of "domestic
abuse" to include acts against a minor child in the victim's
custody. The statute now also includes definitions for stalking,
cyberstalking, harassing, and course of conduct. Amends R.I. Gen.
Laws §40-11-2 and §15-15-1.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 382. An Act Relating to Criminal
Procedure - Search Warrants. In 2004, R.I. Public Law Ch. 441,
Sec. 2, and Ch. 493, Sec. 2 permitted a search warrant be issued
for the collection of various forms of DNA evidence. However, the
2004 legislation was only applicable to investigations initiated
subsequent to the passage of the law. The 2006 legislation
amended this portion of the 2004 Act by removing the limiting
language making the law applicable to all criminal investigations
and prosecutions.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 119 and ch. 331. An Act Relating
to Alcoholic Beverages - Regulation of Sales. The legislation
permits restaurant patrons to remove and transport the remains
of any bottle of wine the patron purchased in conjunction with a
full course meal. The Act requires the seller re-cork or seal the
bottle in such a way that it would be obvious if the seal was
removed or broken. Patrons are required to place the container in
the trunk or behind an upright seat in the vehicle and the seal
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must remain unbroken while in the vehicle. Creates R.I. Gen.
Laws §3-8-16.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 206 and ch. 207. An Act Relating
to Criminal Offenses - Children - Sexual Offender Registration
and Community Notification. Entitled "The Jessica Lunsford
Child Predator Act", this legislation provides a new possible
penalty for sex offenders - lifetime electronic monitoring. The Act
also imposes penalties on persons harboring offenders seeking to
avoid the electronic monitoring. Finally, this amendment requires
offenders to finance the mandatory sex offender treatment.
Amends R.I. Gen. Laws §11-37-8.2.1; §11-1-4; §11-37-8.2; §11-
37.1-6; §13-8-30; §13-8-32; Creates §13-8-34.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 164 and ch. 195. An Act Relating
to Domestic Relations - Adoption of Children. Under RI Gen Law
Section 15-7-17 of the General Laws adopted children retain the
right to inherit from or through his or her natural parents. This
legislation gives administrators, executors, and trustees immunity
from suit by adopted children for damages incurred as a result of
the lawful administration of the estate if done without knowledge
of the adopted child. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-17.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 578. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses - Law Practice. Prior to this legislation, any receipt of fee
for the services performed by an attorney at law was deemed the
"practice of law." This legislation added an exception that allows a
lawyer or law firm to agree to share a stautory or tribunal
approved fee award with a non-profit, tax-exempt organization
that referred the matter. The fee award or settlement must be
made in connection with a proceeding designed to advance the
purpose of the organization which makes it tax-exempt. The client
must also consent in writing to the division. Amends R.I. Gen.
Laws §§11-27-3, 11-27-6, 11-27-8 and 11-27-10.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 316 and ch. 189. An Act Relating
to Labor and Labor Relations - Rhode Island Parental and Family
Medical Leave Act - Insurance Benefits - Personal Income Tax.
This legislation adds domestic partners to three independent laws.
First, the "Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act"
is amended to include "domestic partners" as family members.
Second, COBRA Insurance Benefits are amended to include
"domestic partners" as dependents of an employee. Finally, any
amount taxable to a tax payer as a result of payment of insurance
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benefits for a domestic partner (or other dependent) can be
deducted from the taxpayer's federal gross income. Amends R.I.
Gen Laws §28-48-1.
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 423 and ch. 577. An Act Relating
to Courts and Civil Procedure - Causes of Action - Firefighter's
Immunity. Establishes additional immunity for firefighters and
other emergency personnel when rendering voluntary assistance.
Police, firefighters, and other rescuers are immune from civil
damages for any personal injuries resulting from his or her
rending emergency assistance . This legislation extends this
liability to protect these individuals from civil damages for any
property damage as well. The Act continues to apply only to
actions constituting ordinary negligence and does not extend to
acts or omissions constituting gross, willful, or wanton negligence.
